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How do you grasp the contents of your mind - your desires, your fears, your sensations, your beliefs? We typically think that we are better able to discern our own mental states than others are. But is this correct? And if it is, what explains your special or 'privileged' access to your own states? Privileged Access is a comprehensive anthology of new and seminal essays, by leading philosophers, about the nature of self-knowledge. Most of the essays are new, including specially commissioned contributions from such prominent thinkers as BermAdez, Dretske, Lycan, Sosa and others, but the anthology also includes reprints of classic articles by Boghossian, Shoemaker, Wright and others. The volume provides for an in-depth understanding of contemporary answers to key philosophical questions which have strongly influenced developments in epistemology, ontology, and the philosophy of mind since Descartes. Featuring an introductory chapter outlining the main currents of thought about self-knowledge, this comprehensive collection of cutting-edge philosophical work will prove an invaluable resource for students and researchers alike.
How do you know your own thoughts and feelings? Do we have 'privileged access' to our own minds? Does introspection provide a grasp of a thinking self or 'I'? The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology. In this outstanding introduction Brie Gertler assesses the leading theoretical approaches to self-knowledge, explaining the work of many of the key figures in the field: from Descartes and Kant, through to Bertrand Russell and Gareth Evans, as well as recent work by Tyler Burge, David Chalmers, William Lycan and Sydney Shoemaker. Beginning with an outline of the distinction between self-knowledge and self-awareness and providing essential historical background to the problem, Gertler addresses specific theories of self-knowledge such as the acquaintance theory, the inner sense theory, and the rationalist theory, as well as leading accounts of self-awareness. The book concludes with a critical explication of the dispute between empiricist and rationalist approaches. Including helpful chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary, Self Knowledge is essential reading for those interested in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and personal identity.
Arguing About the Mind is an accessible, engaging introduction to the core questions in the philosophy of mind. This collection offers a selection of thought-provoking articles that examine a broad range of issues from the mind and body relation to animal and artificial intelligence. Topics addressed include:
The editors provide lucid introductions to each section, give an overview of the debate and outline the arguments of the papers. An original and stimulating reader, Arguing About the Mind is ideal for students new to the philosophy of mind.
How do you grasp the contents of your mind - your desires, your fears, your sensations, your beliefs? We typically think that we are better able to discern our own mental states than others are. But is this correct? And if it is, what explains your special or 'privileged' access to your own states? Privileged Access is a comprehensive anthology of new and seminal essays, by leading philosophers, about the nature of self-knowledge. Most of the essays are new, including specially commissioned contributions from such prominent thinkers as BermAdez, Dretske, Lycan, Sosa and others, but the anthology also includes reprints of classic articles by Boghossian, Shoemaker, Wright and others. The volume provides for an in-depth understanding of contemporary answers to key philosophical questions which have strongly influenced developments in epistemology, ontology, and the philosophy of mind since Descartes. Featuring an introductory chapter outlining the main currents of thought about self-knowledge, this comprehensive collection of cutting-edge philosophical work will prove an invaluable resource for students and researchers alike.
How do you know your own thoughts and feelings? Do we have 'privileged access' to our own minds? Does introspection provide a grasp of a thinking self or 'I'? The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology. In this outstanding introduction Brie Gertler assesses the leading theoretical approaches to self-knowledge, explaining the work of many of the key figures in the field: from Descartes and Kant, through to Bertrand Russell and Gareth Evans, as well as recent work by Tyler Burge, David Chalmers, William Lycan and Sydney Shoemaker. Beginning with an outline of the distinction between self-knowledge and self-awareness and providing essential historical background to the problem, Gertler addresses specific theories of self-knowledge such as the acquaintance theory, the inner sense theory, and the rationalist theory, as well as leading accounts of self-awareness. The book concludes with a critical explication of the dispute between empiricist and rationalist approaches. Including helpful chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary, Self Knowledge is essential reading for those interested in philosophy of mind, epistemology, and personal identity.
Arguing About the Mind is an accessible, engaging introduction to the core questions in the philosophy of mind. This collection offers a selection of thought-provoking articles that examine a broad range of issues from the mind and body relation to animal and artificial intelligence. Topics addressed include:
The editors provide lucid introductions to each section, give an overview of the debate and outline the arguments of the papers. An original and stimulating reader, Arguing About the Mind is ideal for students new to the philosophy of mind.
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