This book shows how deregulation is transforming the size, structure, and geographic range of U.S. banks, the scope of banking services, and the nature of bank-customer relationships. Over the past two decades the characteristics that had made American banks different from other banks throughout the world--a fragmented geographical structure of the industry, which restricted the scale of banks and their ability to compete with one another, and strict limits on the kinds of products and services commercial banks could offer--virtually have been eliminated. Understanding the origins and persistence of the unique banking regulations that defined U.S. banking for over a century lends an important perspective on the economic and political causes and consequences of the current process of deregulation.

Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries--but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents. Calomiris and Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why they endure, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation.

This book shows how and why deregulation has transformed the size, structure and geographic range of US banks, the scope of banking services, and the nature of bank-customer relationships. Over recent decades the characteristics that had made American banks different - the fragmented geographical structure of the industry, which restricted the scale of banks and their ability to compete with one another, and strict limits on the kinds of products and services commercial banks could offer - have virtually been eliminated. Understanding the origins and persistence of the unique banking regulations that defined US banking for over a century lends an important perspective on the economic and political causes and consequences of the current process of deregulation. History helps to define the political constituencies for and against deregulation, the political process through which bank regulations are determined, and the way deregulation is likely to affect future bank performance and stability.

Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries--but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, "Fragile by Design" demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents due to unforeseen circumstances. Rather, these fluctuations result from the complex bargains made between politicians, bankers, bank shareholders, depositors, debtors, and taxpayers. The well-being of banking systems depends on the abilities of political institutions to balance and limit how coalitions of these various groups influence government regulations.

"Fragile by Design" is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation. Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why some endure while others are undermined, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues.

China's increasing role in global economic affairs has placed the country at a crossroads: how many and what types of international capital-market transactions will China permit? How will China's financial system change internally? What kind of relationships will the Chinese government develop with foreign financial institutions, especially with those based in the United States? Can China broker a sustainable partnership with America that will avoid sending economic shock waves throughout the world?

Drawing on the contemporary research of prominent international scholars, the experts in this volume outline the trajectory of China's financial markets since the advent of reform and anticipate their uncertain future. Chapter authors and commentators include Geert Bekaert, Loren Brandt, Lee Branstetter, Mary Wadsworth Darby, Michael DeStefano, Barry Eichengreen, Campbell Harvey, Fred Hu, Xiaobo Lu, Christian Lundblad, Ailsa Roell, Daniel Rosen, Shang-Jin Wei, Jialin Yu, and Xiaodong Zhu.

The book begins with an overview of the history of financial-sector development, regulation, and performance and then focuses on the banking sector, discussing the progress, challenges, and prospects of current sector reform. Subsequent chapters describe the role of foreign capital in China's development and analyze the changes in capital flows and controls over time; explore various explanations for China's composition of foreign-capital and foreign-exchange policies, particularly the factors shaping China's reliance on foreign direct investment; and provide an international, comparative perspective on the remarkable growth experience of China and the contribution of its institutional environment to that experience.

Contributors dispute the belief that stock market listing has done little to reform state-owned enterprises and take a hard look at the exchange rate regime choice for China, considering the potential long-run desirability of flexibility and the appropriate sequencing of reforms in foreign-exchange policy, domestic banking reform, and capital-market openness. The book concludes with a roundtable discussion in which prominent economists, including Peter Garber, Robert Hodrick, John Makin, David Malpass, Frederic Mishkin, and Eswar Prasad, debate the pace of the appreciation of China's currency and the likely consequences of that policy within and outside of China.

The authors weigh the functions of this industry, its practices and policies, and the changing nature of the consumer finance marketplace to determine whether limiting such lending would serve the public interest.