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This is a book on metaethics and moral epistemology. It asks two
fundamental questions: (i) Is there any such thing as
(non-relative) moral truth?; and (ii) If there is such truth, how
do we come into epistemic contact with it? Roughly the first half
of the book is aimed at answering the first question. Its animating
idea is that we should take our ordinary, tutored moral judgments
seriously-judgments typified by our conviction that it is clearly
true that some acts, policies, social norms et al. are morally
right or wrong, permissible or impermissible, praiseworthy or
condemnable, etc., no matter when, where, or by whom they are
performed. In order to provide a firm conceptual basis for such
judgments, the book develops a theory of moral truth, based on a
theory of moral facts. The account of moral truth and moral facts
is further grounded on a theory of moral properties. In short, the
book develops a theory of moral realism, roughly, the view that
there are indeed non-relative, first-order moral truths. The second
half of the book is aimed at answering the second question above.
Building squarely on the metaethical theories developed earlier,
the book argues for a non-empiricist theory of justified moral
belief and knowledge. Pivotal to this project is a careful analysis
of various forms of moral skepticism, by which I mean any
conception of morality substantially at odds with the general
contours of our ordinary moral thinking. All such skepticisms are
rejected, and in their place a broadly intuitionist, epistemically
fallibilist theory of moral knowledge is advanced. The conclusion
reached is that we have very strong reason to believe that our
ordinary moral thinking, although certainly liable to error, is
fundamentally sound. Moral knowledge is ubiquitous.
This is a book on metaethics and moral epistemology. It asks two
fundamental questions: (i) Is there any such thing as
(non-relative) moral truth?; and (ii) If there is such truth, how
do we come into epistemic contact with it? Roughly the first half
of the book is aimed at answering the first question. Its animating
idea is that we should take our ordinary, tutored moral judgments
seriously-judgments typified by our conviction that it is clearly
true that some acts, policies, social norms et al. are morally
right or wrong, permissible or impermissible, praiseworthy or
condemnable, etc., no matter when, where, or by whom they are
performed. In order to provide a firm conceptual basis for such
judgments, the book develops a theory of moral truth, based on a
theory of moral facts. The account of moral truth and moral facts
is further grounded on a theory of moral properties. In short, the
book develops a theory of moral realism, roughly, the view that
there are indeed non-relative, first-order moral truths. The second
half of the book is aimed at answering the second question above.
Building squarely on the metaethical theories developed earlier,
the book argues for a non-empiricist theory of justified moral
belief and knowledge. Pivotal to this project is a careful analysis
of various forms of moral skepticism, by which I mean any
conception of morality substantially at odds with the general
contours of our ordinary moral thinking. All such skepticisms are
rejected, and in their place a broadly intuitionist, epistemically
fallibilist theory of moral knowledge is advanced. The conclusion
reached is that we have very strong reason to believe that our
ordinary moral thinking, although certainly liable to error, is
fundamentally sound. Moral knowledge is ubiquitous.
This is a book on metaethics-in particular, an inquiry into the
metaphysical foundations of morality. After carefully exploring the
metaphysical commitments, or lack thereof, of the leading versions
of moral anti-realism, Kulp develops a new and in-depth theory of
moral realism. Starting with the firm recognition of the importance
of our common sense belief that we possess a great deal of moral
knowledge-that, for example, some acts are objectively right and
some objectively wrong-the book goes on to examine the metaphysical
grounds of various skeptical responses to this perspective. In
great part, the book is devoted to developing a version of realist
metaethics: specifically, developing in detail realist theories of
moral truth, moral facts, and moral properties.Concluding with the
rejection of prominent contemporary forms of moral anti-realism,
Kulp presents a rigorous non-naturalistic theory of moral realism,
and a vindication of the basic commitments of commonsense moral
thought.
This is a book on metaethics-in particular, an inquiry into the
metaphysical foundations of morality. After carefully exploring the
metaphysical commitments, or lack thereof, of the leading versions
of moral anti-realism, Kulp develops a new and in-depth theory of
moral realism. Starting with the firm recognition of the importance
of our common sense belief that we possess a great deal of moral
knowledge-that, for example, some acts are objectively right and
some objectively wrong-the book goes on to examine the metaphysical
grounds of various skeptical responses to this perspective. In
great part, the book is devoted to developing a version of realist
metaethics: specifically, developing in detail realist theories of
moral truth, moral facts, and moral properties.Concluding with the
rejection of prominent contemporary forms of moral anti-realism,
Kulp presents a rigorous non-naturalistic theory of moral realism,
and a vindication of the basic commitments of commonsense moral
thought.
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