Risk-based capital standards presume a need for common capital standards across countries. The details of forging an agreement were left to the staffs of the primary bank regulators in each country, and compromises were inevitable. Although domestic constituencies' reactions to the proposals were invited, the arduous negotiations that led to the proposals generated intense pressure on the principals not to make changes. The European Community's approach to financial integration seems to be driven by a political desire to achieve an integrated market within Europe, despite significant institution al differences among countries. Underlying that desire is a belief that the market pressures that result from different regulatory systems operating in the same market will produce the right answer . The financial provisions of the U .S.-Canada free-trade agreement take a direction that, in my judgment, is more productive. The provisions are more limited in scope than are those of the European initiative. National treatment and national sovereignty are preserved. However, the delicate issue of national responsibility for failing institutions, and its relationship to monetary policies, is not addressed. A Better Alternative A productive basis for international regulation can be formulated around three principles: 1. free entry for foreign-owned subsidiaries chartered under the laws of the host country; 2. national treatment for those subsidiaries; and 3. national responsibility for (a) monetary policy, (b) prevention of unwarranted financial panics in domestically chartered institutions, whether foreign or domestically owned, and (c) supervision of all domestically chartered institutions, regardless of ownership.

Risk-based capital standards presume a need for common capital standards across countries. The details of forging an agreement were left to the staffs of the primary bank regulators in each country, and compromises were inevitable. Although domestic constituencies' reactions to the proposals were invited, the arduous negotiations that led to the proposals generated intense pressure on the principals not to make changes. The European Community's approach to financial integration seems to be driven by a political desire to achieve an integrated market within Europe, despite significant institutional differences among countries. Underlying that desire is a belief that the market pressures that result from different regulatory systems operating in the same market will produce the right answer. The financial provisions of the U.S.-Canada free-trade agreement take a direction that, in my judgment, is more productive. The provisions are more limited in scope than are those of the European initiative. National treatment and national sovereignty are preserved. However, the delicate issue of national responsibility for failing institutions, and its relationship to monetary policies, is not addressed. A Better Alternative A productive basis for international regulation can be formulated around three principles: 1. free entry for foreign-owned subsidiaries chartered under the laws of the host country; 2. national treatment for those subsidiaries; and 3. national responsibility for (a) monetary policy, (b) prevention of unwarranted financial panics in domestically chartered institutions, whether foreign or domestically owned, and (c) supervision of all domestically chartered institutions, regardless of ownership.

In Chapter 5, William Shughart also considers the part that politics played in banking legislation during the 1930s, but he looks at the banking legislation passed in the United States. Shughart draws par ticular attention to the provisions in the Banking Act of 1933 that required the separation of commercial and investment banking activ ities. Applying a public choice analysis, Shughart asks who gained from the provisions, and he concludes that the commercial banking industry, the investment banking industry, and the U. S. Treasury Department can all be said to have benefited in the years immedi ately following the passage of the act. Richard Timberlake, in his comment, extends Shughart's analysis to show how the federal gov ernment manipulated the monetary policy of the 1930s for its own benefit. The history of the regulation of the savings and loan industry is the subject of Chapter 6. James Barth and Martin Regalia examine the way in which regulation of the industry has evolved since the first savings and loan was established in the 1830s. They conclude that the stated purpose of regulation appears to have changed, even while the regulations themselves often have not. Barth and Regalia provide some important insights into the contribution of thrift regu lation to the current problems facing the indusb-y as well as some suggestions about the direction reform should-and should not take."