Constitutionalizing Criminal Law calls for an overhaul of the way the Supreme Court has developed the relationship between criminal and constitutional law. The court has relied heavily on its power to constitutionalize principles of “fundamental justice” under section 7 of the Charter. In so doing, it employs both principles of criminal law theory and instrumental rationality. The court less frequently invokes enumerated Charter rights when striking down criminal laws. This book persuasively argues that the court should abandon the use of instrumental rationality and constitutionalize principles of criminal law theory only when an unjust criminal law cannot be struck down using an enumerated right.

Constitutionalizing Criminal Law calls for an overhaul of the way the Supreme Court has developed the relationship between criminal and constitutional law. The court has relied heavily on its power to constitutionalize principles of "fundamental justice" under section 7 of the Charter. In so doing, it employs both principles of criminal law theory and instrumental rationality. The court less frequently invokes enumerated Charter rights when striking down criminal laws. This book persuasively argues that the court should abandon the use of instrumental rationality and constitutionalize principles of criminal law theory only when an unjust criminal law cannot be struck down using an enumerated right.