Reprint of book originally published in 1926.

In the years after invading Iraq and Afghanistan, the US military realized that it had a problem: How does a military force set the economic conditions for security success? This problem was certainly not novel-the military had confronted it before in such diverse locations as Grenada, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The scale and complexity of the problem, however, were unlike anything military planners had confronted beforehand. This was especially the case in Iraq, where some commentators expected oil production to drive reconstruction.1 When the fragile state of Iraq's infrastructure and a rapidly deteriorating security situation prevented this from happening, the problem became even more vexing: Should a military force focus on security first, or the economy? How can it do both? This is the challenge of Stability Economics.

The United States failed in both Lebanon in 1982-1984 and Iraq in 2003, to achieve its political objectives. While there are many reasons for this, perhaps the greatest is that the government failed to coordinate and direct all of its resources in a unified manner to achieve its goals. This book outlines four key indicators, present in both Lebanon and Iraq, that suggest the United States did not have a grand strategy. Further, this book reveals that Lebanon and Iraq are not anomalies; there are both historical and structural reasons why the United States struggles to implement grand strategies.

Historians tend to agree that Ramon Magsaysay's leadership and his relationship with Edward Lansdale are two of the most important features of the Philippine governments campaign against the Huks from 1946-1954. Yet the nuances of his leadership and the nature of their relationship deserve greater investigation. This thesis seeks to further illuminate Magsaysay and Lansdale's relationship by focusing on the role of empathy and sociocultural understanding, in defeating the Huks and restoring the Philippine government's legitimacy. US policy in the Philippines at the time, bolstered regimes riddled with corruption, graft, and nepotism, reinforcing poor governance, and resulting in a loss of government legitimacy. This energized the Huk movement until they were on the verge of toppling the government. A change in US policy coincided with the emergence of Magsaysay and Lansdale. They reversed Huk momentum, rejuvenated the demoralized and oppressive armed forces, and restored the Philippine government's legitimacy, all in less than four years. Their shared, genuine empathy for the Filipino people fostered deep sociocultural understanding. Their combined capabilities and resources then translated empathy and sociocultural understanding into concrete measures to combat the Huks and rebuild popular support for the government.

The British and US experience with the use of local, irregular security forces suggest their importance in assisting the host nation government and counterinsurgent forces. Their successful establishment, training, and employment demonstrate the importance of several prerequisites including partnership with an advisory force, consent of the host nation's government to exist, and that the security force is accountable to the local civil authority. Without these prerequisites, the local, irregular security force could risk illegitimacy in the eyes of the populace, the host nation government, and the counterinsurgent. However, partnership does not guarantee a local irregular force's success. The host nation's involvement in the decision to build irregular forces is important from the beginning of the campaign. Through the examination of archival research and primary source interviews associated with the British experience in North-West Frontier and the Dhofar region of Oman, one can start to understand the prerequisites needed to create a successful mentorship force. The paper examines the method of partnership, selection and traits of the advisors, and the host nation government's role in building the Punjab Irregular Forces and Frontier Corps in North-West Frontier in India, the firqat in Dhofar, and the Sons of Iraq. Illustrated.

This thesis contends the debate on whether to embrace a population centric or enemy-centric counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan detracts focus from building a balanced approach, customized for the human and political landscape in each area of operation (AO). The debate should be finally resolved since each strategic axis represents a crucial portion of the ideal hybrid approach, which necessarily looks different from one AO to the next. Each extreme, whether focusing all effort on killing and capturing the enemy (enemy-centric) or partnering with and protecting the population from the enemy (population-centric) is unique to local conditions on the ground. "Centric" means to focus efforts only in one direction or the other. The "centric" banners must be dropped and the US should maintain a balanced approach, integrating both strategies and freeing commanders to use every available resource across the lines of effort in the concentrations he deems appropriate and conducive to his specific AO. The US is fighting a counterinsuregency that necessitates both the destruction of the enemy and the nurturing of the population. Counterinsurgency, as another form of warfare, must utilize all elements of national power to achieve the desired outcome. The consensus from a comprehensive study of multiple counterinsurgency models indicates that utilizing all available resources to achieve a balanced approach and providing the autonomy our commanders require to achieve success in their AOs is the most effective way to deal with counterinsurgencies now and in the future.

This work is the continuation and revision of a project started in 2006 with the publication of In Contact by the Combat Studies Institute. The original concept was to present a series of military vignettes in a style similar to the widely used case-study methodology commonly found in military literature. The final version of Between the Rivers, instead of following this strict case-study format, presents combat action vignettes as narrative accounts of the various types of actions challenging combat leaders in Iraq in 2003-2005.

A collection of essays profiling: Alexander the Great; Ghenghis Khan; Napoleon Bonaparte; Horatio Nelson; John J. Pershing; Erwin Rommell; Curtis LeMay.From the foreword: "In selecting the seven great commanders presented in this volume, the contributors sought to cover a wide spectrum of military endeavor, encompassing a very broad time-frame, different nationalities and cultures, and representatives from ground, sea, and air warfare. The commanders selected were masters of warfare in their particular time and environment. Each capitalized upon the social, political, economic, and technological conditions of his day to forge successful military forcees and win significant and noteworthy victories that profoundly altered the world in which he lived."

A collection of essays profiling: Alexander the Great; Ghenghis Khan; Napoleon Bonaparte; Horatio Nelson; John J. Pershing; Erwin Rommell; Curtis LeMay.From the foreword: "In selecting the seven great commanders presented in this volume, the contributors sought to cover a wide spectrum of military endeavor, encompassing a very broad time-frame, different nationalities and cultures, and representatives from ground, sea, and air warfare. The commanders selected were masters of warfare in their particular time and environment. Each capitalized upon the social, political, economic, and technological conditions of his day to forge successful military forcees and win significant and noteworthy victories that profoundly altered the world in which he lived."