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Reprint of book originally published in 1926.
In the years after invading Iraq and Afghanistan, the US military
realized that it had a problem: How does a military force set the
economic conditions for security success? This problem was
certainly not novel-the military had confronted it before in such
diverse locations as Grenada, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The scale
and complexity of the problem, however, were unlike anything
military planners had confronted beforehand. This was especially
the case in Iraq, where some commentators expected oil production
to drive reconstruction.1 When the fragile state of Iraq's
infrastructure and a rapidly deteriorating security situation
prevented this from happening, the problem became even more vexing:
Should a military force focus on security first, or the economy?
How can it do both? This is the challenge of Stability Economics.
The United States failed in both Lebanon in 1982-1984 and Iraq in
2003, to achieve its political objectives. While there are many
reasons for this, perhaps the greatest is that the government
failed to coordinate and direct all of its resources in a unified
manner to achieve its goals. This book outlines four key
indicators, present in both Lebanon and Iraq, that suggest the
United States did not have a grand strategy. Further, this book
reveals that Lebanon and Iraq are not anomalies; there are both
historical and structural reasons why the United States struggles
to implement grand strategies.
Historians tend to agree that Ramon Magsaysay's leadership and his
relationship with Edward Lansdale are two of the most important
features of the Philippine governments campaign against the Huks
from 1946-1954. Yet the nuances of his leadership and the nature of
their relationship deserve greater investigation. This thesis seeks
to further illuminate Magsaysay and Lansdale's relationship by
focusing on the role of empathy and sociocultural understanding, in
defeating the Huks and restoring the Philippine government's
legitimacy. US policy in the Philippines at the time, bolstered
regimes riddled with corruption, graft, and nepotism, reinforcing
poor governance, and resulting in a loss of government legitimacy.
This energized the Huk movement until they were on the verge of
toppling the government. A change in US policy coincided with the
emergence of Magsaysay and Lansdale. They reversed Huk momentum,
rejuvenated the demoralized and oppressive armed forces, and
restored the Philippine government's legitimacy, all in less than
four years. Their shared, genuine empathy for the Filipino people
fostered deep sociocultural understanding. Their combined
capabilities and resources then translated empathy and
sociocultural understanding into concrete measures to combat the
Huks and rebuild popular support for the government.
The British and US experience with the use of local, irregular
security forces suggest their importance in assisting the host
nation government and counterinsurgent forces. Their successful
establishment, training, and employment demonstrate the importance
of several prerequisites including partnership with an advisory
force, consent of the host nation's government to exist, and that
the security force is accountable to the local civil authority.
Without these prerequisites, the local, irregular security force
could risk illegitimacy in the eyes of the populace, the host
nation government, and the counterinsurgent. However, partnership
does not guarantee a local irregular force's success. The host
nation's involvement in the decision to build irregular forces is
important from the beginning of the campaign. Through the
examination of archival research and primary source interviews
associated with the British experience in North-West Frontier and
the Dhofar region of Oman, one can start to understand the
prerequisites needed to create a successful mentorship force. The
paper examines the method of partnership, selection and traits of
the advisors, and the host nation government's role in building the
Punjab Irregular Forces and Frontier Corps in North-West Frontier
in India, the firqat in Dhofar, and the Sons of Iraq. Illustrated.
This thesis contends the debate on whether to embrace a population
centric or enemy-centric counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan
detracts focus from building a balanced approach, customized for
the human and political landscape in each area of operation (AO).
The debate should be finally resolved since each strategic axis
represents a crucial portion of the ideal hybrid approach, which
necessarily looks different from one AO to the next. Each extreme,
whether focusing all effort on killing and capturing the enemy
(enemy-centric) or partnering with and protecting the population
from the enemy (population-centric) is unique to local conditions
on the ground. "Centric" means to focus efforts only in one
direction or the other. The "centric" banners must be dropped and
the US should maintain a balanced approach, integrating both
strategies and freeing commanders to use every available resource
across the lines of effort in the concentrations he deems
appropriate and conducive to his specific AO. The US is fighting a
counterinsuregency that necessitates both the destruction of the
enemy and the nurturing of the population. Counterinsurgency, as
another form of warfare, must utilize all elements of national
power to achieve the desired outcome. The consensus from a
comprehensive study of multiple counterinsurgency models indicates
that utilizing all available resources to achieve a balanced
approach and providing the autonomy our commanders require to
achieve success in their AOs is the most effective way to deal with
counterinsurgencies now and in the future.
This work is the continuation and revision of a project started in
2006 with the publication of In Contact by the Combat Studies
Institute. The original concept was to present a series of military
vignettes in a style similar to the widely used case-study
methodology commonly found in military literature. The final
version of Between the Rivers, instead of following this strict
case-study format, presents combat action vignettes as narrative
accounts of the various types of actions challenging combat leaders
in Iraq in 2003-2005.
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Great Commanders (Hardcover)
Christopher R Gabel, James H. Willbanks; Combat Studies Institute Press
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R1,407
Discovery Miles 14 070
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Ships in 10 - 15 working days
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A collection of essays profiling: Alexander the Great; Ghenghis
Khan; Napoleon Bonaparte; Horatio Nelson; John J. Pershing; Erwin
Rommell; Curtis LeMay.From the foreword: "In selecting the seven
great commanders presented in this volume, the contributors sought
to cover a wide spectrum of military endeavor, encompassing a very
broad time-frame, different nationalities and cultures, and
representatives from ground, sea, and air warfare. The commanders
selected were masters of warfare in their particular time and
environment. Each capitalized upon the social, political, economic,
and technological conditions of his day to forge successful
military forcees and win significant and noteworthy victories that
profoundly altered the world in which he lived."
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Great Commanders (Paperback)
Christopher R Gabel, James H. Willbanks; Combat Studies Institute Press
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R682
Discovery Miles 6 820
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Ships in 10 - 15 working days
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A collection of essays profiling: Alexander the Great; Ghenghis
Khan; Napoleon Bonaparte; Horatio Nelson; John J. Pershing; Erwin
Rommell; Curtis LeMay.From the foreword: "In selecting the seven
great commanders presented in this volume, the contributors sought
to cover a wide spectrum of military endeavor, encompassing a very
broad time-frame, different nationalities and cultures, and
representatives from ground, sea, and air warfare. The commanders
selected were masters of warfare in their particular time and
environment. Each capitalized upon the social, political, economic,
and technological conditions of his day to forge successful
military forcees and win significant and noteworthy victories that
profoundly altered the world in which he lived."
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