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In this book, Christine Tappolet offers readers a thorough,
wide-ranging, and highly accessible introduction to the philosophy
of emotions. It covers recent interdisciplinary debates on the
nature of emotions as well as standard theories of emotions, such
as feeling theories, motivational theories, and evaluative
theories. The book includes discussions of the alleged
irrationality of emotions, and looks into the question of whether
emotions could not, in some cases, contribute positively to
theoretical and practical rationality. In addition, the role of
emotions in the theory of virtues and the theory of values receives
a detailed treatment. Finally, the book turns to the question of
how we can regulate and even educate our emotions by engaging with
music and with narrative art. The overall picture of emotions that
emerges is one that does justice to the central role that emotions
play in our lives, conceiving of emotions as crucial to our grasp
of values. As an opinionated introduction, the book doesn't pretend
to be neutral but aims to engage readers in contemporary debates.
Each chapter closes with questions for further discussion and
suggestions for further reading. Key Features: Written for advanced
undergraduates, suitable as the main text in a philosophy of
emotion course or as a complement to a set of primary readings
Includes useful features for student readers like introductions,
study questions, and suggestions for further reading in each
chapter Considers whether emotions interfere with our reasoning or
whether they can, in some cases, help us to be more rational Argues
against basic emotion theory and social constructionism that
emotions are both shaped by biological forces and social forces
Discusses a variety of subjectivist and objectivist approaches,
which share the assumption that emotions and values are closely
connected.
In this book, Christine Tappolet offers readers a thorough,
wide-ranging, and highly accessible introduction to the philosophy
of emotions. It covers recent interdisciplinary debates on the
nature of emotions as well as standard theories of emotions, such
as feeling theories, motivational theories, and evaluative
theories. The book includes discussions of the alleged
irrationality of emotions, and looks into the question of whether
emotions could not, in some cases, contribute positively to
theoretical and practical rationality. In addition, the role of
emotions in the theory of virtues and the theory of values receives
a detailed treatment. Finally, the book turns to the question of
how we can regulate and even educate our emotions by engaging with
music and with narrative art. The overall picture of emotions that
emerges is one that does justice to the central role that emotions
play in our lives, conceiving of emotions as crucial to our grasp
of values. As an opinionated introduction, the book doesn't pretend
to be neutral but aims to engage readers in contemporary debates.
Each chapter closes with questions for further discussion and
suggestions for further reading. Key Features: Written for advanced
undergraduates, suitable as the main text in a philosophy of
emotion course or as a complement to a set of primary readings
Includes useful features for student readers like introductions,
study questions, and suggestions for further reading in each
chapter Considers whether emotions interfere with our reasoning or
whether they can, in some cases, help us to be more rational Argues
against basic emotion theory and social constructionism that
emotions are both shaped by biological forces and social forces
Discusses a variety of subjectivist and objectivist approaches,
which share the assumption that emotions and values are closely
connected.
Many people place great stock in the importance of civic virtue to
the success of democratic communities. Is this hope well-grounded?
The fundamental question is whether it is even possible to
cultivate ethical and civic virtues in the first place. Taking for
granted that it is possible, at least three further questions
arise: What are the key elements of civic virtue? How should we
cultivate these virtuous dispositions? And finally, how should
schools be organized in order to make the education of citizen
possible? These interrelated questions are the focus of this
collection. By considering these questions from a variety of
philosophical perspectives ranging from moral psychology,
philosophy of education, and political philosophy, the nine essays
assembled here advance our understanding of the challenges we face
in trying to shape children to be virtuous citizens.
Negative emotions are familiar enough, but they have rarely been a
topic of study in their own right. This volume brings together
fourteen chapters on negative emotions, written in a highly
accessible style for non-specialists and specialists alike. It
starts with chapters on general issues raised by negative emotions,
such as the nature of valence, the theoretical implications of
nasty emotions, the role of negative emotions in fiction, as well
as the puzzles raised by ambivalent and mixed emotions. The second
part of the volume consists of studies of specific emotional
phenomena, ranging from the emotion of being moved and the sense of
uncanniness to jealousy, hatred, shame, contempt, anxiety, and
grief.
Many people place great stock in the importance of civic virtue to
the success of democratic communities. Is this hope well-grounded?
The fundamental question is whether it is even possible to
cultivate ethical and civic virtues in the first place. Taking for
granted that it is possible, at least three further questions
arise: What are the key elements of civic virtue? How should we
cultivate these virtuous dispositions? And finally, how should
schools be organized in order to make the education of citizen
possible? These interrelated questions are the focus of this
collection. By considering these questions from a variety of
philosophical perspectives ranging from moral psychology,
philosophy of education, and political philosophy, the nine essays
assembled here advance our understanding of the challenges we face
in trying to shape children to be virtuous citizens.
Among the many practical failures that threaten us, weakness of
will or akrasia is often considered to be a paradigm of
irrationality. The eleven new essays in this collection, written by
an excellent international team of philosophers, some
well-established, some younger scholars, give a rich overview of
the current debate over weakness of will and practical
irrationality more generally. Issues covered include classical
questions such as the distinction between weakness and compulsion,
the connection between evaluative judgement and motivation, the
role of emotions in akrasia, rational agency, and the existence of
the will. The also include new topics, such as group akrasia,
strength of will, the nature of correct choice, the structure of
decision theory, the temporality of prudential reasons, and
emotional rationality. Because these questions cut across
philosophy of mind and ethics, the collection will be essential
reading for scholars, postgraduates, and upper-level undergraduates
in both these fields.
Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet present eleven original essays on weakness of will, a topic straddling the divide between moral philosophy and philosophy of mind, and the subject of much current attention. An international team of established scholars and younger talent provide perspectives on all the key issues in this fascinating debate; the book will be essential reading for anyone working in the area.
Some concepts, such as colour concepts or value concepts, seem to
bear traces of the mind's own make-up. For instance, an extreme
position would be that colours and values are not in the world at
all, they instead are mere projections that tell us more about the
users of response-dependent concepts than about the world they
inhabit. But even setting aside such extreme views, a number of
important philosophical and psychological questions remain open.
What exactly is response-dependence, and does any concept have this
feature? What is the appropriate metaphysics for properties
represented by response-dependent concepts, and for these concepts
themselves? What determines the extension of such properties? How
are we to account for knowledge expressed in terms of
response-dependent concepts? What mechanisms correctly explain the
origins of response-dependent concepts, and their role in
representation?
Some concepts, such as colour concepts or value concepts, seem to
bear traces of the mind's own make-up. For instance, an extreme
position would be that colours and values are not in the world at
all, they instead are mere projections that tell us more about the
users of response-dependent concepts than about the world they
inhabit. But even setting aside such extreme views, a number of
important philosophical and psychological questions remain open.
What exactly is response-dependence, and does any concept have this
feature? What is the appropriate metaphysics for properties
represented by response-dependent concepts, and for these concepts
themselves? What determines the extension of such properties? How
are we to account for knowledge expressed in terms of
response-dependent concepts? What mechanisms correctly explain the
origins of response-dependent concepts, and their role in
representation?
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