Reprint of book originally published in 1926.

On 7 December 1941 the United States suffered a devastating surprise attack that thrust it into a worldwide war. Our enemy had extensively planned the attack, conducted detailed reconnaissance of its target to determine how to achieve the most destruction, and had innovatively planned the operation to overcome all obstacles. Two services that needed to work together were never ordered to do so, losing synergy that was sorely needed. The United States had indications that an attack was possible but had no single agency to gather all of the available information for an analysis that would suggest an attack. When the attack started, there were indications that something large was happening, but the word was never spread, and our enemy's attack was devastating. Sixty years later the United States was again thrust it into a worldwide war. On 11 September 2001 enemies of our nation conducted an overwhelming surprise attack against our homeland. Our enemy had again meticulously planned the operation and conducted extensive reconnaissance of its targets before its destructive attacks. Many agencies in our government had indications of an attack, but again, there was no single agency that analyzed all available intelligence to provide us a warning. As word of the attack spread, people refused to accept that the impossible was happening, and again our enemy delivered an overwhelming attack. As our nation prosecutes the global war on terrorism, it is imperative that we in the profession of arms study those events in which our homeland has been successfully and directly attacked in the past. While attacking our enemies around the world, we must first ensure that our homeland remains completely protected and safe. Not only should we study the tactics, techniques, and procedures of recent operations, but we also need to study history-events where we analyze the actions of both attacked and defender so we are better prepared to handle similar situations that may arise in the future. We should study what mistakes we made and what things we did well as well as the enemy's successes and failures. We must do all of this to increase our ability to prevent another attack on the United States. The United States is a nation in which it is easy to move about and see, even in a time of war, and our homeland is now a part of the battlespace, a target for our enemies. How do we prevent an enemy from observing a target when it is not overtly breaking the law? Our many intelligence agencies provide outstanding intelligence, but how do we gather all of the information to synergistically determine our enemies' intentions and get this information to the commanders who need it? Our job is to keep America safe, and even when we are in the midst of fighting a war, it is critical that we take the time to study the past so we do not make the same mistakes in the future. All dates used in this book are Hawaiian time (Japan is one day ahead of Hawaii). The attack on Pearl Harbor occurred on 7 December, which was 8 December in Japan.

In the years after invading Iraq and Afghanistan, the US military realized that it had a problem: How does a military force set the economic conditions for security success? This problem was certainly not novel-the military had confronted it before in such diverse locations as Grenada, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The scale and complexity of the problem, however, were unlike anything military planners had confronted beforehand. This was especially the case in Iraq, where some commentators expected oil production to drive reconstruction.1 When the fragile state of Iraq's infrastructure and a rapidly deteriorating security situation prevented this from happening, the problem became even more vexing: Should a military force focus on security first, or the economy? How can it do both? This is the challenge of Stability Economics.

Since the early 20th century the US Army has used Civil War and other battlefields as "outdoor classrooms" in which to educate and train its officers. Employing a methodology developed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1906, both the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and US Army War College conducted numerous battlefield staff rides to prepare officers for duties in both war and peace. Often interrupted by the exigencies of the nation's wars, the tradition was renewed and reinvigorated at Fort Leavenworth in the early 1980s. Since 1983 the Leavenworth Staff Ride Team has guided military students on battlefields around the world. For those unable to avail themselves directly of the team's services the Combat Studies Institute has begun to produce a series of staff ride guides to serve in lieu of a Fort Leavenworth instructor. The newest volume in that series, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Gudmens' "Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Shiloh, 6-7 April 1862" is a valuable study that examines the key considerations in planning and executing the campaign and battle. Modern tacticians and operational planners will find themes that still resonate. Gudmens demonstrates that leaders in Blue and Gray, in facing the daunting tasks of this, the bloodiest battle to this point on the continent, rose to the challenge. They were able to meet this challenge through planning, discipline, ingenuity, leadership, and persistence-themes worthy of reflection by today's leaders. Combat Studies Institute.

The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to present Long War Occasional Paper 27, "The Challenge of Adaptation: The US Army in the Aftermath of Conflict, 1953-2000," by CSI historian Mr. Robert Davis. Using three case studies from the late twentieth century, Davis examines the processes by which the US Army sought to prepare itself for the future after the conclusion of a major conflict. It is essentially a study of how, in the wake of major conflict, the Army "learned its lessons." In each of these periods - post Korean War, post Vietnam War, and post Cold War - the Army examined its existing institutional structures and processes, force structure, training and educational systems, and doctrine to prepare for an uncertain future. Following the Korean War, the nation struggled to define the role of ground forces in a Cold War era seemingly dominated by airpower and nuclear weapons. The Army also wrestled with the conceptual problem of creating a "dual-capable" force which could fight on both nuclear and conventional battlefields. President Kennedy's "Flexible Response" defense strategy and the Vietnam War abruptly ended the Army's unsatisfactory Pentomic Era. By contrast, after the Vietnam War the nation and the Army re-emphasized a "threat based" approach to developing and measuring its capabilities against the clearly defined military threats posed by the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. During the seventeen years between 1973 and 1990, the Army implemented wide-ranging institutional, doctrinal, training, educational and force structure changes which yielded an Army of unprecedented capability by the first Gulf War in 1991. After the end of the Cold War, however, the nation and the Army faced a very uncertain national security situation without a clearly definable threat. Like the advent of the nuclear era some fifty years prior, the information age seemed to call into question the role of ground forces in future military operations. Following a decade of unconventional operations in the 1990s, the Army launched another wide-ranging transformation effort in 1999 using a new "capabilities based" model to prepare itself for uncertain future military threats. The events of 9/11 and the declaration of the war on terror in 2001 again refocused the nation and the Army on the role of ground forces in the 21st century. This study provides insights into how the US Army sought to prepare for the future at the end of major conflicts, and suggests approaches which Army leaders may wish to keep in mind as they continue to adapt to evolving circumstances and realities.

Consider the following: The United States is engaged in what some political and media leaders call an immoral war, a war that did not have to be fought. After a relatively easy initial conquest, the US Army finds itself faced with armed resistance to US occupation. US strategic goals have changed since the war began; domestic political opposition increases as insurgent activities prolong the war. Insurgent leaders monitor US domestic politics and adjust their strategy accordingly. US Army Soldiers adapt to the uncertainty and employ novel techniques to complex military and nonmilitary problems in a land where they are strangers and about which they have little understanding. Does this sound familiar? It should, but this description does not depict events from 2003 to 2007 in the Middle East-it describes events from 1898 to 1902 in the Philippines. Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to publish its 24th Long War Series Occasional Paper, Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1902, by CSI historian Robert Ramsey. In it he analyzes case studies from two key Philippine military districts and highlights several themes that are relevant to today's ongoing operations in the Long War. Between 1899 and 1902 the US Army was successful in defeating Filipino resistance to American occupation using what military leaders at the time called a combination of attraction and coercion. However, success came only after initial setbacks, disappointments, and significant changes in leadership, military strategy, and political adaptation. In the two regions of the Luzon Island analyzed in this occasional paper, Army leaders employed a mix of political and economic incentives, combined with military actions and strict martial law to subdue the resistance. The geographic isolation of the insurrectos on the Philippine archipelago was also an advantage for US forces. The capture of key insurrecto leaders provided critical intelligence, and their post-capture pledge of support for the new government helped break the resistance by 1902. This work highlights, among many other themes, the importance of perseverance, adaptability, and cultural understanding. Written at the request of the Command and General Staff College for use in their curriculum, we believe this occasional paper will be a valuable addition to the professional development of all Army leaders.

The United States failed in both Lebanon in 1982-1984 and Iraq in 2003, to achieve its political objectives. While there are many reasons for this, perhaps the greatest is that the government failed to coordinate and direct all of its resources in a unified manner to achieve its goals. This book outlines four key indicators, present in both Lebanon and Iraq, that suggest the United States did not have a grand strategy. Further, this book reveals that Lebanon and Iraq are not anomalies; there are both historical and structural reasons why the United States struggles to implement grand strategies.

The initial conflicts in the Global War on Terrorism, Afghanistan and Iraq, pose significant challenges for the armed forces of the United States and its coalition allies. Among the challenges is the use of field artillery in those campaigns that fall short of conventional warfare. Engaged in a spectrum from full-scale combat to stability and support operations, the military is faced with an ever-changing environment in which to use its combat power. For instance, it is axiomatic that the massive application of firepower necessary to destroy targets in decisive phase III combat operations is not necessary in phase IV stability operations. However, the phasing of campaigns has become increasingly fluid as operations shift from phase III to IV and back to phase III, or activities in one portion of a country are in phase IV while in another portion phase III operations rage. The challenges of this environment are significant but not new. The US military has faced them before, in places like the American West, the Philippines, Latin America, Vietnam, and others. Dr. Larry Yates' study, Field Artillery in Military Operations Other Than War: An Overview of the US Experience, captures the unique contributions of that branch in a variety of operational experiences. In doing so, this work provides the modern officer with a reference to the continuing utility of field artillery in any future conflict. combat Studies Institute.

Historians tend to agree that Ramon Magsaysay's leadership and his relationship with Edward Lansdale are two of the most important features of the Philippine governments campaign against the Huks from 1946-1954. Yet the nuances of his leadership and the nature of their relationship deserve greater investigation. This thesis seeks to further illuminate Magsaysay and Lansdale's relationship by focusing on the role of empathy and sociocultural understanding, in defeating the Huks and restoring the Philippine government's legitimacy. US policy in the Philippines at the time, bolstered regimes riddled with corruption, graft, and nepotism, reinforcing poor governance, and resulting in a loss of government legitimacy. This energized the Huk movement until they were on the verge of toppling the government. A change in US policy coincided with the emergence of Magsaysay and Lansdale. They reversed Huk momentum, rejuvenated the demoralized and oppressive armed forces, and restored the Philippine government's legitimacy, all in less than four years. Their shared, genuine empathy for the Filipino people fostered deep sociocultural understanding. Their combined capabilities and resources then translated empathy and sociocultural understanding into concrete measures to combat the Huks and rebuild popular support for the government.