This study uses a comparative analysis of the Malayan Emergency, the American experience in Vietnam, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM to examine the role and effectiveness of artillery units in complex counterinsurgency environments. Through this analysis, four factors emerge which impact the employment of artillery units: the counterinsurgency effort's requirement for indirect fires; constraints and limitations on indirect fires; the counterinsurgency effort's force organization; and the conversion cost of nonstandard roles for artillery units. In conclusion, the study offers five broadly descriptive fundamentals for employing artillery units in a counterinsurgency environment: invest in tactical leadership, exploit lessons learned, support the operational approach and strategic framework, maintain pragmatic fire support capability, and minimize collateral damage. Finally, the study examines the role of education for leaders in a counterinsurgency, and its influence on these imperative fundamentals.

A collection of essays profiling: Alexander the Great; Ghenghis Khan; Napoleon Bonaparte; Horatio Nelson; John J. Pershing; Erwin Rommell; Curtis LeMay.From the foreword: "In selecting the seven great commanders presented in this volume, the contributors sought to cover a wide spectrum of military endeavor, encompassing a very broad time-frame, different nationalities and cultures, and representatives from ground, sea, and air warfare. The commanders selected were masters of warfare in their particular time and environment. Each capitalized upon the social, political, economic, and technological conditions of his day to forge successful military forcees and win significant and noteworthy victories that profoundly altered the world in which he lived."

From the foreword: ""The Drillmaster of Valley Forge"-Baron Von Steuben-correctly noted in his "Blue Book" how physical conditioning and health (which he found woefully missing when he joined Washington's camp) would always be directly linked to individual and unit discipline, courage in the fight, and victory on the battlefield. That remains true today. Even an amateur historian, choosing any study on the performance of units in combat, quickly discovers how the levels of conditioning and physical performance of Soldiers is directly proportional to success or failure in the field. In this monograph, Dr. Whitfield "Chip" East provides a pragmatic history of physical readiness training in our Army. He tells us we initially mirrored the professional Armies of Europe as they prepared their forces for war on the continent. Then he introduces us to some master trainers, and shows us how they initiated an American brand of physical conditioning when our forces were found lacking in the early wars of the last century. Finally, he shows us how we have and must incorporate science (even when there exists considerable debate ) to contribute to what we do-and how we do it-in shaping today's Army. Dr. East provides the history, the analysis, and the pragmatism, and all of it is geared to understanding how our Army has and must train Soldiers for the physical demands of combat."

From the foreword: "The present volume, Vanguard of Valor II, offers six accounts of US Soldiers at the tip of the spear during the Afghan campaign. The Combat Studies Institute's Vanguard of Valor series is intended to document small unit actions in Afghanistan. These books play an equally important role by offering insights to Soldiers who may find themselves in the years ahead under similar conditions, whether in Afghanistan or in some other troubled land where they have been deployed to conduct the dangerous business of defending the national interest in a theater of war."

Prepared by the Afghan Study Team of the Combat Studies Institure, U.S. Army, From the foreword by Genral (ret.) David Petraeus: "In 2010, as the scale and tempo of Coalition operations in Afghanistan increased, so did the need for historical accounts of small-unit actions. As commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), I commissioned the Combat Studies Institute to research and write the cases collected in this volume and in those that will follow. By capturing key insights from both lethal and non-lethal operations, I hoped these accounts would be of immediate utility to sergeants and lieutenants at the center of future operations. The eight actions described in these pages take the reader through a wide range of platoon-level operations, from an intense firefight near Kandahar to an intricate civic action project in Kunar Province. Drawing from dozens of Soldier interviews, these accounts vividly depict the actions themselves and offer critical insights of greatest benefit to the small-unit actions leaders of today and tomorrow. The US Army always has prided itself as an institution of constant learning, strongly committed to drawing lessons from its past. This volume from the Combat Studies Institute is an excellent example of that long and honorable tradition. I hope that you will find the actions n Vanguard of Valor to be both instructive and compelling. I am sure that you will find them to be inspirational."

Full color maps and illustrations throughout.

This work is the continuation and revision of a project started in 2006 with the publication of In Contact by the Combat Studies Institute. The original concept was to present a series of military vignettes in a style similar to the widely used case-study methodology commonly found in military literature. The final version of Between the Rivers, instead of following this strict case-study format, presents combat action vignettes as narrative accounts of the various types of actions challenging combat leaders in Iraq in 2003-2005.

In the years after invading Iraq and Afghanistan, the US military realized that it had a problem: How does a military force set the economic conditions for security success? This problem was certainly not novel-the military had confronted it before in such diverse locations as Grenada, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The scale and complexity of the problem, however, were unlike anything military planners had confronted beforehand. This was especially the case in Iraq, where some commentators expected oil production to drive reconstruction.1 When the fragile state of Iraq's infrastructure and a rapidly deteriorating security situation prevented this from happening, the problem became even more vexing: Should a military force focus on security first, or the economy? How can it do both? This is the challenge of Stability Economics.

The United States failed in both Lebanon in 1982-1984 and Iraq in 2003, to achieve its political objectives. While there are many reasons for this, perhaps the greatest is that the government failed to coordinate and direct all of its resources in a unified manner to achieve its goals. This book outlines four key indicators, present in both Lebanon and Iraq, that suggest the United States did not have a grand strategy. Further, this book reveals that Lebanon and Iraq are not anomalies; there are both historical and structural reasons why the United States struggles to implement grand strategies.

The British and US experience with the use of local, irregular security forces suggest their importance in assisting the host nation government and counterinsurgent forces. Their successful establishment, training, and employment demonstrate the importance of several prerequisites including partnership with an advisory force, consent of the host nation's government to exist, and that the security force is accountable to the local civil authority. Without these prerequisites, the local, irregular security force could risk illegitimacy in the eyes of the populace, the host nation government, and the counterinsurgent. However, partnership does not guarantee a local irregular force's success. The host nation's involvement in the decision to build irregular forces is important from the beginning of the campaign. Through the examination of archival research and primary source interviews associated with the British experience in North-West Frontier and the Dhofar region of Oman, one can start to understand the prerequisites needed to create a successful mentorship force. The paper examines the method of partnership, selection and traits of the advisors, and the host nation government's role in building the Punjab Irregular Forces and Frontier Corps in North-West Frontier in India, the firqat in Dhofar, and the Sons of Iraq. Illustrated.

This thesis contends the debate on whether to embrace a population centric or enemy-centric counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan detracts focus from building a balanced approach, customized for the human and political landscape in each area of operation (AO). The debate should be finally resolved since each strategic axis represents a crucial portion of the ideal hybrid approach, which necessarily looks different from one AO to the next. Each extreme, whether focusing all effort on killing and capturing the enemy (enemy-centric) or partnering with and protecting the population from the enemy (population-centric) is unique to local conditions on the ground. "Centric" means to focus efforts only in one direction or the other. The "centric" banners must be dropped and the US should maintain a balanced approach, integrating both strategies and freeing commanders to use every available resource across the lines of effort in the concentrations he deems appropriate and conducive to his specific AO. The US is fighting a counterinsuregency that necessitates both the destruction of the enemy and the nurturing of the population. Counterinsurgency, as another form of warfare, must utilize all elements of national power to achieve the desired outcome. The consensus from a comprehensive study of multiple counterinsurgency models indicates that utilizing all available resources to achieve a balanced approach and providing the autonomy our commanders require to achieve success in their AOs is the most effective way to deal with counterinsurgencies now and in the future.

This work is the continuation and revision of a project started in 2006 with the publication of In Contact by the Combat Studies Institute. The original concept was to present a series of military vignettes in a style similar to the widely used case-study methodology commonly found in military literature. The final version of Between the Rivers, instead of following this strict case-study format, presents combat action vignettes as narrative accounts of the various types of actions challenging combat leaders in Iraq in 2003-2005.

Includes maps. Combat Studies Institute Leavenworth Paper series, number 23. From the foreword: "Third War offers a lucid and well-researched analysis of irregular warfare during the American Civil War. Dr. Martin's focus on insurgent operations in the western border region brings fresh insights to this area of study. Moreover, the history of insurgency in these western states offers a greater understanding of irregular warfare to those who may be tasked with mounting counterinsurgency operations in the not so distant future."

This study uses a comparative analysis of the Malayan Emergency, the American experience in Vietnam, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM to examine the role and effectiveness of artillery units in complex counterinsurgency environments. Through this analysis, four factors emerge which impact the employment of artillery units: the counterinsurgency effort's requirement for indirect fires; constraints and limitations on indirect fires; the counterinsurgency effort's force organization; and the conversion cost of nonstandard roles for artillery units. In conclusion, the study offers five broadly descriptive fundamentals for employing artillery units in a counterinsurgency environment: invest in tactical leadership, exploit lessons learned, support the operational approach and strategic framework, maintain pragmatic fire support capability, and minimize collateral damage. Finally, the study examines the role of education for leaders in a counterinsurgency, and its influence on these imperative fundamentals.

In March 1947, the United States established an economic and military assistance program to bolster the nationalist Greek government against a communist insurgency. The Greek government suffered from a collapsed economy, deep social divisions, and an inability to defeat the insurgents in battle. The Joint US Military Advisory and Planning Group provided operational advice to the Greek National Army that improved the nationalists' aggressiveness, tactics, battlefield management, and logistics. The advisors used training, mentorship, directive control, and disciplinary action to affect the nationalists' combat leadership. The improved leadership led to more effective combat operations against the communists. These operations pressured the insurgency, which had alienated Yugoslavia and committed to fighting with conventional tactics. These two insurgent errors, the massive economic and military aid program, and the improved nationalist combat performance resulted in a decisive victory in August 1949. The study provides insight into how advisors can affect a military's leadership.