This study of the normative justification for the use of criminal sanctions as a means of cartel control goes beyond the historical and economic viewpoints by adding a normative evaluation of anti-cartel regimes and analysing cartel control in the USA, Europe and the UK. The analysis is unique in seeking to establish why, in a liberal society, criminal sanctions should apply to individuals who participate in this sort of activity. Although cartels have been rhetorically likened to theft and fraud, there are significant differences. Notwithstanding these differences, Cartels, Markets and Crime presents an argument for the criminalisation of economic collusion and, with this argument in mind, analyses the regimes of the USA, EU and UK and considers the possibility of global convergence.

A common criticism of the competition rules posed by EU authorities is that they are too inflexible, thereby prohibiting adequate responses to economic and industrial shocks. Competition Law in Crisis challenges this suggestion through an examination of competition responses to crises past and present. With an analysis spanning the response of UK and EU competition authorities to the economic and commercial outfall of the 2008 financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and potential responses to the climate crisis in the context of post-Brexit British industrial policy, the book argues that relaxing the competition regime is precisely the wrong response. The rigidity of competition rules in the UK and EU has both normative and positive implications for not just the methodology used in competition analysis, but also the role of competition law within the legal order of both jurisdictions. The book concludes with a discussion of the place of the competition in the UK's and EU's legal order.

A common criticism of the competition rules posed by EU authorities is that they are too inflexible, thereby prohibiting adequate responses to economic and industrial shocks. Competition Law in Crisis challenges this suggestion through an examination of competition responses to crises past and present. With an analysis spanning the response of UK and EU competition authorities to the economic and commercial outfall of the 2008 financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and potential responses to the climate crisis in the context of post-Brexit British industrial policy, the book argues that relaxing the competition regime is precisely the wrong response. The rigidity of competition rules in the UK and EU has both normative and positive implications for not just the methodology used in competition analysis, but also the role of competition law within the legal order of both jurisdictions. The book concludes with a discussion of the place of the competition in the UK's and EU's legal order.

In the US and EU, legal analysis in competition cases is conducted on a case-by-case approach. This approach assesses each particular practice for both its legality and its welfare effects. While this analytic method has the merits of 'getting the result right' by, inter alia, reducing error costs in antitrust adjudication, it comes at a cost of certainty, predictability and clarity in the legal principles which govern antitrust law. This is a rule of law concern. This is the first book to explore this tension between Europe's 'More Economic Approach', the US's Rule of Reason, and the Rule of Law. The tension manifests itself in the assumptions in and choice of analytic method; the institutional agents driving this effects based approach and their competency to use and assess the results of the methodology they demand; and, the nature and stability of the legal principles used in modern effects-based competition analysis. The book forcefully argues that this approach to competition law represents a threat to the rule of law. Competition, Effects and Predictability will be of interest to European and American competition law scholars and practitioners, legal historians, policy makers and members of the judiciary.