This book explores the issue of private sector over-indebtedness following the recent financial crisis. It addresses the various challenges for policymakers, investors and economic agents affected by applied remedial policies as the private non-financial sector in Europe continues to face increased challenges in servicing its debt, with the problem mainly concentrated in several countries in the EU periphery and Eastern Europe. Chapters from expert contributors address reduced investment as firms concentrate on deleveraging and repairing their balance sheets, curtailed consumer spending, depressed collateral values and weak credit creation. They examine effective policies to facilitate private sector debt restructuring which may involve significant upfront costs in terms of time to implement and committed budgetary resources, as well as necessary reforms required to improve the broader institutional framework and judicial capacity. The book also explores the issue of over indebtedness in the household sector, contributing to the literature in establishing best practice principles for household debt.

The COVID-19 pandemic and the global response to it has led to a major upheaval of the international banking sector. This book has an international reach and constitutes a blend between theory and international, EU, comparative and national law and practice, with the primary purpose to review the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the architecture and content of international monetary and banking law. Part I is focused on this aspect, considering the response of international financial fora and some major central banks all over the globe to the crisis. A secondary purpose is considered in Parts II and III, offering a thorough overview, analysis, and discussion of two main issues which currently are of a significant importance for, and have heavy impact on, the law governing monetary policy and relations, banking regulation and payment systems law: (i) digitalisation of money and finance and (ii) sustainable finance. Other selected legal aspects relating to central banking, as well as to banking regulation and supervision are finally discussed in Part IV, and in particular central banks' independence and accountability, unconventional monetary policies, comparative aspects of central banking and banking failures, legal aspects of monetary integration, and the legal nature of financial standards. The individual Chapters are written, exclusively, by members of the Committee on International Monetary Law of the International Law Association (MOCOMILA) and reflect the global composition of this Committee of leading experts in international monetary and banking law from international financial institutions, central banks, the academia, the judiciary, and legal practice.

Since the global financial crisis of 2008, claims by clients, shareholders, depositors, and bondholders of financial firms have increased against financial supervisors and resolution authorities for inadequate supervision or resolution action. Liability of Financial Supervisors and Resolution Authorities is the first book to offer a thorough and systematic analysis of the liability regimes which apply to financial supervisors and resolution authorities at the EU level (particularly relevant since the European Banking Union came into operation in 2014), at the level of individual EU Member States, as well as in other major jurisdictions worldwide. The jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction approach provides a detailed analysis of the liability regimes as they apply to local financial supervisors and resolution authorities in major civil law, common law, and mixed legal system jurisdictions. This global view of the primary financial jurisdictions as examples provides a unique and comprehensive overview which is of great practical and theoretical importance. The work concludes with a comparative law evaluation that discusses to what extent limitations of the liability of national financial supervisors and resolution authorities are valid under the EU rules on Member State liability. It also explores whether it would be preferable to adopt a uniform liability standard for the European Central Bank (ECB), the Single Resolution Board (SRB), and national financial supervisors and resolution authorities. Furthermore, it addresses whether it would be preferable to adopt a provision to the effect that the Court of Justice of the European Union has exclusive jurisdiction in relation to the ECB, SRB, and the national financial supervisors and resolution authorities.