On 24 February 2022, the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, unleashed an attack on Ukraine that developed into the most significant conflict in Europe since the Second World War. Fought over the same ground that the Germans and the Soviet Union battled on between 1941 and 1944, Russia attempted to advance to the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv and replace its president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, with a puppet regime. Facing determined resistance, the Russians failed to reach the city, being compelled to withdraw and re-direct their forces to other fronts. The Battle of Kyiv tells the story of the heroic resilience of the Ukrainians over the military forces of a country which has more than three times its population and an economy almost ten times larger. This book is also an analysis of the enormous support given to Ukraine, both politically and militarily, by NATO and other nations, without which Ukraine’s military might have failed to beat back the invaders. The author explores the first phase of the war, during which Russian armour, mechanized and air mobile troops drove on Kyiv, surrounded Chernihiv, seized Kherson twice, and threatened the very existence of the Ukrainian state. The United States’ intelligence services estimated that the Russians would seize Kyiv within three days. They offered to evacuate President Zelensky back to Lviv. His alleged response to the Americans was: ‘I need ammunition, not a ride.’ He and his government stayed in Kyiv and the battle lines were drawn. The Russians continued their offensive. As well as bearing down on Kyiv and Kherson, Putin’s troops also threatened Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and the beleaguered port city of Mariupol. This book covers all the fighting for these areas up until Russia’s subsequent withdraw from the region around Kyiv. It addresses the military operations on the ground, the destruction of the buildings and the Ukrainian infrastructure, the suffering of the civilian population and the day-by-day struggles for survival. Writing as the battle raged on, the author examines the conflict with an unparalleled immediacy and poignancy. The Battle of Kyiv is an important historical document depicting the uncertainty and anxiety faced by the contesting forces and by the rest of the world as the war in Ukraine hung in the balance.

War by Numbers assesses the nature of conventional warfare through the analysis of historical combat. Christopher A. Lawrence establishes what we know about conventional combat and why we know it. By demonstrating the impact a variety of factors have on combat he moves such analysis beyond the work of Carl von Clausewitz and into modern data and interpretation. Using vast data sets, Lawrence examines force ratios, the human factor in case studies from World War II and beyond, the combat value of superior situational awareness, and the effects of dispersion, among other elements. Lawrence challenges existing interpretations of conventional warfare and shows how such combat should be conducted in the future, simultaneously broadening our understanding of what it means to fight wars by the numbers.

While the past half-century has seen no diminution in the valor and fighting skill of the U.S. military and its allies, the fact remains that our wars have become more protracted, with decisive results more elusive. With only two exceptions-Panama and the Gulf War under the first President Bush-our campaigns have taken on the character of endless slogs without positive results. This fascinating book takes a ground-up look at the problem in order to assess how our strategic objectives have recently become divorced from our true capability, or imperatives. The book presents a unique examination of the nature of insurgencies and the three major guerrilla wars the United States has fought in Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam. It is both a theoretical work and one that applies the hard experience of the last five decades to address the issues of today. As such, it also provides a timely and meaningful discussion of America's current geopolitical position. It starts with the previously close-held casualty estimate for Iraq that The Dupuy Institute compiled in 2004 for the U.S. Department of Defense. Going from the practical to the theoretical, it then discusses a construct for understanding insurgencies and the contexts in which they can be fought. It applies these principles to Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam, assessing where the projection of U.S. power can enhance our position and where it merely weakens it. It presents an extensive analysis of insurgencies based upon a unique database of 83 post-WWII cases. The book explores what is important to combat and what is not important to resist in insurgencies. As such, it builds a body of knowledge based upon a half-century's worth of real-world data, with analysis, not opinion. In these pages, Christopher A. Lawrence, the President of The Dupuy Institute, provides an invaluable guide to how the U.S. can best project its vital power, while avoiding the missteps of the recent past.

The Battle of Kursk was one of the defining moments of World War II. In July 1943, German forces under Erich von Manstein--one of Germany’s best generals--launched a massive attack in an offensive code-named Citadel. A week later, the Soviets counterattacked, sparking a huge clash of tanks at Prokhorovka, the largest armor battle in history, pitting more than 600 Soviet tanks against some 300 German panzers. Though the Germans gained a tactical victory, destroying huge numbers of Soviet tanks, they failed to achieve their objectives, and in the end the battle marked a turning point on the Eastern Front. The Red Army gained the strategic initiative and would not lose it.