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In the 1980s, Britain actively engaged with China in order to
promote globalisation and manage Hong Kong’s decolonisation.
Influenced by neoliberalism, Margaret Thatcher saw Britain as a
global trading nation, which was well placed to serve China’s
reform. During the negotiations over Hong Kong’s future, British
diplomats aimed to educate the Chinese in free-market capitalism.
Nevertheless, Deng Xiaoping held an alternative vision of
globalisation, one that privileged sovereignty and socialism over
market liberalism and democracy. By drawing extensively upon the
declassified British archives along with Chinese sources, this book
explores how Britain and China negotiated for Hong Kong’s future,
and how Anglo-Chinese relations flourished after 1984 but suffered
a setback as a result of the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. This
original study argues that Thatcher was a pragmatic neoliberal, and
the British diplomacy of ‘educating’ China yielded mixed
results. -- .
In 1950 the British government accorded diplomatic recognition to
the newly founded People's Republic of China. But it took 22 years
for Britain to establish full diplomatic relations with China. How
far was Britain's China policy a failure until 1972? This book
argues that Britain and China were involved in the 'everyday Cold
War', or a continuous process of contestation and cooperation that
allowed them to 'normalize' their confrontation in the absence of
full diplomatic relations. From Vietnam and Taiwan to the mainland
and Hong Kong, China's 'everyday Cold War' against Britain was
marked by diplomatic ritual, propaganda rhetoric and symbolic
gestures. Rather than pursuing a failed policy of 'appeasement',
British decision-makers and diplomats regarded engagement or
negotiation with China as the best way of fighting the 'everyday
Cold War'. Based on extensive British and Chinese archival sources,
this book examines not only the high politics of Anglo-Chinese
relations, but also how the British diplomats experienced the Cold
War at the local level.
In 1950 the British government accorded diplomatic recognition to
the newly founded People's Republic of China. But it took 22 years
for Britain to establish full diplomatic relations with China. How
far was Britain's China policy a failure until 1972? This book
argues that Britain and China were involved in the 'everyday Cold
War', or a continuous process of contestation and cooperation that
allowed them to 'normalize' their confrontation in the absence of
full diplomatic relations. From Vietnam and Taiwan to the mainland
and Hong Kong, China's 'everyday Cold War' against Britain was
marked by diplomatic ritual, propaganda rhetoric and symbolic
gestures. Rather than pursuing a failed policy of 'appeasement',
British decision-makers and diplomats regarded engagement or
negotiation with China as the best way of fighting the 'everyday
Cold War'. Based on extensive British and Chinese archival sources,
this book examines not only the high politics of Anglo-Chinese
relations, but also how the British diplomats experienced the Cold
War at the local level.
After 1949, the British Empire in Hong Kong was more vulnerable
than the lack of Chinese demand for return and the success of Hong
Kong's economic transformations might have suggested. Its
vulnerability stemmed as much from Britain's imperial decline and
America's Cold War requirements as from a Chinese threat. It
culminated in the little known '1957 Question', a year when the
British position in Hong Kong appeared more uncertain than any time
since 1949. This is the first scholarly study that places Hong Kong
at the heart of the Anglo-American relationship in the wider
context of the Cold War in Asia. Unlike existing works, which tend
to treat British and US policies in isolation, this book explores
their dynamic interactions - how the two allies perceived,
responded to, and attempted to influence each other's policies and
actions. It also provides a major reinterpretation of Hong Kong's
involvement in the containment of China. Dr Mark argues that,
concerned about possible Chinese retaliation, the British insisted
and the Americans accepted that Hong Kong's role should be as
discreet and non-confrontational in nature as possible. Above all,
top decision-makers in Washington evaluated Hong Kong's
significance not in its own right, but in the context of the
Anglo-American relationship: Hong Kong was seen primarily as a
bargaining chip to obtain British support for US policy elsewhere
in Asia. By using a variety of British and US archival material as
well as Chinese sources, Dr Mark examines how the British and US
government discussed, debated, and disagreed over Hong Kong's role
in the Cold War, and reveals the dynamics of the Anglo-American
alliance and the dilemmas of small allies in a global conflict.
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