Controlling Pollution in Transition Economies examines and evaluates the recent experience of implementing pollution charges and the use of environmental permits in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia.The book focuses on controlling point-source air and water pollution. It describes and analyses the experience of implementing pollution charges and fines, and the interactions of these fiscal instruments with systems of pollution permits. The ten country case studies have been written by specialists who have been or are actively involved with the development or revision of pollution charges. Based on the experience of these countries, general conclusions are drawn for implementing pollution charge systems in other contexts. This book will encourage new theoretical and empirical work on the problem of implementing economic instruments (pollution charges), in combination with 'command-and-control' instruments (pollution permits). Practitioners and policy analysts as well as graduate students, academics, researchers and environmental consultants will find this book an important contribution to the existing literature.

With revitalized and stronger political parties should we see more effective and accountable government? Despite the resurgence of parties in America, charges of irresponsible and unreliable government remain. Why the disconnect? In Parties, Politics, and Public Policy in America, Marc Hetherington along with new coauthor Bruce Larson explore this question, while giving students an overview of how parties work and shape public policymaking in America. In this eleventh edition, Hetherington and Larson provide more in-depth coverage of the parties' functions in Congress and campaign finance. In addition, the authors examine developments in the 2008 nomination and election contests-generational voting patterns, shifts in the red-blue divide, and the possibility of a partisan realignment. No other book for this course combines the breadth of scholarship with the brevity and accessibility found here.

Close competition for majority party control of the U.S. House of Representatives has transformed the congressional parties from legislative coalitions into partisan fundraising machines. With the need for ever increasing sums of money to fuel the ongoing campaign for majority control, both Republicans and Democrats have made large donations to the party and its candidates mandatory for members seeking advancement within party and congressional committee hierarchies.

Eric S. Heberlig and Bruce A. Larson not only analyze this development, but also discuss its implications for American government and democracy. They address the consequences of selecting congressional leaders on the basis of their fundraising skills rather than their legislative capacity and the extent to which the battle for majority control leads Congress to prioritize short-term electoral gains over long-term governing and problem-solving.

With the need for ever increasing sums of money to fuel the ongoing campaign for majority control, both Republicans and Democrats have made large donations to the party and its candidates mandatory for members seeking advancement within party and congressional committee hierarchies. Eric S. Heberlig and Bruce A. Larson analyze this development and discuss its implications for American government and democracy. They address the consequences of selecting congressional leaders on the basis of their fundraising skills rather than their legislative capacity and the extent to which the battle for majority control leads Congress to prioritize short-term electoral gains over long-term governing and problem-solving.