Many years after the United States initiated a military response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the nation continues to prosecute what it considers an armed conflict against transnational terrorist groups. Understanding how the law of armed conflict applies to and regulates military operations executed within the scope of this armed conflict against transnational non-state terrorist groups is as important today as it was in September 2001. In The War on Terror and the Laws of War seven legal scholars, each with experience as military officers, focus on how to strike an effective balance between the necessity of using armed violence to subdue a threat to the nation with the humanitarian interest of mitigating the suffering inevitably associated with that use. Each chapter addresses a specific operational issue, including the national right of self-defense, military targeting and the use of drones, detention, interrogation, trial by military commission of captured terrorist operatives, and the impact of battlefield perspectives on counter-terror military operations, while illustrating how the law of armed conflict influences resolution of that issue. This Second Edition carries on the critical mission of continuing the ongoing dialogue about the law from an unabashedly military perspective, bringing practical wisdom to the contentious topic of applying international law to the battlefield.

Many years after the United States initiated a military response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the nation continues to prosecute what it considers an armed conflict against transnational terrorist groups. Understanding how the law of armed conflict applies to and regulates military operations executed within the scope of this armed conflict against transnational non-state terrorist groups is as important today as it was in September 2001. In The War on Terror and the Laws of War seven legal scholars, each with experience as military officers, focus on how to strike an effective balance between the necessity of using armed violence to subdue a threat to the nation with the humanitarian interest of mitigating the suffering inevitably associated with that use. Each chapter addresses a specific operational issue, including the national right of self-defense, military targeting and the use of drones, detention, interrogation, trial by military commission of captured terrorist operatives, and the impact of battlefield perspectives on counter-terror military operations, while illustrating how the law of armed conflict influences resolution of that issue. This Second Edition carries on the critical mission of continuing the ongoing dialogue about the law from an unabashedly military perspective, bringing practical wisdom to the contentious topic of applying international law to the battlefield.

This study analyzes the pitfalls of accepting Army/Marine counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine as the joint solution. It also offers insights and ideas from an Airman's perspective for strengthening joint doctrine development in order to deliver fresh alternatives to our national decision makers and combatant commanders. Major General Dunlap's assessment of Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency-which regrettably reflects a one-dimensional, groundcentric perspective-is an impressive and influential document, skillfully addressing many difficult COIN issues.

1. As you know, in the last few months since the President's death and the abrupt retirement of the Vice President, there have been some instances of public unrest. I fully appreciate that the threat of disorder occasioned by the absence of a Chief Executive precipitated your assumption of power as Commander-in-Chief, UAFUS, and your designation of yourself as permanent Military Plenipotentiary of the United States. It is obvious to me that strong leadership is needed in these troubled times. Indeed, I am convinced that it was inept civilian leadership that caused our defeat in the Second Gulf War. 2. Despite the approval of your actions by The Referendum, it was still necessary to make several arrests for acts of sedition. One of these traitors, I am sorry to say, is a retired officer and a 1992 graduate of the National War College. The officer, Prisoner 222305759, has been convicted by court-martial and is awaiting execution. In violation of my standing orders, the prisoner was allowed writing materials. Somehow he managed to draft a letter to a fellow alumnus chronicling what he calls the "Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012." By hand-writing the letter he defeated the electroscriber scanners we placed in his cell. Fortunately, our security forces were still able to intercept it. 3. Because of its potential interest to you, a copy of the prisoner's letter is attached. As the document indicates, the prisoner evidently had secreted into the stockade old notes, articles, and newspaper clippings he saved from his War College days. These documents were recovered in a search of the prisoner's cell. For your edification, I have had an intelligence agent analyze them and annotate your copy of the letter with endnotes citing these references where appropriate. 4. Upon receipt of your order affirming the sentence of the court, Prisoner 222305759 will be executed in accordance with applicable directives. /s/ Ben N. Dykarnilt General, UAFUS

As the guarantor of international security, the United States must commit to a long-term military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. But what are the tools necessary to succeed on the new battlefields of the Long War? In this volume, a group of the foremost U.S. military officials and national security experts analyze the American experience in Iraq and Afghanistan thus far in order to map a way forward not only for the military, but for diplomats, elected officials, and the American public. Thomas Donnelly, Frederick W. Kagan, and their coauthors offer several core lessons for success in The Long War. They argue that decentralizing command is the key to efficient operations on an ever-changing battlefield; that air power is the unsung hero of counterinsurgency warfare; that public opinion can influence crucial military decisions; and that the military should minimize its role in domestic affairs. Finally, although the battlefields have changed over the last fifty years, the authors contend that America's long-held counterinsurgency strategy to foster political support at home, employ diplomacy overseas, and extend military assistance to allies remains effective. The Long War will not soon be over. But, in the words of retired Army special forces officer Colonel Robert Killebrew, the United States already has "the tools it needs in order to prevail in the wars of the twenty-first century."