From Anders Breivik in Norway, who murdered scores of young people in a bombing and mass-shooting attack, to Omar Mateen, the Orlando killer who perpetrated the worst mass shooting in American history, lone wolves have demonstrated that they can be as dangerous as organized terrorist groups. Who are these terrorists and what can be done about them? An internationally renowned terrorism expert presents the first comprehensive treatment of this important issue. After delving into the diversity in motivations and backgrounds of lone wolf terrorists, Simon makes the following key points about this growing threat: lone wolves have proven to be more creative and dangerous than many terrorist groups; lone wolves are not just Islamist extremists but can be found among all types of political and religious ideologies; the Internet has provided the perfect breeding ground for isolated individuals with terrorist tendencies, but it may also prove to be their undoing; there are few women in this category, but this is likely to change in the coming years; and the common perception that nothing can be done about lone wolves is wrong. In fact, innovative strategies and policies can be developed to both prevent and respond to this type of terrorism. Drawing on his more than twenty-five years of experience studying terrorism, Simon has produced an insightful book that is essential reading for anyone concerned about the potential terrorist threats from violence-prone individuals in our midst.This paperback edition contains a new preface by the author, which reviews lone-wolf incidents since the publication of the original edition.

This book is unlike other RAND publications. While it is based in part on objective research, particularly as it applies to knowing the enemy, it also includes the personal reflections of someone who has thought about terrorism for decades. I initiated RAND's research on terrorism in 1972 with a simple memorandum that observed that this phenomenon was likely to spread and increase and could create serious problems for the United States and its allies; therefore, I proposed, we should take a serious look at it...This book differs from other RAND publications in yet another respect. The reader will find strong personal opinions on these pages. There is much concerning the conduct of the war on terror that I agree with: the muscular initial response to 9/11, the removal of the Taliban government, the relentless pursuit of al Qaeda's leaders and planners, the increasingly sophisticated approach to homeland security, and, although I have deep reservations about the invasion of Iraq, President Bush's determination to avoid an arbitrary timetable for withdrawal. The list of things with which I do not agree is longer: the needless bravado, the arrogant attitude toward needed allies, the exploitation of fear, the exaggerated claims of progress, the serial bending of history and fact, the persistence of a wanted-poster approach while the broader ideological struggle is ignored, the rush to invade Iraq, the failure to deploy sufficient troops there despite the advice of senior military leaders and the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, the cavalier dismissal of treaties governing the conduct of war, the mistreatment of prisoners, the unimaginable public defense of torture, the use of homeland security funding for political pork barrel spending, and the failure to educate and involve citizens. This book is not intended to serve any political agenda. Its sole objective is to reckon how America can defeat its terrorist foes while preserving its own liberty. Throughout the Cold War, Americans maintained a rough consensus on defense matters, despite substantive disagreements. Unity did not require the suspension of honest differences or of civilized political debate. But today's fierce partisanship has reduced national politics to a gang war. The constant maneuvering for narrow political advantage, the rejection of criticism as disloyalty, the pursuit by interest groups of their own exclusive agendas, and the radio, television, newspaper, and Internet debates that thrive on provocation and partisan zeal provide a poor platform for the difficult and sustained effort that America faces. All of these trends imperil the sense of community required to withstand the struggle ahead. We don't need unanimity. We do need unity. Democracy is our strength. Partisanship is our weakness...Excerpt from "Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves". As the United States battles a fierce insurgency in Iraq, pursues a tenacious Taliban movement in Afghanistan, and wages a global campaign to dismantle the jihadist terrorist enterprise responsible for 9/11, many Americans are asking, "Where are we in this global struggle? Who are we fighting? What are we fighting against? What are we fighting for?" On the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Brian Michael Jenkins presents a clear-sighted and sober analysis of where we are today in the struggle against terrorism. An internationally renowned authority on terrorism, Jenkins distills the jihadists' operational code and suggests how they might assess their situation very differently than how we might do so. He outlines a ferociously pragmatic but principled approach that goes beyond attacking terrorist networks and operational capabilities to defeating their entire missionary enterprise by deterring their recruitment, encouraging defections, and converting those in captivity. Jenkins believes that homeland security should move beyond gates and guards and become the impetus for rebuilding America's decaying infrastructure. He advises Americans to adopt a realistic approach to risk and get a lot smarter about security. America needs to build upon its traditions of determination and self-reliance and, above all, preserve its commitment to American values of democracy, civil freedom, and individual liberties. Preserving these values is no mere matter of morality, he argues; it is a strategic imperative. How we deal with the terrorist threat is one of the major challenges of this century. Jenkins points the way forward.

Since 9/11, homegrown terrorists have planned or implemented terrorist activities, supported others terrorist activities, or become radicalized in the United States and traveled abroad to conduct activities against other countries or the United States. This paper examines the cases of homegrown terrorism, highlights lessons learned from those cases that suggest future actions, and includes a chronology of terrorist events in the United States.

"This book provides an array of answers to the question, In the ten years since the 9/11 attacks, how has America responded? In a series of essays, RAND authors lend a farsighted perspective to the national dialogue on 9/11's legacy; assess the military, political, fiscal, social, cultural, psychological, and moral implications of U.S. policymaking since 9/11; and, suggest options for effectively dealing with the terrorist threat in the future. In a series of essays, this book addresses the question of how America has responded in the ten years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks and suggests options for more effectively dealing with the terrorist threat in the future. The attacks on 9/11 set in motion a great array of changes in America. These essays capture this upheaval, but better still they do something RAND is so well positioned to do: They provide expert assessments of where our responses are strong, where they have fallen short, and how we need to change yet more". (Honorable Richard J. Danzig, former U.S. Secretary of the Navy and chairman of the Center for a New American Security). "This book helpfully outlines the central reality that America is engaged in what has already been, and promises to continue being, a long war. It emphasizes that despite the killing of Osama Bin Laden and the advent of the, OEArab Spring America will continue to need an effective counterterrorist strategy. The papers also provide a good outline of the progress America has made in a number of vital areas, particularly intelligence and military capabilities, in the past decade". (Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, chairman of the National Commission on Terrorism and head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq in 2003 and 2004). "This book will make a significant contribution to our understanding of the past ten years and inform decisions about where we should go from here. It's a much-needed call to mark this anniversary by reassessing those things we now accept as common wisdom. The perspectives and insights in these essays are inadequately reflected in the current discussion and debate". (Suzanne E. Spaulding, executive director of both the National Commission on Terrorism and the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction).