This is a memorial for Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, a pioneering political scientist, international relations specialist and peace scholar of the 20th century. Born in Prague, he was a professor at MIT, Yale and Harvard and spent a decade at the Social Science Center Berlin (WZB). He was a global leader in the theory and scientific analysis of international relations and comparative politics who published on nationalism, social communication, European integration, war and peace, arms control, social cybernetics, general systems analysis, and global modelling. He pioneered the development and analysis of large-scale political and social data across nations and over time and proposed a widespread access to these data and their scientific evaluation. This book offers biographical data on Karl W. Deutsch, reproduces chapters from his PhD thesis and his book Nerves of Government. Colleagues from the USA (A.S. Markovits, H. Alker, R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.,P. J. Katzenstein, T.R. Cusack, C.L. Taylor), Germany (D. Senghaas, R. Wildenmann, R. Mackensen, K. v. Beyme) and the Czech Republic (M. Hroch) offer Collegial Critiques and Memorials. It provides a comprehensive bibliography of his publications and memorials for a great scholar, a superb academic teacher and world citizen. * Karl Wolfgang Deutsch was a major global pioneer in Political Science, internationalrelations and peace research in the 20th century. * His most creative contributions were the concept of social mobilization, the use of cyberneticsto study human relationships, the introduction of politics in world modeling, and the role of communication in governance.* He was president of the American Political Science Association (1969-70) and of theInternational Political Science Association (1976-79) and was a Director of the SocialScience Research Center Berlin (1977-87). * Academics, including graduate students, exploring nationalism, political integration,social communications, cybernetics, and global modeling will find this volume instructive.

From the Preface to the Twenty-fifth Anniversary Edition:This was a controversial book, and likely remains so.? The world 25 years later looks quite different. With the end of the Cold War, the United States is now the world's only superpower. If this country cannot shape the international system and bring peace and stability to much of the world, surely no other state can. Yet the will to a broadly internationalist foreign policy cannot currently be found in the United States. The near-consensus that ranged across foreign policy elites before the Vietnam War has never been restored. Maybe that's just as well. But I hold to much of the basic perspective of this book as offering some guidance for fellow ?cooperative internationalists.? The power to shape international affairs is limited; military intervention is a costly, blunt, and dangerous instrument. The five questions I ask on page 108 of this book remain appropriate. I do believe there are appropriate circumstances for military action in international affairs. In most circumstances I do not believe that it is desirable, effective, or just to try to spread democracy or other American values by force of arms. Much more could be done by way of financial assistance as well as consistent ideological and technical support to create a more democratic and interdependent environment within which peace can be secured.? If the Vietnam War derived in substantial part from an overconfident and unilateral interpretation of history, that is a mistake from which we can still learn.

From the Preface to the Twenty-fifth Anniversary Edition: This was a controversial book, and likely remains so.... The world 25 years later looks quite different. With the end of the Cold War, the United States is now the world's only superpower. If this country cannot shape the international system and bring peace and stability to much of the world, surely no other state can. Yet the will to a broadly internationalist foreign policy cannot currently be found in the United States. The near-consensus that ranged across foreign policy elites before the Vietnam War has never been restored. Maybe that's just as well. But I hold to much of the basic perspective of this book as offering some guidance for fellow "cooperative internationalists." The power to shape international affairs is limited; military intervention is a costly, blunt, and dangerous instrument. The five questions I ask on page 108 of this book remain appropriate. I do believe there are appropriate circumstances for military action in international affairs. In most circumstances I do not believe that it is desirable, effective, or just to try to spread democracy or other American values by force of arms. Much more could be done by way of financial assistance as well as consistent ideological and technical support to create a more democratic and interdependent environment within which peace can be secured.... If the Vietnam War derived in substantial part from an overconfident and unilateral interpretation of history, that is a mistake from which we can still learn.