|
Showing 1 - 10 of
10 matches in All Departments
This book contains a unique perspective: that of a scientifically
and philosophically educated agnostic who thinks there is
impressive-if maddeningly hidden-evidence for the existence of God.
Science and philosophy may have revealed the poverty of the
familiar sources of evidence, but they generate their own partial
defense of theism. Bryan Frances, a philosopher with a graduate
degree in physics, judges the standard evidence for God's existence
to be awful. And yet, like many others with similar scientific and
philosophical backgrounds, he argues that the usual reasons for
atheism, such as the existence of suffering and success of science,
are weak. In this book you will learn why so many people with
scientific and philosophical credentials are agnostics (rather than
atheists) despite judging all the usual evidence for theism to be
fatally flawed.
In this book, Michael Huemer and Bryan Frances debate whether –
and how – we can gain knowledge of the world outside of our own
minds. Starting with opening statements, the debate moves through
two rounds of replies. Frances argues that we lack knowledge
because, for example, we cannot rule out the possibility that we
are brains in vats being artificially stimulated in such a way as
to create an illusion of living in the real world. Huemer disagrees
that we need evidence against such possibilities in order to gain
knowledge of the external world, maintaining instead that we are
entitled to presume that things are as they appear unless and until
we acquire specific grounds for thinking otherwise. The authors go
on to discuss how one should think about controversial issues
wherein the experts persistently disagree. Frances argues that we
should generally withhold judgment about such issues or at least
greatly reduce our confidence. Huemer agrees that people are often
overconfident about controversial issues but tries to carve out
exceptions wherein one can rationally hold on to controversial
views. Accessible whilst also detailed and substantial, this
thoughtful debate is suitable for readers at all levels, from those
encountering the topic for the first time through those who are
deeply familiar with the issues. Key Features: Showcases arguments
from two leading philosophers in standard form and in clear
language Presents definitions in an easily accessible form Summary
boxes recap key arguments Includes an annotated bibliography and
glossary of all specialized vocabulary
In this book, Michael Huemer and Bryan Frances debate whether –
and how – we can gain knowledge of the world outside of our own
minds. Starting with opening statements, the debate moves through
two rounds of replies. Frances argues that we lack knowledge
because, for example, we cannot rule out the possibility that we
are brains in vats being artificially stimulated in such a way as
to create an illusion of living in the real world. Huemer disagrees
that we need evidence against such possibilities in order to gain
knowledge of the external world, maintaining instead that we are
entitled to presume that things are as they appear unless and until
we acquire specific grounds for thinking otherwise. The authors go
on to discuss how one should think about controversial issues
wherein the experts persistently disagree. Frances argues that we
should generally withhold judgment about such issues or at least
greatly reduce our confidence. Huemer agrees that people are often
overconfident about controversial issues but tries to carve out
exceptions wherein one can rationally hold on to controversial
views. Accessible whilst also detailed and substantial, this
thoughtful debate is suitable for readers at all levels, from those
encountering the topic for the first time through those who are
deeply familiar with the issues. Key Features: Showcases arguments
from two leading philosophers in standard form and in clear
language Presents definitions in an easily accessible form Summary
boxes recap key arguments Includes an annotated bibliography and
glossary of all specialized vocabulary
Suffering that is not coupled with any redeeming good is one of our
world's more troubling, apparent glitches. It is particularly
vexing for any theist who believes that the world was created by a
supremely morally good, knowledgeable, and powerful god. Gratuitous
Suffering and the Problem of Evil: A Comprehensive Introduction is
among the first book-length discussions of theistic approaches to
this issue. Bryan Frances's lucid and jargon-free analyses of a
variety of possible responses to the problem of gratuitous
suffering will provide serious students or general readers much
material with which to begin an extended contemplation of this
ancient and contemporary concern. The perfect size and scope for an
introductory philosophy class's discussion of the problem of evil
and suffering, and deliberately crafted to be approachable by all
interested readers, Gratuitous Suffering and the Problem of Evil is
philosophy doing what it does best: serious, engaged, rigorous
explorations of even the darkest truths. The book offers many
useful pedagogical features, including chapter overviews and
summaries, annotated suggested readings, and eight-eight discussion
questions.
By pooling together exhaustive analyses of certain philosophical
paradoxes, we can prove a series of fascinating results regarding
philosophical progress, agreement on substantive philosophical
claims, knockdown arguments in philosophy, the wisdom of
philosophical belief (quite rare, because the knockdown arguments
show that we philosophers have been wildly wrong about language,
logic, truth, or ordinary empirical matters), the epistemic status
of metaphysics, and the power of philosophy to refute common sense.
As examples, this Element examines the Sorites Paradox, the Liar
Paradox, and the Problem of the Many - although many other
paradoxes can do the trick too.
This book contains a unique perspective: that of a scientifically
and philosophically educated agnostic who thinks there is
impressive-if maddeningly hidden-evidence for the existence of God.
Science and philosophy may have revealed the poverty of the
familiar sources of evidence, but they generate their own partial
defense of theism. Bryan Frances, a philosopher with a graduate
degree in physics, judges the standard evidence for God's existence
to be awful. And yet, like many others with similar scientific and
philosophical backgrounds, he argues that the usual reasons for
atheism, such as the existence of suffering and success of science,
are weak. In this book you will learn why so many people with
scientific and philosophical credentials are agnostics (rather than
atheists) despite judging all the usual evidence for theism to be
fatally flawed.
Suffering that is not coupled with any redeeming good is one of our
world's more troubling, apparent glitches. It is particularly
vexing for any theist who believes that the world was created by a
supremely morally good, knowledgeable, and powerful god. Gratuitous
Suffering and the Problem of Evil: A Comprehensive Introduction is
among the first book-length discussions of theistic approaches to
this issue. Bryan Frances's lucid and jargon-free analyses of a
variety of possible responses to the problem of gratuitous
suffering will provide serious students or general readers much
material with which to begin an extended contemplation of this
ancient and contemporary concern. The perfect size and scope for an
introductory philosophy class's discussion of the problem of evil
and suffering, and deliberately crafted to be approachable by all
interested readers, Gratuitous Suffering and the Problem of Evil is
philosophy doing what it does best: serious, engaged, rigorous
explorations of even the darkest truths. The book offers many
useful pedagogical features, including chapter overviews and
summaries, annotated suggested readings, and eight-eight discussion
questions.
In epistemology the nagging voice of the sceptic has always been
present. Over the last thirty years or so philosophers have thought
of several promising ways to counter the radical sceptic: for
instance, facts about the reliability of our cognitive processes,
principles determining which possibilities must be ruled out in
order to have knowledge, and principles regarding the
context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions. In this entertaining
and provocative book, Bryan Frances presents a new argument
template for generating new kinds of radical scepticism, ones that
hold even if all the clever anti-sceptical fixes defeat the
traditional sceptic. Not only is the argument schema novel, but the
sceptical consequences are entirely unexpected. Although the new
sceptic concludes that we don't know that fire engines are red,
that we sometimes have pains in our knees, or even that we believe
that fire engines are red or that knees sometimes throb, she admits
that we know millions of exotic truths such as the fact that black
holes exist. You can know about the existence of black holes, but
not about the colour of your shirt or even about what you believe
regarding the colour of your shirt.
The new sceptical arguments proceed in the usual way (here's a
sceptical hypothesis; you can't neutralize it, you have to be able
to neutralize it to know P; so you don't know P), but the sceptical
hypotheses plugged into it are "real live" scientific-philosophical
hypotheses often thought to be actually true, such as error
theories about belief, colour, pain location, and character traits.
Frances investigates the questions, "Under what conditions do we
need to rule out these error theories in order toknow things
inconsistent with them?" and "Can we rule them out?" Particular
attention is paid to recent methods used to counter the traditional
sceptic. Sharp, witty, and fun to read, Scepticism Comes Alive will
be highly provocative for anyone interested in knowledge and its
limits.
In epistemology the nagging voice of the sceptic has always been
present. Over the last thirty years or so philosophers have thought
of several promising ways to counter the radical sceptic: for
instance, facts about the reliability of our cognitive processes,
principles determining which possibilities must be ruled out in
order to have knowledge, and principles regarding the
context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions. In this entertaining
and provocative book, Bryan Frances presents a new argument
template for generating new kinds of radical scepticism, ones that
hold even if all the clever anti-sceptical fixes defeat the
traditional sceptic. Not only is the argument schema novel, but the
sceptical consequences are entirely unexpected. Although the new
sceptic concludes that we don't know that fire engines are red,
that we sometimes have pains in our knees, or even that we believe
that fire engines are red or that knees sometimes throb, he admits
that we know millions of exotic truths such as the fact that black
holes exist. You can know about the existence of black holes, but
not about the colour of your shirt or even about what you believe
regarding the colour of your shirt. The new sceptical arguments
proceed in the usual way (here's a sceptical hypothesis; you can't
neutralize it, you have to be able to neutralize it to know P; so
you don't know P), but the sceptical hypotheses plugged into it are
'real live' scientific-philosophical hypotheses often thought to be
actually true, such as error theories about belief, colour, pain
location, and character traits. Frances investigates the questions,
'Under what conditions do we need to rule out these error theories
in order to know things inconsistent with them?' and 'Can we rule
them out?' Particular attention is paid to recent methods used to
counter the traditional sceptic. Sharp, witty, and fun to read,
Scepticism Comes Alive will be highly provocative for anyone
interested in knowledge and its limits.
|
You may like...
Jubilate Deo
Cecilia McDOWALL
Sheet music
R157
Discovery Miles 1 570
Opening
Bob Chilcott
Sheet music
R107
Discovery Miles 1 070
|