This book is a study of proconsulship, a form of delegated political-military leadership historically associated with the governance of large empires. Opening with a conceptual and historical analysis of proconsulship as an aspect of imperial or quasi-imperial rule generally, it surveys its origins and development in the late Roman Republic and its manifestations in the British Empire. The main focus is proconsulship in American history. Beginning with the occupation of Cuba and the Philippines after the Spanish-American War, it discusses the role of General Douglas MacArthur in East Asia during and after World War II, the occupation of Germany (focusing on General Lucius Clay), and proconsular leadership during the Vietnam War and the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan at the turn of the twenty-first century. An additional chapter provides an assessment of the evolution of American political-military command and control and decision making after the end of the Cold War.

There is a broad consensus among informed observers both inside and outside the Beltway that American public diplomacy leaves much to be desired. Recent studies describe ineffectiveness, inadequate resources, and a general lack of direction. Further complicating this situation, there is no real consensus among critics on what must be done to fix current problems. Moreover, the ills afflicting public diplomacy are poorly understood. Losing Hearts and Minds? situates these problems within the complex environment of U.S. government bureaucracy, and relates them to other instruments of national power, particularly diplomatic activities and military force. This book prompts debate by analyzing obstacles to effective public diplomacy, and offers a comprehensive vision of this critical dimension of statecraft, which without improvements will ill serve the nation in its ongoing efforts to counter the global threat of terror. After a systematic exploration of the concepts and terminology used to characterize public diplomacy and the wider domain of strategic influence, Carnes Lord examines the contemporary security environment and sketches an overall strategy that should guide the United States in projecting influence in the war on terror and in pursuing larger global interests. The author then looks at the cultural and institutional problems that have long handicapped the performance of the U.S. government in these areas. The book concludes with a detailed examination of the specific problems facing governmental agencies involved in public diplomacy and kindred disciplines, including the Departments of State and Defense, international broadcasters, and the White House.

This book demonstrates that under the leadership of President Ronald Reagan and through the mechanism of his National Security Council staff, the United States developed and executed a comprehensive grand strategy, involving the coordinated use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power, and that grand strategy led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In doing so, it refutes three orthodoxies: that Reagan and his administration deserve little credit for the end of the Cold War, with most of credit going to Mikhail Gorbachev; that Reagan's management of the National Security Council staff was singularly inept; and that the United States is incapable of generating and implementing a grand strategy that employs all the instruments of national power and coordinates the work of all executive agencies. The Reagan years were hardly a time of interagency concord, but the National Security Council staff managed the successful implementation of its program nonetheless.

This book demonstrates that under the leadership of President Ronald Reagan and through the mechanism of his National Security Council staff, the United States developed and executed a comprehensive grand strategy, involving the coordinated use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power, and that grand strategy led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In doing so, it refutes three orthodoxies: that Reagan and his administration deserve little credit for the end of the Cold War, with most of credit going to Mikhail Gorbachev; that Reagan's management of the National Security Council staff was singularly inept; and that the United States is incapable of generating and implementing a grand strategy that employs all the instruments of national power and coordinates the work of all executive agencies. The Reagan years were hardly a time of interagency concord, but the National Security Council staff managed the successful implementation of its program nonetheless.

This book is a study of proconsulship, a form of delegated political-military leadership historically associated with the governance of large empires. Opening with a conceptual and historical analysis of proconsulship as an aspect of imperial or quasi-imperial rule generally, it surveys its origins and development in the late Roman Republic and its manifestations in the British Empire. The main focus is proconsulship in American history. Beginning with the occupation of Cuba and the Philippines after the Spanish-American War, it discusses the role of General Douglas MacArthur in East Asia during and after World War II, the occupation of Germany (focusing on General Lucius Clay), and proconsular leadership during the Vietnam War and the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan at the turn of the twenty-first century. An additional chapter provides an assessment of the evolution of American political-military command and control and decision making after the end of the Cold War.

What do leaders need to know in order to be effective? Carnes Lord-a political scientist with extensive experience at high levels of American government-here offers witty and trenchant counsel to both leaders and the citizens who elect them. Exploring such issues as leadership in war and crises, diplomacy, intelligence, the media, and the role of political advisors, Lord enumerates the major challenges confronting modern leaders and offers practical advice on how leaders should deal with them. The Modern Prince anticipates-at times in startling fashion-the situation facing the Donald Trump administration in an ongoing political drama that has few precedents in the history of the republic.

The present volume, Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-first Century, is the twenty-sixth in the Newport Papers monograph series, published since 1991 by the Naval War College Press. Its primary aim is to provide a snapshot of a process-the ongoing reconfiguration of America's foreign military "footprint" abroad-that is likely to prove of the most fundamental importance for the long-term security of the United States, yet has so far received little if any systematic attention from national security specialists and still less from the wider public. As such, it serves well the broad mission of the Newport Papers series-to provide rigorous and authoritative analysis, of a sort not readily available in the world of academic or commercial publishing, of issues of strategic salience to the U.S. Navy and the national security community generally. Reposturing the Force is, however, unusual in the manner in which it combines rigor and authoritativeness, for several of its authors are or recently were senior U.S. government officials. Ryan Henry and Lincoln Bloomfield, Jr., have been central figures in the Global Defense Posture Review (initiated by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 2002 as the key mechanism for forcing transformation of the U.S. overseas presence) while serving as, respectively, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. As such, they are uniquely positioned to comment on the unfolding of this vast, complex, and extremely sensitive undertaking, many of the details of which are still in flux or are (and likely will remain) classified. For additional perspective on the subject, however, we have felt it important to include also papers by several independent scholars and policy analysts. Robert Harkavy's opening essay helps to place current developments in the American global posture in a larger historical and strategic framework. Andrew Erickson and Justin Mikolay provide an in-depth analysis of the role of Guam in recent thinking and decisions about the posture of the U.S. military in the western Pacific. Finally, Robert Work examines the emerging concept of "sea basing" in Navy and Marine Corps doctrine and force planning, an integral yet so far largely neglected dimension of the American military presence abroad.

A provocative treatise on the requirements of leadership in the modern world The role of leaders is never more crucial than during times of war. The ability to inspire confidence and communicate resolution is essential to the national interest. The requirements of leadership are not limited to military affairs: citizens look to leaders to guide the economy, protect the laws, and safeguard national values. Leadership has never been simple, but it is even more complicated in the age of mass democracy: globalization, the power of the media, and the constraints of bureaucracy are among the many challenges facing leaders at the beginning of the twenty-first century. What do leaders need to know in order to be effective? Carnes Lord-an eminent political scientist who has held a number of high-level positions in the United States government-here offers witty and trenchant counsel to both leaders and the citizens who elect them. Exploring such issues as leadership in war and crises, diplomacy, the use of secret intelligence, the role of political advisors, and the media, Lord enumerates the major challenges confronting modern leaders and offers practical advice on how leaders can deal with them effectively.