Lo Jung-pang, a renowned professor at the University of California, Davis, completed a 600-page typed manuscript entitled China as a Sea Power, 1127-1368 in 1957, but he died without arranging for the book to be published. Bruce Elleman, who found the manuscript in the UC Davis archives in 2004, has digitized the manuscript and edited it for length and accuracy. Lo Jung-pang argued that during each of the three occasions when imperial China embarked on maritime enterprises (the Qin and Han dynasties, the Sui and Tang dynasties, and Song, Yuan, and early Ming dynasties), the beginning was made by coastal states when China was divided, the height was reached when China was strong and unified, and the decline took place when China weakened, the people became absorbed by internal affairs, and the policy of the state became directed to the north and the west. These cycles of maritime interest, lasting roughly five hundred years, corresponded with cycles of cohesion and division, strength and weakness, prosperity and impoverishment, expansion and contraction. Today a strong and outward looking China is again building up its navy and seeking maritime dominance, with important implications for trade, diplomacy and naval affairs. Events will not necessarily follow the same course as in the past, but Lo Jung-pang's book suggests questions that can be raised for study as events unfold in the years and decades to come.

Excerpt from the introduction: "In the late nineteenth century, the French Jeune Ecole, or "new school," of naval thinking promoted a commerce-raiding strategy for the weaker naval power to defeat the dominant naval power. France provided the vocabulary for the discussion-Jeune Ecole and guerre de course (war of the chase)-and embodied the geopolitical predicament addressed: France had been a dominant land power, known for its large and proficient army and resentful of British imperial dominance and commercial preeminence. But its navy had rarely matched the Royal Navy in either quantity or quality, and its economy could not support both a preeminent army and navy. So its naval thinkers thought of an economical way out of its predicament. They argued that a guerre de course allowed weaker maritime power, such as France, to impose disproportionate costs on the stronger sea power in order to achieve its objectives. Sadly for France, the strategy did not work as anticipated, and British naval dominance and imperial primacy endured. The case studies in this book reveal why this was so, and they shed light on the dynamic of rivalries between maritime and continental powers. This issue is an important one in that from the heyday of the British Empire to the present, maritime powers have set the global order, and continental powers have contested it. So the dynamic is still with us, and it is of vital national import to all countries that benefit from the present international order of freedom of navigation, free trade, and the rule of international law."

This book examines the origins of the US Navy’s 2007 Maritime Strategy, the formation of the US government’s “Pivot to Asia� strategy, and the most recent revisions to this strategy that focus more specifically on China. Besides examining the details of this strategy formulation, the book explores the internal and external repercussions on the US Navy of the Pivot to Asia. It discusses the “Fat Leonard� scandal, which involved bribery and corruption in contracts for the maintenance of the US fleets in the region, and considers the sharp decrease in training and readiness of the Pacific fleet to support the pivot, which in turn led to serious maritime collisions. It also assesses the impact of the pivot on other countries in the region, engaging in the debate as to whether the pivot was necessary in order to convince the countries of the region that the United States had not lost its staying power, or whether the pivot managed to make tensions in the Asia-Pacific worse even while allowing the strategic situation in the Middle East and Europe to worsen as a result of neglect.

In Taiwan Straits: Crisis in Asia and the Role of the U.S. Navy, historian Bruce Elleman surveys the situation that has led to the current tensions between China and Taiwan. Starting in 1949, the final phase of the civil war in China, which ended with Communist rule of the mainland and nationalist control of Taiwan, this work explores how the 100-mile wide passage of water, known as the Taiwan Strait has served as the geographic flashpoint between the two nations. Even though U.S. Navy destroyers have patrolled this body of water from 1950 to 1979, it has seen four crises-1954-55, 1958, 1962, and, after the withdrawal of the U.S. Navy, 1995-96-that threatened to push Taiwan and China to the brink of war. Notwithstanding the role of the United States in defusing cross-strait tensions for some three decades and the cold peace that has settled in since then, the Taiwan Strait continues to be a major source of anxiety for the region and the world. Taiwan Straits: Crisis in Asia and the Role of the U.S. Navy traces the evolution of this tension between the two nations, details the history of the crises between them, and brings this story forward into the present by considering continuing sources of conflict, present diplomatic efforts by the aggrieved nations, and other key interests-from the United States and Europe to other regional powers-and future possible outcomes in the ongoing struggle between China and Taiwan relations. Simply written and cogently argued, it is the ideal source for military personnel, diplomats, and scholars and student of the modern Far East.

This book provides a comprehensive history of the modern Chinese navy from 1840 to the present. Beginning with a survey of naval developments in earlier imperial times, the book goes on to show how China has since the mid-19th century four times built or rebuilt its navy: after the Opium Wars, a navy which was sunk or captured by the Japanese in the war of 1894-1895; during the 1920s and 1930s, a navy again sunk or lost to Japan, in the war of 1937-1945; in the 1950s, a navy built with Soviet help, which stagnated following the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s; and finally the present navy which absorbed its predecessor, but with the most modern sections dating from the 1990s-a navy which continues to grow and prosper. The book also shows how the underlying strategic imperative for the Chinese navy has been the defense of China's coasts and major rivers; how naval mutiny was a key factor in the overthrow of the Qing and the Nationalist regimes; and how successive Chinese governments, aware of the potent threat of naval mutiny, have restricted the growth, independence, and capabilities of the navy. Overall, the book provides-at a time when many people in the West view China and its navy as a threat-a rich, detailed, and realistic assessment of the true nature of the Chinese navy and the contemporary factors that affect its development.

This book provides a comprehensive history of the modern Chinese navy from 1840 to the present. Beginning with a survey of naval developments in earlier imperial times, the book goes on to show how China has since the mid-19th century four times built or rebuilt its navy: after the Opium Wars, a navy which was sunk or captured by the Japanese in the war of 1894-1895; during the 1920s and 1930s, a navy again sunk or lost to Japan, in the war of 1937-1945; in the 1950s, a navy built with Soviet help, which stagnated following the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s; and finally the present navy which absorbed its predecessor, but with the most modern sections dating from the 1990s-a navy which continues to grow and prosper. The book also shows how the underlying strategic imperative for the Chinese navy has been the defense of China's coasts and major rivers; how naval mutiny was a key factor in the overthrow of the Qing and the Nationalist regimes; and how successive Chinese governments, aware of the potent threat of naval mutiny, have restricted the growth, independence, and capabilities of the navy. Overall, the book provides-at a time when many people in the West view China and its navy as a threat-a rich, detailed, and realistic assessment of the true nature of the Chinese navy and the contemporary factors that affect its development.

China's recent economic reforms have opened its economy to the world. This policy, however, is not new: in the late nineteenth century, the United States put forward the Open Door Policy as a counter to European exclusive 'spheres of influence' in China. This book, based on extensive original archival research, examines and re-evaluates China's Open Door Policy. It considers the policy from its inception in 1899 right through to the post-1978 reforms. It relates these changes to the various shifts in China's international relations, discusses how decades of foreign invasion, civil war and revolution followed the destruction of the policy in the 1920s, and considers how the policy, when applied in Taiwan after 1949, and by Deng Xiaoping in mainland China after 1978, was instrumental in bringing about, respectively, Taiwan's 'economic miracle' and mainland China's recent economic boom. The book argues that, although the policy was characterised as United States 'economic imperialism' during the Cold War, in reality it helped China retain its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Open Door Policy in China was proposed by the U.S. government in 1899. Although adopted to stop the foreign partition of China, it was condemned as economic imperialism during the Cold-War period. With the People s Republic of China (PRC) embracing market reforms, encouraging foreign investment, and promoting capitalist growth in the 21st Century, this book examines and re-evaluates the former economically-based critiques of the Open Door Policy, from its inception in 1899 to its collapse in the 1920s. It offers new evidence suggesting the hitherto underestimated role of the Open Door Policy in protecting China s territorial integrity from Russian and Japanese encroachment. Using primary documents located in the Peking government s Foreign Ministry archives in Taipei, Taiwan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs archive in Tokyo, Japan, and the Trotsky archives at Harvard University, United States, it sheds light on how the destruction of the Open Door Policy during the 1920s cleared the way for a resurgence of Russian and Japanese expansionism in China, ushering in decades of foreign invasion, civil war, and revolution, until the 1949 establishment of the PRC once again shored up China s threatened territorial integrity. "

This book examines the nature and character of naval expeditionary warfare, in particular in peripheral campaigns, and the contribution of such campaigns to the achievement of strategic victory. Naval powers, which can lack the massive ground forces to win in the main theatre, often choose a secondary theatre accessible to them by sea and difficult for their enemies to reach by land, giving the sea power and its expeditionary forces the advantage. The technical term for these theatres is 'peripheral operations.' The subject of peripheral campaigns in naval expeditionary warfare is central to the British, the US, and the Australian way of war in the past and in the future. All three are reluctant to engage large land forces because of the high human and economic costs. Instead, they rely as much as possible on sea and air power, and the latter is most often in the form of carrier-based aviation. In order to exert pressure on their enemies, they have often opened additional theaters in on-going, regional, and civil wars. This book contains thirteen case studies by some of the foremost naval historians from the United States, Great Britain, and Australia whose collected case studies examine the most important peripheral operations of the last two centuries. This book will be of much interest to students of naval warfare, military history, strategic studies and security studies.

This book examines the nature and character of naval expeditionary warfare, in particular in peripheral campaigns, and the contribution of such campaigns to the achievement of strategic victory. Naval powers, which can lack the massive ground forces to win in the main theatre, often choose a secondary theatre accessible to them by sea and difficult for their enemies to reach by land, giving the sea power and its expeditionary forces the advantage. The technical term for these theatres is 'peripheral operations.' The subject of peripheral campaigns in naval expeditionary warfare is central to the British, the US, and the Australian way of war in the past and in the future. All three are reluctant to engage large land forces because of the high human and economic costs. Instead, they rely as much as possible on sea and air power, and the latter is most often in the form of carrier-based aviation. In order to exert pressure on their enemies, they have often opened additional theaters in on-going, regional, and civil wars. This book contains thirteen case studies by some of the foremost naval historians from the United States, Great Britain, and Australia whose collected case studies examine the most important peripheral operations of the last two centuries. This book will be of much interest to students of naval warfare, military history, strategic studies and security studies.

This is the first scholarly book examining naval coalition warfare over the past two centuries from a multi-national perspective. Containing case studies by some of the foremost naval historians from the US, Great Britain, and Australia, it also examines the impact of international law on coalitions. Together these collected essays comprise a comprehensive examination of the most important naval coalitions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Chapters are arranged chronologically, beginning with the Napoleonic Wars, and ending with the second Gulf War, and each makes use of new research and methodologies to address the creation of the coalition, its actions, and its short- and long-term repercussions. The editors draw contemporary lessons from the book's historical case studies. These findings are used to discuss the likelihood and character of future naval coalition; for example, the likelihood and possible outcome of an anti-PRC coalition in defence of Taiwan. Naval Coalition Warfare will be of great interest to students of naval history, strategic studies, international history and international relations in general.

This is the first scholarly book examining naval coalition warfare over the past two centuries from a multi-national perspective.

Containing case studies by some of the foremost naval historians from the US, Great Britain, and Australia, it also examines the impact of international law on coalitions. Together these collected essays comprise a comprehensive examination of the most important naval coalitions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Chapters are arranged chronologically, beginning with the Napoleonic Wars, and ending with the second Gulf War, and each makes use of new research and methodologies to address the creation of the coalition, its actions, and its short- and long-term repercussions.

The editors draw contemporary lessons from the book's historical case studies. These findings are used to discuss the likelihood and character of future naval coalition; for example, the likelihood and possible outcome of an anti-PRC coalition in defence of Taiwan.

Naval Coalition Warfare will be of great interest to students of naval history, strategic studies, international history and international relations in general.

This new collection of scholarly, readable, and up-to-date essays covers the most significant naval blockades of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Here the reader can find Napoleon's Continental Blockade of England, the Anglo-American War of 1812, the Crimean War, the American Civil War, the first Sino-Japanese War 1894-95, the Spanish-American War, the First World War, the second Sino-Japanese War 1937-45, the Second World War in Europe and Asia, the Nationalist attempt to blockade the PRC, the Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, the British blockade of Rhodesia, the Falklands War, the Persian Gulf interdiction program, the PRC "missile" blockade of Taiwan in 1996, and finally Australia's recent "reverse" blockade to keep illegal aliens out of the country. The authors of each chapter address the causes of the blockade in question, its long and short-term repercussions, and the course of the blockade itself. More generally, they address the state of the literature, taking advantage of new research and new methodologies to provide something of value to both the specialist and non-specialist reader. Taken as a whole, this volume presents fresh insights into issues such as what a blockade is, why countries might choose them, which navies can and cannot make use of them, what responses lead to satisfactory or unsatisfactory conclusions, and how far-reaching their consequences tend to be. This book will be of great interest to all students and scholars of strategic studies, military history and maritime studies in particular.

This new collection of scholarly, readable, and up-to-date essays covers the most significant naval blockades of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Here the reader can find Napoleon's Continental Blockade of England, the Anglo-American War of 1812, the Crimean War, the American Civil War, the first Sino-Japanese War 1894-95, the Spanish-American War, the First World War, the second Sino-Japanese War 1937-45, the Second World War in Europe and Asia, the Nationalist attempt to blockade the PRC, the Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, the British blockade of Rhodesia, the Falklands War, the Persian Gulf interdiction program, the PRC "missile" blockade of Taiwan in 1996, and finally Australia's recent "reverse" blockade to keep illegal aliens out of the country.

The authors of each chapter address the causes of the blockade in question, its long and short-term repercussions, and the course of the blockade itself. More generally, they address the state of the literature, taking advantage of new research and new methodologies to provide something of value to both the specialist and non-specialist reader. Taken as a whole, this volume presents fresh insights into issues such as what a blockade is, why countries might choose them, which navies can and cannot make use of them, what responses lead to satisfactory or unsatisfactory conclusions, and how far-reaching their consequences tend to be.

This book will be of great interest to all students and scholars of strategic studies, military history and maritime studies in particular.

Contents:
The opium wars and the origins of China's modern warfare; the Taiping rebellion; the Nian, Muslim and Tungan rebellions; the Ili crisis and China's defense of Xinjiang; the Sino-French war over Anam; the Sino- French war, 1894-95; the Boxer uprising, 1900; Chinese warlords and modern warfare; the nationalists' northern expedition to unite China; Sino-Soviet conflict in Manchuria, 1926-30; the Sino-Japanese war, 1937- 45; China's nationalist/communist civil war; China's role in the Korean war; the 1962 Sino-Indian border dispute and the Vietnam war; the Sino- Soviet territorial conflict; the Sino-Vietnamese conflict.

Why did the Chinese empire collapse and why did it take so long for a new government to reunite China? Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989 seeks to answer these questions by exploring the most important domestic and international conflicts over the past two hundred years, from the last half of the Qing empire through to modern day China. It reveals how most of China's wars during this period were fought to preserve Chinese unity, and examines their distinctly cyclical pattern of imperial decline, domestic chaos and finally the creation of a new unifying dynasty.
Exposing China as an imperialist country, and one which has often manipulated western powers in its favour, Bruce A. Elleman seeks to redress the view of China as a victimized nation. Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989 is a concise survey of the military history of China, and makes a valuable contribution to the debate over whether China poses a military threat to the West today.

This comprehensive survey of historical and contemporary issues related to maritime crime and piracy, with a special focus on Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, explains why piracy is a growing problem and how it affects security policy making in the United States. Here, piracy is defined as taking place on the high seas, while maritime crime takes place within a country's territorial waters. Seaborne terrorism may occur in either one of these maritime zones. Maritime piracy can be divided into several categories, from pirates robbing a ship or its crew of petty items while at sea to taking a ship's cargo and taking control of a vessel, reflagging it, and then using this captured ship to smuggle drugs, transport illegal immigrants, or conduct further acts of piracy. This is the most dangerous, not only because pirates can use a captured ship to carry out more raids, but also because they can use the ship's identity papers to transport goods and weapons-potentially WMDs-into otherwise secure port areas. A special concern to the US is that the threat of piracy is growing most quickly in parts of the world-such as Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia-where both global trade is rapidly expanding and where international terrorist groups are actively functioning or have supporters. This geographical overlap suggests that the risk that pirates and terrorists may one day cooperate to strike at the US or an ally is most likely also on the rise. While many important African, South Asia, and Southeast Asian cases have received insufficient attention, many well-known historical piracy events stand in need of a reappraisal. This book integrates a number of multinational, multiregional, and historical cases of piracy, maritime crime, and seaborne terrorism to investigate whether piracy and other forms of maritime crime are becoming a major United States national security concern. It analyzes some of the most important cases, especially of the 19th, 20th, and early 21st centuries, as well as specific historical events. This allows to draw lessons as to what are the components of successful and unsuccessful piracy, common causes, the type of navy necessary to control it, and finally, possible military, political, and economic consequences. The book also discusses various types of cases, including parasitic, intrinsic, episodic, and opportunistic piracy. Specific cases are also evaluated in terms of the changing interpretations of international law and the recent reported growth rates of piracy, maritime crime, and seaborne terrorism. These findings are used to explore the impact of piracy on maritime security, in particular in Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia and their surrounding waters, which is where the majority of contemporary piracies and maritime crimes occur. Different methods of policing piracy and maritime crime are evaluated, including the viability of adopting greater Maritime Domain Awareness, which would require that all ships at sea-regardless of size or function-emit a signal beacon identifying their name, country of origin, and route. This combination of historical and modern day piracy and the many cases studied will provide readers with a broader understanding of maritime piracy.

Maritime powers dominate the planet, from the British empire of the 19th century, to the American post-World War II domination of global affairs. To a large degree their control of the globe is based on control of the seas. This book seeks to examine the strengths and weaknesses of maritime power, including specific chapters on mutiny, blockades, coalitions, expeditionary warfare, piracy, commerce raiding, and soft power operations, but with larger discussion of such sea power characteristics as sea control, sea denial, and the competition between land powers and sea powers. The conclusions will discuss how many other countries, including Russia during the Cold War and the PRC today, have or are seeking to use sea power to claim regional and then eventually global hegemony.

Now in a fully updated edition, this accessible text provides a balanced history of modern China in a global context. Through years of living and research in China, Taiwan, Japan, and Russia, the authors are deeply qualified to understand China's internal dynamics as well as its foreign relations over centuries. Arguing that modern Chinese history cannot be understood without a deep appreciation of the outside factors that have influenced the country, the authors focus on China's near neighbors, especially Japan and Russia. They also emphasize the tragic role of almost endless warfare throughout Chinese history. Providing a unique comparative approach, the authors bridge the cultural divide separating Chinese history from Western readers trying to understand it. Specifically geared to the teaching requirements of the semester system, the book is divided into four parts and a total of twenty-eight chapters, corresponding either to two chapters per week in a fourteen-week semester or one chapter per week in a two-semester course.

Excerpt from the introduction: "In the late nineteenth century, the French Jeune Ecole, or "new school," of naval thinking promoted a commerce-raiding strategy for the weaker naval power to defeat the dominant naval power. France provided the vocabulary for the discussion-Jeune Ecole and guerre de course (war of the chase)-and embodied the geopolitical predicament addressed: France had been a dominant land power, known for its large and proficient army and resentful of British imperial dominance and commercial preeminence. But its navy had rarely matched the Royal Navy in either quantity or quality, and its economy could not support both a preeminent army and navy. So its naval thinkers thought of an economical way out of its predicament. They argued that a guerre de course allowed weaker maritime power, such as France, to impose disproportionate costs on the stronger sea power in order to achieve its objectives. Sadly for France, the strategy did not work as anticipated, and British naval dominance and imperial primacy endured. The case studies in this book reveal why this was so, and they shed light on the dynamic of rivalries between maritime and continental powers. This issue is an important one in that from the heyday of the British Empire to the present, maritime powers have set the global order, and continental powers have contested it. So the dynamic is still with us, and it is of vital national import to all countries that benefit from the present international order of freedom of navigation, free trade, and the rule of international law."