This volume brings together a set of scholarly, readable and up-to-date essays covering the most significant naval mutinies of the 20th century, including Russia (1905), Brazil (1910), Austria (1918), Germany (1918), France (1918-19), Great Britain (1931), Chile (1931), the United States (1944), India (1946), China (1949), Australia, and Canada (1949).
Each chapter addresses the causes of the mutiny in question, its long- and short-term repercussions, and the course of the mutiny itself. More generally, authors consider the state of the literature on their mutiny and examine significant historiographical issues connected with it, taking advantage of new research and new methodologies to provide something of value to both the specialist and non-specialist reader. The book provides fresh insights into issues such as what a mutiny is, what factors cause them, what navies are most susceptible to them, what responses lead to satisfactory or unsatisfactory conclusions, and how far-reaching their consequences tend to be.

East Asia was a major focus of struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War of 1945 to 1991, with multiple "hot" and "cold" conflicts in China, Korea, and Vietnam. The struggle for predominance in East Asia, however, largely predated the Cold War, as this book shows, with many examples of the United States and Russia/the Soviet Union working to exercise and increase control in the region. The book focuses on secret treaties, 26 of them, signed from the mid-1890s through 1950, when secret agreements between China and the USSR, including several concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway, gave Russia greater control over Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. One of the most important was negotiated in 1945, when Stalin signed the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty with Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalists, that included a secret protocol granting the Soviet Navy sea control over the Manchurian littorals. This secret protocol excluded the US Navy from landing Nationalist troops at the major Manchurian ports, thereby guaranteeing the Chinese Communist victory in Northeast China; from Manchuria, the Chinese Communists quickly spread south to take all of Mainland China. To a large degree, therefore, this formerly undiscussed secret diplomacy set the underlying conditions for the Cold War in East Asia.

This book examines the emergence of Communist power in China during the interwar period, focusing especially on the role of the Soviet Union and the 1927 Nanchang Uprising. It describes the history behind the alliance between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists, the impact of the USSR's military and political advisers, and the success of the Northern Expedition that resulted in the April 1927 purge of the Communists from the Nationalist Party. It explores the debates between leading communists in Moscow, notably Stalin - who thought that China was ready in 1927 for an urban-based Communist revolution, similar to what had happened in Russia ten years before - and Trotsky who opposed it. It goes on examine the seizure of power in Nanchang by the Communists, the establishment of China's first short-lived soviet republic, and the reasons why the soviet soon collapsed. It explains the consequences of the rising, including the adoption by the Communists of guerilla warfare, the foundation of China's second soviet, and after moving to northwest China during the 1930s, the rise of Communist power throughout all of mainland China which culminated in the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. The book stresses the importance of the mythology that evolved around the Nanchang Uprising: since criticism of the Nanchang Uprising would open themselves up to accusations that they were Trotskyites, the Chinese Communists created the myth that the Nanchang Uprising was a success, and later dated the origins of the People's Liberation Army to this event.

The railways of Manchuria offer an intriguing vantage point for an international history of northeast Asia. Before the completion of the Trans-Siberian railway in 1916, the only rail route from the Imperial Russian capital of St. Petersburg to the Pacific port of Vladivostok transited Manchuria. A spur line from the Manchurian city of Harbin led south to ice-free Port Arthur. Control of these two rail lines gave Imperial Russia military, economic, and political advantages that excited rivalry on the part of Japan and unease on the part of weak and divided China. Meanwhile, the effort to defend and retain that strategic hold against rising Japanese power strained distant Moscow. Control of the Manchurian railways was contested in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5; Japan's 1931 invasion and establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo; the second Sino-Japanese War and World War II in Asia; and, the Chinese civil war that culminated in the Communist victory over the Nationalists. Today, the railways are critical to plans for development of China's sparsely populated interior. This volume brings together an international group of scholars to explore this fascinating history.

The railways of Manchuria offer an intriguing vantage point for an international history of northeast Asia. Before the completion of the Trans-Siberian railway in 1916, the only rail route from the Imperial Russian capital of St. Petersburg to the Pacific port of Vladivostok transited Manchuria. A spur line from the Manchurian city of Harbin led south to ice-free Port Arthur. Control of these two rail lines gave Imperial Russia military, economic, and political advantages that excited rivalry on the part of Japan and unease on the part of weak and divided China. Meanwhile, the effort to defend and retain that strategic hold against rising Japanese power strained distant Moscow. Control of the Manchurian railways was contested in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5; Japan's 1931 invasion and establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo; the second Sino-Japanese War and World War II in Asia; and, the Chinese civil war that culminated in the Communist victory over the Nationalists. Today, the railways are critical to plans for development of China's sparsely populated interior. This volume brings together an international group of scholars to explore this fascinating history.

This book examines the emergence of Communist power in China during the interwar period, focusing especially on the role of the Soviet Union and the 1927 Nanchang Uprising. It describes the history behind the alliance between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists, the impact of the USSR's military and political advisers, and the success of the Northern Expedition that resulted in the April 1927 purge of the Communists from the Nationalist Party. It explores the debates between leading communists in Moscow, notably Stalin ? who thought that China was ready in 1927 for an urban-based Communist revolution, similar to what had happened in Russia ten years before ? and Trotsky who opposed it. It goes on examine the seizure of power in Nanchang by the Communists, the establishment of China's first short-lived soviet republic, and the reasons why the soviet soon collapsed. It explains the consequences of the rising, including the adoption by the Communists of guerilla warfare, the foundation of China's second soviet, and after moving to northwest China during the 1930s, the rise of Communist power throughout all of mainland China which culminated in the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. The book stresses the importance of the mythology that evolved around the Nanchang Uprising: since criticism of the Nanchang Uprising would open themselves up to accusations that they were Trotskyites, the Chinese Communists created the myth that the Nanchang Uprising was a success, and later dated the origins of the People's Liberation Army to this event.

The important and previously undocumented event in the history of the Second World War: the negotiation of 'prisoner' exchanges between the United States and Japan during 1941 to 1943, is examined here by Bruce Elleman.
Approximately 7000 American citizens had been arrested by the Japanese authorities while visiting Japan as tourists, conducting business, teaching English or carrying out missionary work. The same amount of Japanese citizens living illegally in the United States had to be repatriated to secure the Americans' release.
Challenging the conventional perceptions regarding the role and justification of the detention camp, this insightful book addresses questions regarding the diplomatic agreement between Japan and the United States, the Japanese-American detention camps and the role of one of the most successful minority groups in the United States today: the Japanese-Americans.

The important and previously undocumented event in the history of the Second World War: the negotiation of 'prisoner' exchanges between the United States and Japan during 1941 to 1943, is examined here by Bruce Elleman.
Approximately 7000 American citizens had been arrested by the Japanese authorities while visiting Japan as tourists, conducting business, teaching English or carrying out missionary work. The same amount of Japanese citizens living illegally in the United States had to be repatriated to secure the Americans' release.
Challenging the conventional perceptions regarding the role and justification of the detention camp, this insightful book addresses questions regarding the diplomatic agreement between Japan and the United States, the Japanese-American detention camps and the role of one of the most successful minority groups in the United States today: the Japanese-Americans.

This volume brings together a set of scholarly, readable and up-to-date essays covering the most significant naval mutinies of the 20th century, including Russia (1905), Brazil (1910), Austria (1918), Germany (1918), France (1918-19), Great Britain (1931), Chile (1931), the United States (1944), India (1946), China (1949), Australia, and Canada (1949).
Each chapter addresses the causes of the mutiny in question, its long- and short-term repercussions, and the course of the mutiny itself. More generally, authors consider the state of the literature on their mutiny and examine significant historiographical issues connected with it, taking advantage of new research and new methodologies to provide something of value to both the specialist and non-specialist reader. The book provides fresh insights into issues such as what a mutiny is, what factors cause them, what navies are most susceptible to them, what responses lead to satisfactory or unsatisfactory conclusions, and how far-reaching their consequences tend to be.

Drawing on sources in Japanese, Chinese, and American archives and libraries, this book reassesses another facet of Woodrow Wilson's agenda at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference at the end of World War I. Breaking with accepted scholarly opinions, the author argues that Wilson did not "betray" China, as many Chinese and Western scholars have charged; rather, Wilson successfully negotiated a compromise with the Japanese to ensure that China's sovereignty would be respected in Shandong Province. Rejecting the compromise, Chinese negotiators refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles, creating conditions for the Soviet Union's entry into China and its later influence over the course of the Chinese revolution.

Drawing on sources in Japanese, Chinese, and American archives and libraries, this book reassesses another facet of Woodrow Wilson's agenda at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference at the end of World War I. Breaking with accepted scholarly opinions, the author argues that Wilson did not "betray" China, as many Chinese and Western scholars have charged; rather, Wilson successfully negotiated a compromise with the Japanese to ensure that China's sovereignty would be respected in Shandong Province. Rejecting the compromise, Chinese negotiators refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles, creating conditions for the Soviet Union's entry into China and its later influence over the course of the Chinese revolution.

During the Soviet period the USSR conducted diplomatic relations with incumbent regimes while simultaneously cultivating and manipulating communist movements in those same countries. The Chinese case offers a particularly interesting example of this dual policy, for when the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949, their discovery of the nature of Moscow's imperial designs on Chinese territory sowed distrust between the two revolutionary powers and paved the way to the Sino-Soviet split.Drawing on newly available documents from archives in China, Taiwan, Russia, and Japan, this study examines secret agreements signed by Moscow and the Peking government in 1924 and confirmed by a Soviet-Japanese convention in 1925. These agreements essentially allowed the Bolsheviks to reclaim most of tsarist Russia's concessions and privileges in China, including not only Imperial properties but also Outer Mongolia, the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Boxer Indemnity, and the right of extraterritoriality. Each of these topics is analyzed in this volume, and translations of the secret protocols themselves are included in a documentary appendix. Additional chapters discuss Sino-Soviet diplomacy and the parallel history of Soviet relations with the Chinese Communist Party as well as the origins and purpose of the United Front policy.

During the Soviet period the USSR conducted diplomatic relations with incumbent regimes while simultaneously cultivating and manipulating communist movements in those same countries. The Chinese case offers a particularly interesting example of this dual policy, for when the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949, their discovery of the nature of Moscow's imperial designs on Chinese territory sowed distrust between the two revolutionary powers and paved the way to the Sino-Soviet split.

Drawing on newly available documents from archives in China, Taiwan, Russia, and Japan, this study examines secret agreements signed by Moscow and the Peking government in 1924 and confirmed by a Soviet-Japanese convention in 1925. These agreements essentially allowed the Bolsheviks to reclaim most of tsarist Russia's concessions and privileges in China, including not only Imperial properties but also Outer Mongolia, the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Boxer Indemnity, and the right of extraterritoriality. Each of these topics is analyzed in this volume, and translations of the secret protocols themselves are included in a documentary appendix. Additional chapters discuss Sino-Soviet diplomacy and the parallel history of Soviet relations with the Chinese Communist Party as well as the origins and purpose of the United Front policy.

China shares borders with 20 other countries. Each of these neighbors has its own national interests, and in some cases, these include territorial and maritime jurisdictional claims in places that China also claims. Most of these 20 countries have had a history of border conflicts with China; some of them never amicably settled. This book brings together some of the foremost historians, geographers, political scientists, and legal scholars on modern Asia to examine each of China's twenty land or sea borders.

China shares borders with 20 other countries. Each of these neighbors has its own national interests, and in some cases, these include territorial and maritime jurisdictional claims in places that China also claims. Most of these 20 countries have had a history of border conflicts with China; some of them never amicably settled. This book brings together some of the foremost historians, geographers, political scientists, and legal scholars on modern Asia to examine each of China's twenty land or sea borders.

East Asia was a major focus of struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War of 1945 to 1991, with multiple "hot" and "cold" conflicts in China, Korea, and Vietnam. The struggle for predominance in East Asia, however, largely predated the Cold War, as this book shows, with many examples of the United States and Russia/the Soviet Union working to exercise and increase control in the region. The book focuses on secret treaties, 26 of them, signed from the mid-1890s through 1950, when secret agreements between China and the USSR, including several concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway, gave Russia greater control over Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. One of the most important was negotiated in 1945, when Stalin signed the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty with Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalists, that included a secret protocol granting the Soviet Navy sea control over the Manchurian littorals. This secret protocol excluded the US Navy from landing Nationalist troops at the major Manchurian ports, thereby guaranteeing the Chinese Communist victory in Northeast China; from Manchuria, the Chinese Communists quickly spread south to take all of Mainland China. To a large degree, therefore, this formerly undiscussed secret diplomacy set the underlying conditions for the Cold War in East Asia.