As a coercive instrument, the US executed a bombing raid on Libya, Operation El Dorado Canyon, in response to Libya's state-sponsored terrorist attacks throughout the 1970's and 1980's. Initially hailed as a success, many authors, including Robert A. Pape, now view the 1986 raid as a coercive failure because Colonel Muammar Qaddafi did not completely abandon terrorism. In order to determine the success or failure of a mission, the results must be evaluated against the strategic (political) and tactical objectives for that mission. In the context of what the Reagan administration was attempting to achieve with Operation El Dorado Canyon, the mission was undoubtedly a success. Even though it took almost two decades, Qaddafi ultimately concluded that terrorism against the United States should stop. Operation El Dorado Canyon was the leading coercive factor in Qaddafi's eventual transformation. In order to draw the conclusion that Operation El Dorado Canyon was successful in coercing Qaddafi's "change of heart," this thesis will first examine the violent history of Libya, which planted the seeds of hate for the Western "Imperialist" nations, and the assumption of command by Colonel Qaddafi. Next, this thesis will examine the role Qaddafi and Libya played in numerous, highly visible, terrorist attacks throughout the 1970's and 1980's, and the United States' responses to the attacks prior to Operation El Dorado Canyon.