The state's use of the threat, and imposition, of punishments to regulate conduct is thought (or at least said) by many to be legitimised by the idea that the criminal law's burdens only fall on those who are blameworthy for their conduct. However, the formal concept of 'blameworthiness' needs to be made substantive. This puts various ideas regarding the criminal law's person at the heart of debates about blame, guilt, and responsibility. How is the criminal law's person constructed, by whom, and with what disciplinary norms? How is it threatened by new 'knowledge', and how do those threats play out amongst the various stakeholders who claim the criminal law's person as 'theirs'? To address these and cognate questions, this volume brings together an international group of academics to engage with the criminal law's person from a range of disciplinary perspectives.

The overarching objective of this volume is to discuss and critique the legal regulation of human trafficking in national and transnational context. Specifically, discussion is needed not only with regard to the historical and philosophical points of departure for any criminalisation of trafficking, but also, regarding the societal and social framework, the empirical dimension such as existing statistics in the area, and the need for more data. The book combines descriptive and normative analyses of the crime of trafficking in human beings from a cross-legal perspective. Notwithstanding the enhanced interest for human trafficking in politics, the public and the media, a critical perspective such as the one pursued herewith has so far been largely absent. Against this background, this approach allows for theoretical findings to be addressed by pointing out and elaborating different, interdisciplinary conflicts and inconsistencies in the regulation of human trafficking. The book discusses the phenomenon of human trafficking critically from various angles, giving it 'shape' and showing how it comes to life in the legal regulation.

The idea of a cultural defense in criminal law is often ridiculed as "multiculturalism run amok ". To allow someone charged with a crime to say "this is my culture " as an excuse for their action seems to open the door to cultural relativism, to jeopardize the protection of fundamental rights, and to undermine norms of individual responsibility. Many scholars, however, insist that cultural evidence is appropriate, indeed essential, for the fair operation of the criminal law. The criminal law is society's most powerful tool for regulating behaviour, and just for that reason we apply strong safeguards to ensure that criminal sanctions are applied in a fair way. When it comes to individuals, we want our rules for judging responsibility and punishment to track the actual blameworthiness of the specific individual being prosecuted for a specific action in the past. Cultural evidence may help improve our judgements of individual blameworthiness and desert; indeed, cultural evidence might even be necessary if the practice of punishing individuals is to be legitimate and equitable. According to its proponents, the use of cultural evidence when judging individual blameworthiness is a natural extension of the logic of existing criminal law doctrines regarding defences, and of the logic of current philosophical theories of responsibility and agency. This volume brings together scholars of both criminal law and philosophy to rigorously assess these ideas. Each of the chapters addresses a different dimension of the issue, from a range of perspectives, with varying degrees of sympathy or scepticism regarding cultural defences. The result is an important and original contribution to the literature. It explores why cultural diversity raises distinctive challenges in the criminal law context, not found in other domains of the multiculturalism debate, while also exploring how this particular context raises fundamental issues of agency and responsibility that are at the heart of broader debates in legal, social and political philosophy.

The state’s use of the threat, and imposition, of punishments to regulate conduct is thought (or at least said) by many to be legitimised by the idea that the criminal law’s burdens only fall on those who are blameworthy for their conduct. However, the formal concept of ‘blameworthiness’ needs to be made substantive. This puts various ideas regarding the criminal law’s person at the heart of debates about blame, guilt, and responsibility. How is the criminal law’s person constructed, by whom, and with what disciplinary norms? How is it threatened by new ‘knowledge’, and how do those threats play out amongst the various stakeholders who claim the criminal law’s person as ‘theirs’? To address these and cognate questions, this volume brings together an international group of academics to engage with the criminal law’s person from a range of disciplinary perspectives.

The overarching objective of this volume is to discuss and critique the legal regulation of human trafficking in national and transnational context. Specifically, discussion is needed not only with regard to the historical and philosophical points of departure for any criminalisation of trafficking, but also, regarding the societal and social framework, the empirical dimension such as existing statistics in the area, and the need for more data. The book combines descriptive and normative analyses of the crime of trafficking in human beings from a cross-legal perspective. Notwithstanding the enhanced interest for human trafficking in politics, the public and the media, a critical perspective such as the one pursued herewith has so far been largely absent. Against this background, this approach allows for theoretical findings to be addressed by pointing out and elaborating different, interdisciplinary conflicts and inconsistencies in the regulation of human trafficking. The book discusses the phenomenon of human trafficking critically from various angles, giving it 'shape' and showing how it comes to life in the legal regulation.