Does size matter in international negotiations? This book examines the interplay between an institutional design that expresses the principle of the equality of states and the real world size differences of states in an innovative, multi-method investigation of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Panke demonstrates that size-related capacities influence states' participation and effectiveness in international negotiations. Based on extensive interviews with diplomats of smaller and bigger states in a variety of geographical regions, this book develops a theoretical framework linking resources and incentives to states' inclination of formulating national positions and acting upon them. It distinguishes between the policy-initiation, negotiation and decision-taking stages in the policy cycle, illustrating the difference in activity between nations, which affect the dynamics and outcomes of negotiations between member states. This book reveals that there are real and politically significant limits to the effects of size and identifies specific conditions under which smaller states can punch above their weight. It will appeal to scholars of political science, international relations, diplomacy, comparative politics and public policy.

This book explores the interplay between formal rules and real world differences, questioning to what extent size-related capacities between states matters for the dynamics and outcomes of negotiations taking place in the United Nations General Assembly, an institution that strongly reflects the one-state, one-vote principle.