Many important thinkers in the philosophical tradition, like Aristotle or Hume, have used an explicit theory of action as the basis of their respective normative theories of practical rationality and morality. The idea behind this architecture of theories is that action theory can inform us about the origin, bonds, reach and limits of practical reason. The aim of this book is to revive this direct connection between action theory and practical philosophy, in particular to provide systematic action-theoretical underpinnings for the discussion about the normative structure of practical reason. This book brings together a collection of specially commissioned essays from internationally prestigious scholars in the field and represents the state of the art in contemporary philosophy of action. The book is divided into three parts: i. conceptual work about what actions, intentions and intentional actions are; ii. empirical theory of practical deliberation; and iii.theories about the action theoretic features of autonomy. The volume significantly advances these three lines of research and offers important new contributions to each of them.

Many important thinkers in the philosophical tradition, like Aristotle or Hume, have used an explicit theory of action as the basis of their respective normative theories of practical rationality and morality. The idea behind this architecture of theories is that action theory can inform us about the origin, bonds, reach and limits of practical reason. The aim of this book is to revive this direct connection between action theory and practical philosophy, in particular to provide systematic action-theoretical underpinnings for the discussion about the normative structure of practical reason. This book brings together a collection of specially commissioned essays from internationally prestigious scholars in the field and represents the state of the art in contemporary philosophy of action. The book is divided into three parts: i. conceptual work about what actions, intentions and intentional actions are; ii. empirical theory of practical deliberation; and iii.theories about the action theoretic features of autonomy. The volume significantly advances these three lines of research and offers important new contributions to each of them.

Since the millennium, the neurophysiological and psychological bases of moral judgements and actions have been the topic of much empirical research. This volume discusses the relevance and possible usage of this research for (meta-)ethics and action theory. An overview of the empirical research, followed by critical assessments of several of its results, provides orientation on the research and criteria for its reasonable usage.

Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral)--Universit'at Osnabr'uck, 1988.

The anthropogenous greenhouse effect is in danger of becoming the biggest environmental problem of this century, with enormous negative consequences for mankind. In particular, it threatens to kill hundreds of millions of people. Unfortunately, the economic costs for preventing these consequences, according to traditional economic assessment, are gigantic. In The Greenhouse, Christoph Lumer provides moral evaluations of the greenhouse effect and of some of its alternatives, from utilitarian and welfarist perspectives. Relying on economists' estimates of the social consequences of the greenhouse effect and on psychological information about influences on subjective well being, business as usual and three more or less severe greenhouse gas abatement options are assessed from the points of view of hedonistic utilitarianism and of welfare ethics, which incorporate components of distributive justice. These evaluations and theoretical considerations about moral duties justify moral obligations to deal now, and seriously, with the greenhouse effect.