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Reprint of book originally published in 1926.
On 7 December 1941 the United States suffered a devastating
surprise attack that thrust it into a worldwide war. Our enemy had
extensively planned the attack, conducted detailed reconnaissance
of its target to determine how to achieve the most destruction, and
had innovatively planned the operation to overcome all obstacles.
Two services that needed to work together were never ordered to do
so, losing synergy that was sorely needed. The United States had
indications that an attack was possible but had no single agency to
gather all of the available information for an analysis that would
suggest an attack. When the attack started, there were indications
that something large was happening, but the word was never spread,
and our enemy's attack was devastating. Sixty years later the
United States was again thrust it into a worldwide war. On 11
September 2001 enemies of our nation conducted an overwhelming
surprise attack against our homeland. Our enemy had again
meticulously planned the operation and conducted extensive
reconnaissance of its targets before its destructive attacks. Many
agencies in our government had indications of an attack, but again,
there was no single agency that analyzed all available intelligence
to provide us a warning. As word of the attack spread, people
refused to accept that the impossible was happening, and again our
enemy delivered an overwhelming attack. As our nation prosecutes
the global war on terrorism, it is imperative that we in the
profession of arms study those events in which our homeland has
been successfully and directly attacked in the past. While
attacking our enemies around the world, we must first ensure that
our homeland remains completely protected and safe. Not only should
we study the tactics, techniques, and procedures of recent
operations, but we also need to study history-events where we
analyze the actions of both attacked and defender so we are better
prepared to handle similar situations that may arise in the future.
We should study what mistakes we made and what things we did well
as well as the enemy's successes and failures. We must do all of
this to increase our ability to prevent another attack on the
United States. The United States is a nation in which it is easy to
move about and see, even in a time of war, and our homeland is now
a part of the battlespace, a target for our enemies. How do we
prevent an enemy from observing a target when it is not overtly
breaking the law? Our many intelligence agencies provide
outstanding intelligence, but how do we gather all of the
information to synergistically determine our enemies' intentions
and get this information to the commanders who need it? Our job is
to keep America safe, and even when we are in the midst of fighting
a war, it is critical that we take the time to study the past so we
do not make the same mistakes in the future. All dates used in this
book are Hawaiian time (Japan is one day ahead of Hawaii). The
attack on Pearl Harbor occurred on 7 December, which was 8 December
in Japan.
In the years after invading Iraq and Afghanistan, the US military
realized that it had a problem: How does a military force set the
economic conditions for security success? This problem was
certainly not novel-the military had confronted it before in such
diverse locations as Grenada, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The scale
and complexity of the problem, however, were unlike anything
military planners had confronted beforehand. This was especially
the case in Iraq, where some commentators expected oil production
to drive reconstruction.1 When the fragile state of Iraq's
infrastructure and a rapidly deteriorating security situation
prevented this from happening, the problem became even more vexing:
Should a military force focus on security first, or the economy?
How can it do both? This is the challenge of Stability Economics.
Since the early 20th century the US Army has used Civil War and
other battlefields as "outdoor classrooms" in which to educate and
train its officers. Employing a methodology developed at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1906, both the U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College and US Army War College conducted numerous
battlefield staff rides to prepare officers for duties in both war
and peace. Often interrupted by the exigencies of the nation's
wars, the tradition was renewed and reinvigorated at Fort
Leavenworth in the early 1980s. Since 1983 the Leavenworth Staff
Ride Team has guided military students on battlefields around the
world. For those unable to avail themselves directly of the team's
services the Combat Studies Institute has begun to produce a series
of staff ride guides to serve in lieu of a Fort Leavenworth
instructor. The newest volume in that series, Lieutenant Colonel
Jeffrey Gudmens' "Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Shiloh, 6-7
April 1862" is a valuable study that examines the key
considerations in planning and executing the campaign and battle.
Modern tacticians and operational planners will find themes that
still resonate. Gudmens demonstrates that leaders in Blue and Gray,
in facing the daunting tasks of this, the bloodiest battle to this
point on the continent, rose to the challenge. They were able to
meet this challenge through planning, discipline, ingenuity,
leadership, and persistence-themes worthy of reflection by today's
leaders. Combat Studies Institute.
The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to present Long War
Occasional Paper 27, "The Challenge of Adaptation: The US Army in
the Aftermath of Conflict, 1953-2000," by CSI historian Mr. Robert
Davis. Using three case studies from the late twentieth century,
Davis examines the processes by which the US Army sought to prepare
itself for the future after the conclusion of a major conflict. It
is essentially a study of how, in the wake of major conflict, the
Army "learned its lessons." In each of these periods - post Korean
War, post Vietnam War, and post Cold War - the Army examined its
existing institutional structures and processes, force structure,
training and educational systems, and doctrine to prepare for an
uncertain future. Following the Korean War, the nation struggled to
define the role of ground forces in a Cold War era seemingly
dominated by airpower and nuclear weapons. The Army also wrestled
with the conceptual problem of creating a "dual-capable" force
which could fight on both nuclear and conventional battlefields.
President Kennedy's "Flexible Response" defense strategy and the
Vietnam War abruptly ended the Army's unsatisfactory Pentomic Era.
By contrast, after the Vietnam War the nation and the Army
re-emphasized a "threat based" approach to developing and measuring
its capabilities against the clearly defined military threats posed
by the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. During the seventeen years between
1973 and 1990, the Army implemented wide-ranging institutional,
doctrinal, training, educational and force structure changes which
yielded an Army of unprecedented capability by the first Gulf War
in 1991. After the end of the Cold War, however, the nation and the
Army faced a very uncertain national security situation without a
clearly definable threat. Like the advent of the nuclear era some
fifty years prior, the information age seemed to call into question
the role of ground forces in future military operations. Following
a decade of unconventional operations in the 1990s, the Army
launched another wide-ranging transformation effort in 1999 using a
new "capabilities based" model to prepare itself for uncertain
future military threats. The events of 9/11 and the declaration of
the war on terror in 2001 again refocused the nation and the Army
on the role of ground forces in the 21st century. This study
provides insights into how the US Army sought to prepare for the
future at the end of major conflicts, and suggests approaches which
Army leaders may wish to keep in mind as they continue to adapt to
evolving circumstances and realities.
Consider the following: The United States is engaged in what some
political and media leaders call an immoral war, a war that did not
have to be fought. After a relatively easy initial conquest, the US
Army finds itself faced with armed resistance to US occupation. US
strategic goals have changed since the war began; domestic
political opposition increases as insurgent activities prolong the
war. Insurgent leaders monitor US domestic politics and adjust
their strategy accordingly. US Army Soldiers adapt to the
uncertainty and employ novel techniques to complex military and
nonmilitary problems in a land where they are strangers and about
which they have little understanding. Does this sound familiar? It
should, but this description does not depict events from 2003 to
2007 in the Middle East-it describes events from 1898 to 1902 in
the Philippines. Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to
publish its 24th Long War Series Occasional Paper, Savage Wars of
Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900-1902,
by CSI historian Robert Ramsey. In it he analyzes case studies from
two key Philippine military districts and highlights several themes
that are relevant to today's ongoing operations in the Long War.
Between 1899 and 1902 the US Army was successful in defeating
Filipino resistance to American occupation using what military
leaders at the time called a combination of attraction and
coercion. However, success came only after initial setbacks,
disappointments, and significant changes in leadership, military
strategy, and political adaptation. In the two regions of the Luzon
Island analyzed in this occasional paper, Army leaders employed a
mix of political and economic incentives, combined with military
actions and strict martial law to subdue the resistance. The
geographic isolation of the insurrectos on the Philippine
archipelago was also an advantage for US forces. The capture of key
insurrecto leaders provided critical intelligence, and their
post-capture pledge of support for the new government helped break
the resistance by 1902. This work highlights, among many other
themes, the importance of perseverance, adaptability, and cultural
understanding. Written at the request of the Command and General
Staff College for use in their curriculum, we believe this
occasional paper will be a valuable addition to the professional
development of all Army leaders.
The United States failed in both Lebanon in 1982-1984 and Iraq in
2003, to achieve its political objectives. While there are many
reasons for this, perhaps the greatest is that the government
failed to coordinate and direct all of its resources in a unified
manner to achieve its goals. This book outlines four key
indicators, present in both Lebanon and Iraq, that suggest the
United States did not have a grand strategy. Further, this book
reveals that Lebanon and Iraq are not anomalies; there are both
historical and structural reasons why the United States struggles
to implement grand strategies.
The initial conflicts in the Global War on Terrorism, Afghanistan
and Iraq, pose significant challenges for the armed forces of the
United States and its coalition allies. Among the challenges is the
use of field artillery in those campaigns that fall short of
conventional warfare. Engaged in a spectrum from full-scale combat
to stability and support operations, the military is faced with an
ever-changing environment in which to use its combat power. For
instance, it is axiomatic that the massive application of firepower
necessary to destroy targets in decisive phase III combat
operations is not necessary in phase IV stability operations.
However, the phasing of campaigns has become increasingly fluid as
operations shift from phase III to IV and back to phase III, or
activities in one portion of a country are in phase IV while in
another portion phase III operations rage. The challenges of this
environment are significant but not new. The US military has faced
them before, in places like the American West, the Philippines,
Latin America, Vietnam, and others. Dr. Larry Yates' study, Field
Artillery in Military Operations Other Than War: An Overview of the
US Experience, captures the unique contributions of that branch in
a variety of operational experiences. In doing so, this work
provides the modern officer with a reference to the continuing
utility of field artillery in any future conflict. combat Studies
Institute.
Historians tend to agree that Ramon Magsaysay's leadership and his
relationship with Edward Lansdale are two of the most important
features of the Philippine governments campaign against the Huks
from 1946-1954. Yet the nuances of his leadership and the nature of
their relationship deserve greater investigation. This thesis seeks
to further illuminate Magsaysay and Lansdale's relationship by
focusing on the role of empathy and sociocultural understanding, in
defeating the Huks and restoring the Philippine government's
legitimacy. US policy in the Philippines at the time, bolstered
regimes riddled with corruption, graft, and nepotism, reinforcing
poor governance, and resulting in a loss of government legitimacy.
This energized the Huk movement until they were on the verge of
toppling the government. A change in US policy coincided with the
emergence of Magsaysay and Lansdale. They reversed Huk momentum,
rejuvenated the demoralized and oppressive armed forces, and
restored the Philippine government's legitimacy, all in less than
four years. Their shared, genuine empathy for the Filipino people
fostered deep sociocultural understanding. Their combined
capabilities and resources then translated empathy and
sociocultural understanding into concrete measures to combat the
Huks and rebuild popular support for the government.
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