Central Asia and the Caucasus are of immense geopolitical importance for the US and Russia, but neither power has successfully established regional hegemony. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the states of the Caspian region began to develop their oil and gas reserves, and as a result their importance on the international stage is increasing rapidly. Considering the impact of events such as 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iran, alongside issues including national security, energy policies and American ambitions to limit Russian influence, Christopher Bluth explains why the US has failed to establish authority in this globally significant region. Examining US policy from Clinton to Obama and drawing on interviews with leading figures in the US administration, this study presents the first systematic analysis of US policy towards the Caspian states.

This book is a study of cooperative security efforts between the United States and Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It undertakes an analysis of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program and several other programs established by different U.S. Departments. The CTR process demonstrates both, the achievements and limitations of the evolving new framework of interaction between the U.S. and Russia. This investigation is the first attempt to use the CTR process as a case study for U.S.-Russian strategic relations in the post-Cold War international security system. By answering the questions of why this process is prone to some persistent problems of implementation and why it was possible in the first place, it yields significant conclusions regarding the nature of U.S.-Russian relations, and the achievements as well as limitations in the bilateral relationship since the end of the Cold War. "From Antagonism to Partnership" contributes to the existing literature on cooperative threat reduction as a study linking CTR to the wider context of the opportunities, challenges and constraints determining the nature of post-Cold War relations between the U.S. and Russia.

This book gives a comprehensive account of post-war British and German policies towards nuclear weapons and how these interacted in the context of alliance strategy. In this fascinating explanation of an important, but previously unresearched topic, the author gives a detailed account of major episodes in the evolution of the alliance and its doctrine - such as the MLF debate, the origins of flexible response, theatre modernization programmes - and demonstrates how British and German interests impinged upon these episodes. On occasion, these interests converged; at others, they diverged and Britain and Germany took on the role of protagonists. In all of this, one of the less well-known nuclear relationships within the alliance comes vividly into focus. The book tells this part of the alliance's story for the first time, and, in the accounts of the development of German strategy, brings a refreshingly new perspective to the predominant Anglo-American interpretations.

In this book, Christoph Bluth provides an original analysis of one of the most perplexing periods of Soviet foreign and military policy--the build up of strategic forces from the death of Stalin to the SALT I agreement. Bluth outlines Soviet strategic arms policy in this period, identifies the principal interest groups involved and studies a number of critical decisions taken in relation to strategic bombers, strategic nuclear forces based at sea, ballistic missile defence and the military uses of space. Strategic arms policy in the Khrushchev period exhibited a number of apparent paradoxes which the author explains. As well as examining external threat assessment and wider foreign policy, he pays particular attention to the role of domestic factors such as Khrushchev's endeavours to shift resources away from the military industries to agriculture and the production of consumer goods. Bluth is therefore able to demonstrate how domestic priorities and internal power struggles account for some of the seeming inconsistencies of military and foreign policy. Given current reassessments of the nature of the Soviet military threat and the revival of interest in the Khrushchev period, this book is most topical. Using source material hitherto unavailable, Bluth combines, for the first time, an analysis of foreign, military and domestic policy. Soviet strategic arms policy before SALT will, therefore, be of interest to a wide range of students and specialists of Soviet affairs, strategic studies and international relations.

In this book, Dr Christoph Bluth presents an original analysis of the build up of strategic forces from the death of Stalin to the SALT I agreement. The author outlines Soviet strategic arms policy, he identifies the principal interest groups involved and he studies a number of critical decisions taken in relation to strategic bombers, ICBMs, strategic nuclear forces based at sea, ballistic missile defence and the military uses of space. Strategic arms policy in the Khrushchev period exhibited a number of apparent paradoxes, which the author explains. As well as examining external threat assessment and wider foreign policy, he pays particular attention to the role of domestic factors such as Khrushchev's endeavours to shift resource away from military industries to agriculture and consumer goods production. The author is therefore able to demonstrate how domestic priorities and internal power struggles account for the seeming inconsistencies of Soviet military and foreign policy.

India and Pakistan have been in a state of persistent conflict that goes back to the very creation of these states after decolonization. This conflict has resulted in several wars and continuing armed clashes. After both states became nuclear powers, one would have expected a fundamental change in the way they wage war, since it is a fundamental principle of International Relations theory that nuclear-armed states do not go to war with each other. But the situation in South Asia seems to defy this principle. Indias conventional superiority should be neutralized by Pakistans nuclear capability, while Pakistans risk-taking behavior should be reduced. But as a matter of fact, the situation has turned out quite differently: Although large-scale conventional wars have not occurred, the nuclear status seems to have encouraged conflict and risk-taking. The number of armed clashes rose. Bluth and Mumtaz scrutinize the atypical and seemingly paradoxical impact of nuclearization on the conflict between India and Pakistan, paying extra attention on the question of how stable this paradoxical strategic relationship is. They demonstrate that the dominant paradigm used in the International Relations literature is by far not adequate to explain the strategic relations between India and Pakistan and set to work on developing a more coherent explanation. A must-read for everyone interested in International Relations and conflict resolution research.