|
Showing 1 - 5 of
5 matches in All Departments
We find "vertical" relations in many different realms, whether
between atoms and molecules, words and sentences, neurons and
brains, or individuals and societies. This book is the first to
bring together, and comparatively assess, the exciting array of
philosophical approaches to vertical relations that have
independently sprung up in analytic metaphysics, the metaphysics of
mind, and the philosophy of science. Analytic metaphysicians have
recently focused on a relation of 'Ground' that is claimed to be
found in aesthetics, ethics, logic, mathematics, science, and
semantics. Metaphysicians of mind have focussed on a vertical
relation of 'realization' between properties, whilst philosophers
of science associated with the rise of the 'New Mechanism' have
renewed interest in vertical relations of scientific composition
found in so-called "mechanistic explanations". This volume analyses
the inter-relations between these different approaches to spark a
range of new debates, including whether the various frameworks for
vertical relations are independent, complementary or in even
competition.
Grand debates over reduction and emergence are playing out across
the sciences, but these debates have reached a stalemate, with both
sides declaring victory on empirical grounds. In this book, Carl
Gillett provides theoretical frameworks with which to understand
these debates, illuminating both the novel positions of scientific
reductionists and emergentists and the recent empirical advances
that drive these new views. Gillett also highlights the flaws in
existing philosophical frameworks and reorients the discussion to
reflect the new scientific advances and issues, including the
nature of 'parts' and 'wholes', the character of aggregation, and
thus the continuity of nature itself. Most importantly, Gillett
shows how disputes about concrete scientific cases are empirically
resolvable and hence how we can break the scientific stalemate.
Including a detailed glossary of key terms, this volume will be
valuable for researchers and advanced students of the philosophy of
science and metaphysics, and scientific researchers working in the
area.
Grand debates over reduction and emergence are playing out across
the sciences, but these debates have reached a stalemate, with both
sides declaring victory on empirical grounds. In this book, Carl
Gillett provides theoretical frameworks with which to understand
these debates, illuminating both the novel positions of scientific
reductionists and emergentists and the recent empirical advances
that drive these new views. Gillett also highlights the flaws in
existing philosophical frameworks and reorients the discussion to
reflect the new scientific advances and issues, including the
nature of 'parts' and 'wholes', the character of aggregation, and
thus the continuity of nature itself. Most importantly, Gillett
shows how disputes about concrete scientific cases are empirically
resolvable and hence how we can break the scientific stalemate.
Including a detailed glossary of key terms, this volume will be
valuable for researchers and advanced students of the philosophy of
science and metaphysics, and scientific researchers working in the
area.
Physicalism, a topic that has been central to modern philosophy of
mind and metaphysics, is the philosophical view that everything in
the space-time world is ultimately physical. The physicalist will
claim that all facts about the mind and the mental are physical
facts and deny the existence of mental events and state insofar as
these are thought of as independent of physical things, events and
states. This collection of essays, first published in 2001, offers
a series of perspectives on this important doctrine and brings
depth and breadth to the philosophical debate. A group of
distinguished philosophers, comprising both physicalists and their
critics, consider a wide range of issues including the historical
genesis and present justification of physicalism, its metaphysical
presuppositions and methodological role, its implications for
mental causation, and the account it provides of consciousness.
Physicalism is the philosophical view that everything in the space-time world is ultimately physical. This collection of new essays offers a series of "state-of-the-art" perspectives on this important doctrine and brings new depth and breadth to the philosophical debate. A group of distinguished philosophers, comprising both physicalists and their critics, consider a wide range of issues including the historical genesis and present justification of physicalism, its metaphysical presuppositions and methodological role, its implications for mental causation, and the account it provides of consciousness.
|
|