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The EU faces a serious crisis of democratic legitimacy. Citizens
believe that the EU is run by distant and non-responsive political
elites. The EU's perceived lack of responsiveness to ordinary
citizens poses a threat to its very survival. This timely book
presents a comprehensive account of how EU governments signal
responsiveness to the interests of their citizens over European
policies. Schneider develops and tests a theoretical framework of
the intergovernmental dimension of responsive governance in the
European Union, using evidence amassed over nearly ten years of
multi-method research. The findings show that European cooperation
in the Council of the European Union takes place in the shadow of
national elections. Governments signal responsiveness to their
publics by taking positions that are in the interests of
politically relevant voters at the national level, defending these
positions throughout negotiations in the Council, and seeking
appropriate policy outcomes at the EU level.
This book was first published in 2008. Each wave of expansion of
the European Union has led to political tensions and conflict.
Existing members fear their membership privileges will diminish and
candidates are loath to concede the expected benefits of
membership. Despite these conflicts, enlargement has always
succeeded - so why does the EU continue to admit new states even
though current members might lose from their accession? Combining
political economy logic with statistical and case study analyses,
Christina J. Schneider argues that the dominant theories of EU
enlargement ignore how EU members and applicant states negotiate
the distribution of enlargement benefits and costs. She explains
that EU enlargement happens despite distributional conflicts if the
overall gains of enlargement are redistributed from the relative
winners among existing members and applicants to the relative
losers. If the overall gains from enlargement are sufficiently
great, a redistribution of these gains will compensate losers,
making enlargement attractive for all states.
This book was first published in 2008. Each wave of expansion of
the European Union has led to political tensions and conflict.
Existing members fear their membership privileges will diminish and
candidates are loath to concede the expected benefits of
membership. Despite these conflicts, enlargement has always
succeeded - so why does the EU continue to admit new states even
though current members might lose from their accession? Combining
political economy logic with statistical and case study analyses,
Christina J. Schneider argues that the dominant theories of EU
enlargement ignore how EU members and applicant states negotiate
the distribution of enlargement benefits and costs. She explains
that EU enlargement happens despite distributional conflicts if the
overall gains of enlargement are redistributed from the relative
winners among existing members and applicants to the relative
losers. If the overall gains from enlargement are sufficiently
great, a redistribution of these gains will compensate losers,
making enlargement attractive for all states.
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