This book discusses the role of public policy in Article 81 of the EC Treaty. The Commission and (recently) the Court of First Instance have said that the sole objective of Article 81 EC is consumer welfare. Many competition lawyers and economists support this view. Writing in a crisp, plain style, author Christopher Townley demonstrates that public policy considerations are still relevant in that provision. He also examines how and where they are currently considered and then he suggests why, how, and where this might be changed. The book explains how some of the most complex competition law cases can be understood and it offers a framework for those fighting or deciding such cases in the future. As such, it will be of interest to European competition lawyers, both academics and practitioners (furnishing them with a framework for hard cases), as well as students seeking a deeper understanding of how the European competition rules work and how they interact both with European Union and Member State public policy goals. The book will also help competition economists by revealing the mechanisms through which public policy considerations impact the consumer welfare test in European law.

This book focuses on the problems faced by newly-established competition authorities, and on shaping policies and building institutions in those jurisdictions. In particular four key issues encountered by new competition jurisdictions are considered, namely: the challenges and obstacles to adopting competition laws; institutional challenges and choices, with a specific focus on deterrence; the global perspective, with a specific focus on mergers; and a discussion of how to help young academics in new jurisdictions. Theoretical analysis is informed by practice throughout, and in particular by those considered to be at the cutting edge, either working in new competition authorities or from specialists advising them on a daily basis (such as those in the OECD and UNCTAD). New Competition Jurisdictions will be of great interest to lawyers, economists, academics, judges and public officials working in the fields of competition law and policy. Contributors: M. Agarwal, M. Botta, M. Chowdhury, J. Davies, M.S. Gal, D.J. Gerber, C.A. Jones, W.E. Kovacic, D. Lewis, C. Schatan, U. Schwager, H. Shahein, J. Tapia, C. Townley, K. Weeks, R. Whish

In its own words, the mission of the International Competition Network (the ICN) is to advocate the adoption of "superior standards and procedures in competition policy around the world, formulate proposals for procedural and substantive convergence, and seek to facilitate effective international cooperation to the benefit of member agencies, consumers and economies worldwide." ICN members include nearly all competition authorities (NCAs) from around the world (over 100 of them). Since its inception, the ICN has also sought to enrich its discussions and outputs through the inclusion of non-governmental advisors (NGAs), principally large multi-nationals and the legal and economic professions. The ICN is a transnational network, set up by its members, largely without wider state input. This book hypothesises that the ICN's formally neutral structures provide powerful influence mechanisms for strong NCAs and NGAs, over the weak; and 'competition experts' over wider state interests, discussing the legitimacy of this from a political and legal theory perspective, analysing the ICN's effectiveness and efficiency, and suggesting ways that the ICN can improve all three. This study has important implications for the ICN itself, particularly as it launches its 'Third Decade Project', billed as a full self-evaluation. However, the story told here is also relevant to states and the wider regulatory community, due to the widespread use of transnational networks.

This book asks whether the current push to increase uniformity in substantive and procedural competition policy and enforcement in Europe, as well as in related institutional structures, is desirable. It focuses on European Union (EU) competition policy and enforcement (related to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the merger rules), the equivalent rules in the Member States, and the relationships between these different legal orders. Uniformity has many benefits; yet, the advantages of diversity are also legion, enabling more policy experimentation and innovation; and improving the ability to accommodate national preferences. Contrary to the overwhelming view of academics, practitioners and regulators in this area, the book argues that uniformity is insufficient and examines ways of achieving a better mix of uniformity and diversity (the EU's motto is 'United in Diversity'). To achieve this better mix, the book offers a new framework for European competition law: Co-ordinated Diversity. Finally, this book discusses whether Co-ordinated Diversity fits with the current legal order in the EU, as well as the EU constitutional settlement more generally, and suggests some ways that it might be made compatible with this order with relative ease. The book's impact could be significant: changing the results in individual cases; the way cases are argued; and what information is relevant. More importantly, it builds the theoretical foundations for fundamentally altering the way in which the EU and the Member States' competition authorities interact, allowing space for disagreement and uncertainty. The aim is to improve the effiiciency and effectiveness of competition policy-making and enforcement in Europe. It should also increase the legitimacy in this field (rebalancing towards the Member States). Co-ordinated Diversity provides a new way of seeing the EU that better blends difference, when this is demanded, with uniformity and its benefits, as necessary. A timely and ambitious work, this book will be read with interest by all practitioners and academics interested in EU competition law, as well as the related fields of political science and economics.