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In Norms in the Wild, distinguished philosopher Cristina Bicchieri
argues that when it comes to human behavior, social scientists
place too much stress on rational deliberation. In fact, she says,
many choices occur without much deliberation at all. Two people
passing in a corridor automatically negotiate their shared space;
cars at an intersection obey traffic signals; we choose clothing
based on our instincts for what is considered appropriate.
Bicchieri's theory of social norms accounts for these automatic
components of coordination, where individuals react automatically
to cues that focus their attention on what the norm is in that
situation. Social norms thus act as rules for making choices in a
social world where people expect others - often unconsciously - to
follow the same rule. Some norms enable seamless social
co-operation, while others are less beneficial to human
flourishing. Bicchieri is famous for her interdisciplinary work on
game theory and most recently her work on social norms, and Norms
in the Wild represents her latest challenge to many of the
fundamental assumptions of the social sciences. Bicchieri's work
has broad implications not only for understanding human behavior,
but for changing it for better outcomes. People have a strongly
conditioned preference for following social norms, but that also
means that manipulating their expectations can cause major
behavioral changes. Bicchieri has been working recently with UNICEF
and other NGO's to explore the applicability of her views to issues
of human rights around the world. Is it possible to change social
expectations around forced marriage, genital mutilations, and
public health practices like vaccinations and sanitation? If so,
how? What tools might we use? This short book explores how social
norms work, and how changing them - changing preferences, beliefs,
and especially social expectations - can potentially improve lives
all around the world. It will appeal to an unusually broad range of
readers including philosophers, psychologists and others in
behavioral sciences, and anyone involved in public policy or at
NGOs.
In The Grammar of Society, first published in 2006, Cristina
Bicchieri examines social norms, such as fairness, cooperation, and
reciprocity, in an effort to understand their nature and dynamics,
the expectations that they generate, and how they evolve and
change. Drawing on several intellectual traditions and methods,
including those of social psychology, experimental economics and
evolutionary game theory, Bicchieri provides an integrated account
of how social norms emerge, why and when we follow them, and the
situations where we are most likely to focus on relevant norms.
Examining the existence and survival of inefficient norms, she
demonstrates how norms evolve in ways that depend upon the
psychological dispositions of the individual and how such
dispositions may impair social efficiency. By contrast, she also
shows how certain psychological propensities may naturally lead
individuals to evolve fairness norms that closely resemble those we
follow in most modern societies.
In the social sciences norms are sometimes taken to play a key
explanatory role. Yet norms differ from group to group, from
society to society, and from species to species. How are norms
formed and how do they change? This 'state-of-the-art' collection
of essays presents some of the best contemporary research into the
dynamic processes underlying the formation, maintenance,
metamorphosis and dissolution of norms. The volume combines formal
modelling with more traditional analysis, and considers biological
and cultural evolution, individual learning, and rational
deliberation. In filling a significant gap in the current
literature this volume will be of particular interest to
economists, political scientists and sociologists, in addition to
philosophers of the social sciences.
In recent years there has been a great deal of interaction among
game theorists, philosophers, and logicians in certain foundational
problems concerning rationality, the formalization of knowledge and
practical reasoning, and models of learning and deliberation. This
unique volume brings together the work of some of the preeminent
figures in their respective disciplines, all of whom are engaged in
research at the forefront of their fields. Together they offer a
conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic, and
epistemology in the formal models of knowledge, belief,
deliberation, and learning and in the relationship between Bayesian
decision theory and game theory, as well as between bounded
rationality and computational complexity.
This is a collection of, mostly unpublished, papers on topics surrounding decision theory. It addresses the most important areas in the philosophical study of rationality and knowledge, for example: causal vs. evidential decision theory, game theory, backwards induction, bounded rationality, counterfactual reasoning in games and in general, and analyses of the famous common knowledge assumptions in game theory.
There has been a great deal of interaction among game theorists,
philosophers and logicians in certain foundational problems
concerning rationality, the formalization of knowledge and
practical reasoning, and models of learning and deliberation. This
volume brings together the work of some of the pre-eminent figures
in their respective disciplines, all of whom are engaged in
research at the forefront of their fields. Together they offer a
conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic and
epistemology in the formal models of knowledge, belief,
deliberation and learning, and in the relationship between Bayesian
decision theory and game theory, as well as between bounded
rationality and computational complexity.
This book explores how individual actions coordinate to produce
unintended social consequences. In the past this phenomenon has
been explained as the outcome of rational, self-interested
individual behaviour. Professor Bicchieri shows that this is in no
way a satisfying explanation. She discusses how much knowledge is
needed by agents in order to coordinate successfully. If the answer
is unbounded knowledge, then a whole variety of paradoxes arise. If
the answer is very little knowledge, then there seems hardly any
possibility of attaining coordination. The solution to coordination
and cooperation is for agents to learn about each other. The author
concludes that rationality must be supplemented by models of
learning and by an evolutionary account of how social order (i.e.
spontaneous coordinated behaviour) can persist.
In The Grammar of Society, first published in 2006, Cristina
Bicchieri examines social norms, such as fairness, cooperation, and
reciprocity, in an effort to understand their nature and dynamics,
the expectations that they generate, and how they evolve and
change. Drawing on several intellectual traditions and methods,
including those of social psychology, experimental economics and
evolutionary game theory, Bicchieri provides an integrated account
of how social norms emerge, why and when we follow them, and the
situations where we are most likely to focus on relevant norms.
Examining the existence and survival of inefficient norms, she
demonstrates how norms evolve in ways that depend upon the
psychological dispositions of the individual and how such
dispositions may impair social efficiency. By contrast, she also
shows how certain psychological propensities may naturally lead
individuals to evolve fairness norms that closely resemble those we
follow in most modern societies.
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