British Somaliland provides a history of the administration of the British Somaliland Protectorate from the time when Somaliland first became governable, following the defeat of Abdullah Hassan, to independence. Describing the interplay between general imperial policies, and greater realities and developments in Somaliland, the focus of the book remains on the mechanism by which the Protectorate was operated. The regime that developed was, in the end, a highly autocratic despotism, generally benign but occasionally predatory. Independence, when it arrived, was, in retrospect, a tragedy. Somaliland was absorbed into Somalia and a governmental style which suited the conditions of the Protectorate was dissolved into something very different. Since the collapse of Somalia, re-emergent Somaliland appears to be attempting to re-connect to a past remembered as something of a golden age. Highly topical, as Somaliland is re-emerging, this book is an invaluable resource for students and scholars of African History, Imperial History and British History.

The author argues that the way the British Government managed dissent during World War I is important for understanding the way that the war ended. He argues that, from humble beginings in 1914, a comprehensive and effective system of suppression had been developed by the war's end in 1918, with a still greater level of suppression prepared but not implemented. The general characteristics of the system of dissent manage ment were that it was incremental, growing in proportion to the degree of apprehended threat to the war effort; it never became more repressive than a working consensus of the population was prepared to tolerate; and it was calculated to be effective against the particular nature of British anti-war dissent.

The author argues that the way the British Government managed dissent during World War I is important for understanding the way that the war ended. He argues that, from humble beginings in 1914, a comprehensive and effective system of suppression had been developed by the war's end in 1918, with a still greater level of suppression prepared but not implemented. The general characteristics of the system of dissent manage ment were that it was incremental, growing in proportion to the degree of apprehended threat to the war effort; it never became more repressive than a working consensus of the population was prepared to tolerate; and it was calculated to be effective against the particular nature of British anti-war dissent.

This analysis of Britains war policy during the last years of the Great War argues that it was strongly affected by a mood of pessimism. The policy was revised after the defeats suffered by the allies in 1917, so much so that Britain almost "tumbled into peace" the following year.

This analysis of British war policy considers alterations to the grand strategy during the last years of World War I. The argument is that war policy in this period was strongly affected by pessimism, even defeatism. In the aftermath of the defeats and disappointments of 1917, many could understand how the war could be lost, less how victory could be achieved. By the end of 1917, war policy had been revised so that it aimed less to win the war outright than to bring Germany to the conference table in a less exultant mood, whilst laying the bases for a peripheral war, essentially victorious on the continent, either in the last stages of World War I or during the ancicipated World War II. The major feature of this revised policy was that the focus of the war was to be shifted to the Eastern stage. It was hoped that Britain would be able to gain victories here to off-set Germany's conquests in Europe, and the jump-off points for periperal war. It was not believed that peace could be achieved before 1919. When, therefore, Britain tumbled into peace in 1918, policies had been undertaken in the East which were to have profound consequences.