Reprint of book originally published in 1926.

On 7 December 1941 the United States suffered a devastating surprise attack that thrust it into a worldwide war. Our enemy had extensively planned the attack, conducted detailed reconnaissance of its target to determine how to achieve the most destruction, and had innovatively planned the operation to overcome all obstacles. Two services that needed to work together were never ordered to do so, losing synergy that was sorely needed. The United States had indications that an attack was possible but had no single agency to gather all of the available information for an analysis that would suggest an attack. When the attack started, there were indications that something large was happening, but the word was never spread, and our enemy's attack was devastating. Sixty years later the United States was again thrust it into a worldwide war. On 11 September 2001 enemies of our nation conducted an overwhelming surprise attack against our homeland. Our enemy had again meticulously planned the operation and conducted extensive reconnaissance of its targets before its destructive attacks. Many agencies in our government had indications of an attack, but again, there was no single agency that analyzed all available intelligence to provide us a warning. As word of the attack spread, people refused to accept that the impossible was happening, and again our enemy delivered an overwhelming attack. As our nation prosecutes the global war on terrorism, it is imperative that we in the profession of arms study those events in which our homeland has been successfully and directly attacked in the past. While attacking our enemies around the world, we must first ensure that our homeland remains completely protected and safe. Not only should we study the tactics, techniques, and procedures of recent operations, but we also need to study history-events where we analyze the actions of both attacked and defender so we are better prepared to handle similar situations that may arise in the future. We should study what mistakes we made and what things we did well as well as the enemy's successes and failures. We must do all of this to increase our ability to prevent another attack on the United States. The United States is a nation in which it is easy to move about and see, even in a time of war, and our homeland is now a part of the battlespace, a target for our enemies. How do we prevent an enemy from observing a target when it is not overtly breaking the law? Our many intelligence agencies provide outstanding intelligence, but how do we gather all of the information to synergistically determine our enemies' intentions and get this information to the commanders who need it? Our job is to keep America safe, and even when we are in the midst of fighting a war, it is critical that we take the time to study the past so we do not make the same mistakes in the future. All dates used in this book are Hawaiian time (Japan is one day ahead of Hawaii). The attack on Pearl Harbor occurred on 7 December, which was 8 December in Japan.

Ad bellum Pace Parati: prepared in peace for war. This sentiment was much on the mind of Captain Arthur L. Wagner as he contemplated the quality of military education at the Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, during the 1890s.

In July 2002 the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) was reconstituted and given a new charter by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commander, General John Abrams. One of the three missions outlined in that charter is to conduct original, interpretive research on historical topics pertinent to the current doctrinal concerns of the US Army. Having published some 10 works in the intervening two years, CSI is now poised to initiate a new series addressing important facets of the Global War on Terrorism. Lieutenant Colonel Louis DiMarco's Traditions, Changes, and Challenges: Military Operations and the Middle Eastern City is the first in that series called Occasional Papers. The Middle East is one of the most urbanized regions of the world, and growth continues at an unprecedented rate. With operations ongoing in the Middle East today, it is fitting that this inaugural study should focus on military aspects of the urban areas of that region. There is an undoubted need for US military planners to possess a solid foundation of military history, cultural awareness, and an understanding of the intricacies of city design and function in this critical region. Each conflict brings its own challenges and dynamics. The challenges of a Middle Eastern fight require decisive involvement in that region's cities. The enemy is adaptive-we must be adaptive as well. This call to study and understand history and culture is the first step along that road to critical thinking and adaptability. The purpose of this work is to examine the major features of the Middle Eastern city and evaluate the military significance of those features. It intends to serve as a starting point for military professionals, particularly commanders and key staff officers at the Army battalion through corps level, planning or conducting operations in the region. This study should provide the context within which more detailed study, evaluation, and observation can be conducted. Although this study is mindful of the ongoing Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) fight, it was initiated before OIF began and does not specifically reflect its area of operations or lessons learned. This study emphasizes the traditional aspects of the Middle Eastern city because those features are most unique and distinct from western European and North American city design with which military professionals are familiar. In addition, the old city core is often the center of religious activity and thus is disproportionately politically and socially influential. The physical aspects of the traditional Middle Eastern city are examined here in detail-mosques, suqs, residences, and quarters. Also examined in some depth is the less obvious relationship between the Islamic religion and the Middle Eastern urban environment. How the modern Middle Eastern city has changed from its traditional form and the challenges associated with that rapid change are also covered in this study. These facets of the old Middle Eastern city are examined by reference to contemporary travel guides; academic works in the fields of Middle East history, urban geography, history, architecture, and city design; appropriate military manuals and publications; and contemporary travel narratives. This work connects the description of Middle Eastern city design to the conduct of full-spectrum military urban operations. It does this through referencing American and Israeli urban warfare experts, current Army and Joint doctrine described in US Army Field Manual 3-06, Urban Operations and Joint Publication 3-06, Joint Urban Operations, other relevant official publications, and historical experiences. Although the author did conduct limited travel in some of the region's urban centers, circumstances require that this paper primarily rely on open-source research. Finally, the reader should understand that this work is a survey of general regional characteristics.

In the years after invading Iraq and Afghanistan, the US military realized that it had a problem: How does a military force set the economic conditions for security success? This problem was certainly not novel-the military had confronted it before in such diverse locations as Grenada, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The scale and complexity of the problem, however, were unlike anything military planners had confronted beforehand. This was especially the case in Iraq, where some commentators expected oil production to drive reconstruction.1 When the fragile state of Iraq's infrastructure and a rapidly deteriorating security situation prevented this from happening, the problem became even more vexing: Should a military force focus on security first, or the economy? How can it do both? This is the challenge of Stability Economics.

Since the early 20th century the US Army has used Civil War and other battlefields as "outdoor classrooms" in which to educate and train its officers. Employing a methodology developed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1906, both the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and US Army War College conducted numerous battlefield staff rides to prepare officers for duties in both war and peace. Often interrupted by the exigencies of the nation's wars, the tradition was renewed and reinvigorated at Fort Leavenworth in the early 1980s. Since 1983 the Leavenworth Staff Ride Team has guided military students on battlefields around the world. For those unable to avail themselves directly of the team's services the Combat Studies Institute has begun to produce a series of staff ride guides to serve in lieu of a Fort Leavenworth instructor. The newest volume in that series, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Gudmens' "Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Shiloh, 6-7 April 1862" is a valuable study that examines the key considerations in planning and executing the campaign and battle. Modern tacticians and operational planners will find themes that still resonate. Gudmens demonstrates that leaders in Blue and Gray, in facing the daunting tasks of this, the bloodiest battle to this point on the continent, rose to the challenge. They were able to meet this challenge through planning, discipline, ingenuity, leadership, and persistence-themes worthy of reflection by today's leaders. Combat Studies Institute.

The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to present Long War Occasional Paper 27, "The Challenge of Adaptation: The US Army in the Aftermath of Conflict, 1953-2000," by CSI historian Mr. Robert Davis. Using three case studies from the late twentieth century, Davis examines the processes by which the US Army sought to prepare itself for the future after the conclusion of a major conflict. It is essentially a study of how, in the wake of major conflict, the Army "learned its lessons." In each of these periods - post Korean War, post Vietnam War, and post Cold War - the Army examined its existing institutional structures and processes, force structure, training and educational systems, and doctrine to prepare for an uncertain future. Following the Korean War, the nation struggled to define the role of ground forces in a Cold War era seemingly dominated by airpower and nuclear weapons. The Army also wrestled with the conceptual problem of creating a "dual-capable" force which could fight on both nuclear and conventional battlefields. President Kennedy's "Flexible Response" defense strategy and the Vietnam War abruptly ended the Army's unsatisfactory Pentomic Era. By contrast, after the Vietnam War the nation and the Army re-emphasized a "threat based" approach to developing and measuring its capabilities against the clearly defined military threats posed by the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. During the seventeen years between 1973 and 1990, the Army implemented wide-ranging institutional, doctrinal, training, educational and force structure changes which yielded an Army of unprecedented capability by the first Gulf War in 1991. After the end of the Cold War, however, the nation and the Army faced a very uncertain national security situation without a clearly definable threat. Like the advent of the nuclear era some fifty years prior, the information age seemed to call into question the role of ground forces in future military operations. Following a decade of unconventional operations in the 1990s, the Army launched another wide-ranging transformation effort in 1999 using a new "capabilities based" model to prepare itself for uncertain future military threats. The events of 9/11 and the declaration of the war on terror in 2001 again refocused the nation and the Army on the role of ground forces in the 21st century. This study provides insights into how the US Army sought to prepare for the future at the end of major conflicts, and suggests approaches which Army leaders may wish to keep in mind as they continue to adapt to evolving circumstances and realities.

Since the mid-19th century, the United States has frequently employed the US Army on its southern border to perform various roles in support of the Nation - from outright war, to patrolling the border, to chasing bandits while securing persons and property on both sides of the border, and most recently to supporting civil law enforcement and antidrug efforts. Events since 9/11, such as the recent deployment of National Guard Soldiers to the Mexican border, are only the latest manifestation of this long tradition. This 22nd Occasional paper in the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Long War Series, "The US Army on the Mexican Border: A Historical Perspective," by CSI historian Matt M. Matthews, reviews the lengthy history of the US Army on the Mexican border and highlights recurring themes that are relevant to today's ongoing border security mission. Between 1846 and the early decades of the 20th century, the US Army carried out its security missions under a variety of hardships imposed by the massive length and ruggedness of the border. The shortage of soldiers to police the new and oft-disputed border also proved especially problematic. Mexican domestic politics and US-Mexican international relations greatly affected the Army's operations. Since the 1920s, the Army's role has been dramatically different, ranging from noninvolvement to varied forms of support to local, state, and Federal civilian agencies. Mr. Matthews' narrative brings to light these complexities and makes for compelling reading. The ongoing, post-9/11 debate over the military's role in securing our Nation's southern border makes this paper important reading for today's Soldiers. While current and future missions will not mirror those of the past, the historical record is replete with insights and lessons learned from the Army's past that are timely and relevant today.

The United States failed in both Lebanon in 1982-1984 and Iraq in 2003, to achieve its political objectives. While there are many reasons for this, perhaps the greatest is that the government failed to coordinate and direct all of its resources in a unified manner to achieve its goals. This book outlines four key indicators, present in both Lebanon and Iraq, that suggest the United States did not have a grand strategy. Further, this book reveals that Lebanon and Iraq are not anomalies; there are both historical and structural reasons why the United States struggles to implement grand strategies.

The initial conflicts in the Global War on Terrorism, Afghanistan and Iraq, pose significant challenges for the armed forces of the United States and its coalition allies. Among the challenges is the use of field artillery in those campaigns that fall short of conventional warfare. Engaged in a spectrum from full-scale combat to stability and support operations, the military is faced with an ever-changing environment in which to use its combat power. For instance, it is axiomatic that the massive application of firepower necessary to destroy targets in decisive phase III combat operations is not necessary in phase IV stability operations. However, the phasing of campaigns has become increasingly fluid as operations shift from phase III to IV and back to phase III, or activities in one portion of a country are in phase IV while in another portion phase III operations rage. The challenges of this environment are significant but not new. The US military has faced them before, in places like the American West, the Philippines, Latin America, Vietnam, and others. Dr. Larry Yates' study, Field Artillery in Military Operations Other Than War: An Overview of the US Experience, captures the unique contributions of that branch in a variety of operational experiences. In doing so, this work provides the modern officer with a reference to the continuing utility of field artillery in any future conflict. combat Studies Institute.

The command of military forces in combat is unlike any other field of human endeavor. If war is the ultimate form of human competition, then the commander is the ultimate competitor. The commander operates in an environment of chance, uncertainty, and chaos, in which the stakes are, quite literally, life and death. The commander is ultimately responsible for every variable that factors into military success or failure-training, logistics, morale, equipment, planning, and execution. The commander reaps the lion's share of plaudits in victory, but also must accept the blame in defeat, warranted or not. Very often the line that separates fame and ignominy is slender indeed. It is not difficult to identify "great" commanders, though the overwhelming majority of generals who win battles are never considered "great." The truly great commander is generally considered to be one who attains the unexpected or the unprecedented; one who stands above his contemporaries through his skill on the battlefield, or through the sheer magnitude of his accomplishments. In selecting the seven great commanders presented in this volume, the contributors sought to cover a wide spectrum of military endeavor, encompassing a very broad time-frame, different nationalities and cultures, and representatives from ground, sea, and air warfare. The commanders selected were masters of warfare in their particular time and environment. Each capitalized upon the social, political, economic, and technological conditions of his day to forge successful military forces and win significant and noteworthy victories that profoundly altered the world in which he lived. In regards to social context, the societies from which these seven leaders sprang varied tremendously, ranging from the nomadic tribal cultures of Asia to American industrial-age egalitarianism. Each commander faced particular challenges in operating within the social norms of his day and age. These norms govern how leaders are selected, who serves in the military, and to what purpose military operations are conducted. The great commander recognizes these norms, and extracts the maximum possible military effectiveness from them. Similarly, this study embraces a wide variety of political contexts. Each of the seven commanders herein proved adept at operating within the political milieu of his era, understanding if not manipulating the political systems of his country to best advantage. Three of the seven were not only great commanders but also sovereign rulers. Warfare is also closely shaped by its economic context, and the commanders in this study were both enabled and restrained by the economic world in which they lived. Ultimately, economics determines how many men, how much materiel, and how much treasure can be expended in waging any given war, and the successful commander makes the most of the resources his economy affords him. Technology is commonly thought to be one of the key determinants in victory or defeat, but wars won chiefly through technological superiority are actually rather rare in history. Finally, each of the commanders in this study demonstrated extraordinary qualities of leadership in the cauldron of combat. Moral courage, force of will, and a capacity for critical reasoning under stress are all required for a commander to succeed in the chaos, fog, and friction of war. All of the commanders represented in this volume possessed these traits to a remarkable degree. Many other generals could have been included-some familiar names will be conspicuous by their absence. Since the circumstances and context of every war differ, there is no intent to prove that these are the "greatest" seven commanders ever-any attempt to apply a "scorecard" mentality to war as practiced in different places and times is essentially futile. The commanders selected for this volume include: Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, Napoleon Bonaparte, Horatio Nelson, John J. Pershing, Erwin Rommel, and Curtis LeMay

In this monograph, Dr. Whitfield "Chip" East provides a pragmatic history of physical readiness training in our Army. He tells us we initially mirrored the professional Armies of Europe as they prepared their forces for war on the continent. Then he introduces us to some master trainers, and shows us how they initiated an American brand of physical conditioning when our forces were found lacking in the early wars of the last century. Finally, he shows us how we have and must incorporate science (even when there exists considerable debate ) to contribute to what we do-and how we do it-in shaping today's Army. Dr. East provides the history, the analysis, and the pragmatism, and all of it is geared to understanding how our Army has and must train Soldiers for the physical demands of combat.