The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to present Long War Series Occasional Paper 26, "We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War" by CSI historian Mr. Matt M. Matthews. The outcome of the war that was, at best, a stalemate for Israel has confounded military analysts throughout the world. Long considered the most professional and powerful army in the Middle East, with a history of impressive military victories against its enemies, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) emerged from the campaign with its enemies undefeated and its prestige severely tarnished. Matthews's historical analysis of the war includes an examination of IDF and Hezbollah doctrine prior to the war, as well as an overview of the operational and tactical problems encountered by the IDF during the war. His research convincingly argues that the Israeli reliance on poorly understood and controversial Effects-Based Operations (EBO) and Systemic Operational Design (SOD) warfighting theories, and a nearly singular dependence on air power, were root causes of Israeli problems. Additionally, after years of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Gaza Strip and West Bank territories, IDF ground forces were tactically unprepared and untrained to fight against a determined Hezbollah force that conducted what was, in many ways, a conventional, fixed-position defense. IN research this study, Mr. Matthews interviewed several prominent IDF officers and other experts in the field, many of whom had not previously been interviewed. The result is an insightful, comprehensive examination of the war. In 2006, Hezbollah demonstrated that terrorist groups around the world are capable of learning from, adapting to, and exploiting weaknesses in conventional military forces. Inasmuch as the US Army has focused almost exclusively on irregular warfare since 2001, the lessons offered in this analysis are particularly relevant. We believe that this study will be of great use to the US Army as it conducts current operations and prepares for an uncertain future in which potential enemies are watching and learning.

On 7 December 1941 the United States suffered a devastating surprise attack that thrust it into a worldwide war. Our enemy had extensively planned the attack, conducted detailed reconnaissance of its target to determine how to achieve the most destruction, and had innovatively planned the operation to overcome all obstacles. Two services that needed to work together were never ordered to do so, losing synergy that was sorely needed. The United States had indications that an attack was possible but had no single agency to gather all of the available information for an analysis that would suggest an attack. When the attack started, there were indications that something large was happening, but the word was never spread, and our enemy's attack was devastating. Sixty years later the United States was again thrust it into a worldwide war. On 11 September 2001 enemies of our nation conducted an overwhelming surprise attack against our homeland. Our enemy had again meticulously planned the operation and conducted extensive reconnaissance of its targets before its destructive attacks. Many agencies in our government had indications of an attack, but again, there was no single agency that analyzed all available intelligence to provide us a warning. As word of the attack spread, people refused to accept that the impossible was happening, and again our enemy delivered an overwhelming attack. As our nation prosecutes the global war on terrorism, it is imperative that we in the profession of arms study those events in which our homeland has been successfully and directly attacked in the past. While attacking our enemies around the world, we must first ensure that our homeland remains completely protected and safe. Not only should we study the tactics, techniques, and procedures of recent operations, but we also need to study history-events where we analyze the actions of both attacked and defender so we are better prepared to handle similar situations that may arise in the future. We should study what mistakes we made and what things we did well as well as the enemy's successes and failures. We must do all of this to increase our ability to prevent another attack on the United States. The United States is a nation in which it is easy to move about and see, even in a time of war, and our homeland is now a part of the battlespace, a target for our enemies. How do we prevent an enemy from observing a target when it is not overtly breaking the law? Our many intelligence agencies provide outstanding intelligence, but how do we gather all of the information to synergistically determine our enemies' intentions and get this information to the commanders who need it? Our job is to keep America safe, and even when we are in the midst of fighting a war, it is critical that we take the time to study the past so we do not make the same mistakes in the future. All dates used in this book are Hawaiian time (Japan is one day ahead of Hawaii). The attack on Pearl Harbor occurred on 7 December, which was 8 December in Japan.

On 13 July 2008, nine American Soldiers perished while fighting a pitched battle in the village of Wanat in Afghanistan's Waygal Valley. On that day, the men of Company C, 2d Battalion, 503d Parachute Infantry Regiment, endured four hours of intense close quarters combat and mounting casualties. The contingent of 49 United States and 24 Afghan National Army Soldiers valiantly defended their small outpost against a coordinated attack by a determined insurgent force armed with rocket propelled grenades and automatic weapons. Despite the initial advantage of tactical surprise and numerical superiority, it was the insurgents who ultimately broke contact and withdrew from Combat Outpost Kahler. Army historians recognized the need to better understand the Battle of Wanat and ensure those who followed learned from the experiences of the courageous Soldiers who defended their outpost with such tenacity. As initial reports from the battle were received, the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas began to prepare a historical analysis of the circumstances of the Battle of Wanat, launching an exhaustive research effort that produced a comprehensive and compelling example of contemporary history. This study offers an objective narrative of the events surrounding the Battle of Wanat. It does not seek to draw final conclusions or to second guess decisions made before or during the heat of battle. Rather, it is an implement of learning, allowing the reader to see the events of that day through the eyes of the leaders and Soldiers of Task Force Rock. It is meant to provide context to the chaos and complexity of modern conflict, and to help the reader better understand and appreciate the nature of operations in an era of persistent conflict. Finally, this study serves to honor and preserve the memories of the nine brave men who gave their lives at Combat Outpost Kahler.

This study, "Survival Through Adaptations: The Chinese Red Army and the Extermination Campaigns, 1927-1936," analyzes the Chinese Red Army from 1927 to 1936 to determine how the Red Army survived attacks from external military forces and also successfully overcame the threats to its existence posed by changing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policies. During this period, the CCP attempted to develop, expand, and professionalize the Chinese Red Army as a way to defend Communist base areas from a series of Kuomingtang (KMT) Extermination Campaigns. Also during these years, changes in the CCP leadership often placed the Red Army in dangerous situations by underestimating the KMT military threat and overestimating Red Army capabilities. This re-examination of the origin and development of the Chinese People's Liberation Army looks at the Chinese Red Army's strategy, tactics, organization, and training and identifies four themes that helped it adapt and survive: a pragmatic strategy focused on long-term success; creating local populace support through adaptation; strong soldier recruiting, training, and retention; and a comprehensive officer development system.

Ad bellum Pace Parati: prepared in peace for war. This sentiment was much on the mind of Captain Arthur L. Wagner as he contemplated the quality of military education at the Infantry and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, during the 1890s.

In July 2002 the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) was reconstituted and given a new charter by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commander, General John Abrams. One of the three missions outlined in that charter is to conduct original, interpretive research on historical topics pertinent to the current doctrinal concerns of the US Army. Having published some 10 works in the intervening two years, CSI is now poised to initiate a new series addressing important facets of the Global War on Terrorism. Lieutenant Colonel Louis DiMarco's Traditions, Changes, and Challenges: Military Operations and the Middle Eastern City is the first in that series called Occasional Papers. The Middle East is one of the most urbanized regions of the world, and growth continues at an unprecedented rate. With operations ongoing in the Middle East today, it is fitting that this inaugural study should focus on military aspects of the urban areas of that region. There is an undoubted need for US military planners to possess a solid foundation of military history, cultural awareness, and an understanding of the intricacies of city design and function in this critical region. Each conflict brings its own challenges and dynamics. The challenges of a Middle Eastern fight require decisive involvement in that region's cities. The enemy is adaptive-we must be adaptive as well. This call to study and understand history and culture is the first step along that road to critical thinking and adaptability. The purpose of this work is to examine the major features of the Middle Eastern city and evaluate the military significance of those features. It intends to serve as a starting point for military professionals, particularly commanders and key staff officers at the Army battalion through corps level, planning or conducting operations in the region. This study should provide the context within which more detailed study, evaluation, and observation can be conducted. Although this study is mindful of the ongoing Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) fight, it was initiated before OIF began and does not specifically reflect its area of operations or lessons learned. This study emphasizes the traditional aspects of the Middle Eastern city because those features are most unique and distinct from western European and North American city design with which military professionals are familiar. In addition, the old city core is often the center of religious activity and thus is disproportionately politically and socially influential. The physical aspects of the traditional Middle Eastern city are examined here in detail-mosques, suqs, residences, and quarters. Also examined in some depth is the less obvious relationship between the Islamic religion and the Middle Eastern urban environment. How the modern Middle Eastern city has changed from its traditional form and the challenges associated with that rapid change are also covered in this study. These facets of the old Middle Eastern city are examined by reference to contemporary travel guides; academic works in the fields of Middle East history, urban geography, history, architecture, and city design; appropriate military manuals and publications; and contemporary travel narratives. This work connects the description of Middle Eastern city design to the conduct of full-spectrum military urban operations. It does this through referencing American and Israeli urban warfare experts, current Army and Joint doctrine described in US Army Field Manual 3-06, Urban Operations and Joint Publication 3-06, Joint Urban Operations, other relevant official publications, and historical experiences. Although the author did conduct limited travel in some of the region's urban centers, circumstances require that this paper primarily rely on open-source research. Finally, the reader should understand that this work is a survey of general regional characteristics.

The Law of War: Can 20th-Century Standards Apply to the Global War on Terrorism? is the ninth offering in the Combat Studies Institute's (CSI) Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Papers series. Mr. David Cavaleri, a retired Armor lieutenant colonel and CSI historian, has produced a study that examines the evolution and continued applicability of the corpus, both conventional and customary, that constitutes the law of war. As background, Mr. Cavaleri provides a theoretical framework and the development of the law within Western and, specifically, US Army doctrine and regulation. He then presents a case study of the British suppression of the Mau Mau insurgency in 1950s Kenya, a conflict with particular resonance today. Some of the more relevant characteristics of the "emergency," as it was called, include the clash between Western and non-Western cultures and an initially asymmetric fight between conventional security forces and loosely organized, poorly equipped insurgents. The genesis of this study is the public discourse, both explicit and implicit, asserting the possibility that the GWOT may require new rules and new law-of-war prescripts. This important discussion is fraught with complexities and long-term implications; the moral force in warfare is incredibly significant and any changes to the legal framework in place must be very carefully considered. Do we follow the law of war to the letter, do we remain "consistent with the principles of Geneva," or do we approach the conflict as a new challenge requiring fundamental revisions to the law? These are the options Mr. Cavaleri addresses, and we are pleased to contribute this Occasional Paper to the debate. In 1630 the first governor of Massachusetts, John Winthrop, wrote a sermon titled "A Model of Christian Charity" in which he enjoined his fellow colonists to make Boston a "city set on a hill." Subsequent political leaders, President Ronald Reagan for one, have periodically employed that image to portray the United States as a beacon of moral fortitude and Western character. This perception of the United States as a "shining city" creates a dilemma caused by the friction between the regulatory principles of the law of war as codified in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the military necessity of responding to non-Western tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) now encountered during the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). This study is intended to generate discussion about the application of the law of war during 21st-century military campaigns conducted in the contemporary operational environment (COE). It combines a review of the documentary evolution of the law of war with a historical case study of the British experience in Kenya between 1952 and 1960 against the Mau Mau insurgents. It makes no claim that every lesson learned by the British during that counterinsurgency operation can be directly applied by the United States to the challenges of the GWOT, but this analysis does offer some insight about applying the law of war to an unfamiliar, non-Western environment. The debate concerning the law of war's applicability will grow more vocal as non-state enemies of the United States adapt TTP to exploit perceived centers of gravity like public opinion. In anticipation of that escalating debate, this analysis offers the following as its overarching question: Is the current version of the law of war suited to the COE in general and the GWOT in particular?

In the years after invading Iraq and Afghanistan, the US military realized that it had a problem: How does a military force set the economic conditions for security success? This problem was certainly not novel-the military had confronted it before in such diverse locations as Grenada, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The scale and complexity of the problem, however, were unlike anything military planners had confronted beforehand. This was especially the case in Iraq, where some commentators expected oil production to drive reconstruction.1 When the fragile state of Iraq's infrastructure and a rapidly deteriorating security situation prevented this from happening, the problem became even more vexing: Should a military force focus on security first, or the economy? How can it do both? This is the challenge of Stability Economics.

Since the early 20th century the US Army has used Civil War and other battlefields as "outdoor classrooms" in which to educate and train its officers. Employing a methodology developed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1906, both the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and US Army War College conducted numerous battlefield staff rides to prepare officers for duties in both war and peace. Often interrupted by the exigencies of the nation's wars, the tradition was renewed and reinvigorated at Fort Leavenworth in the early 1980s. Since 1983 the Leavenworth Staff Ride Team has guided military students on battlefields around the world. For those unable to avail themselves directly of the team's services the Combat Studies Institute has begun to produce a series of staff ride guides to serve in lieu of a Fort Leavenworth instructor. The newest volume in that series, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey Gudmens' "Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Shiloh, 6-7 April 1862" is a valuable study that examines the key considerations in planning and executing the campaign and battle. Modern tacticians and operational planners will find themes that still resonate. Gudmens demonstrates that leaders in Blue and Gray, in facing the daunting tasks of this, the bloodiest battle to this point on the continent, rose to the challenge. They were able to meet this challenge through planning, discipline, ingenuity, leadership, and persistence-themes worthy of reflection by today's leaders. Combat Studies Institute.