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D. M. Armstrong's A Materialist Theory of the Mind is widely known
as one of the most important defences of the view that mental
states are nothing but physical states of the brain. A landmark of
twentieth-century philosophy of mind, it launched the physicalist
revolution in approaches to the mind and has been engaged with,
debated and puzzled over ever since its first publication over
fifty years ago. Ranging over a remarkable number of topics, from
behaviourism, the will and knowledge to perception, bodily
sensation and introspection, Armstrong argues that mental states
play a causally intermediate role between stimuli, other mental
states and behavioural responses. He uses several illuminating
examples to illustrate this, such as the classic case of pain. This
Routledge Classics edition includes a new Foreword by Peter Anstey,
placing Armstrong's book in helpful philosophical and historical
context.
D. M. Armstrong's A Materialist Theory of the Mind is widely known
as one of the most important defences of the view that mental
states are nothing but physical states of the brain. A landmark of
twentieth-century philosophy of mind, it launched the physicalist
revolution in approaches to the mind and has been engaged with,
debated and puzzled over ever since its first publication over
fifty years ago. Ranging over a remarkable number of topics, from
behaviourism, the will and knowledge to perception, bodily
sensation and introspection, Armstrong argues that mental states
play a causally intermediate role between stimuli, other mental
states and behavioural responses. He uses several illuminating
examples to illustrate this, such as the classic case of pain. This
Routledge Classics edition includes a new Foreword by Peter Anstey,
placing Armstrong's book in helpful philosophical and historical
context.
First published in 1961, Perception and the Physical World contends
that there are insuperable difficulties for the Representative and
Phenomenalist theories. Unreflective common sense thinks of
sense-perception as a direct grasping of the nature of the physical
world. But when we are confronted with facts about sensory
illusion, about the physical and physiological causes of
perception, and with modern scientific views of the real nature of
matter, it is hard to maintain such a 'Direct Realist' theory of
perception. We tend to substitute a Copy or Representative theory
which puts sense-impressions between ourselves and physical
reality. Some philosophers overwhelmed by the difficulties of the
Copy theory, retreat into Phenomenalism, which identifies the
physical world with our sense-impressions. The author re-examines
all the traditional objections to a Direct Realist theory and tries
to show that they can be overcome. This book will be of interest to
students of philosophy.
First published in 1962, Bodily Sensations argues that bodily
sensations are nothing but impressions that physical happenings are
taking place in the body, impressions that may correspond or fail
to correspond to physical reality. In the case of such sensations
as pains, these impressions are accompanied by certain attitudes to
the impressions. He argues, that is to say that bodily sensations
are a sub-species of sense-impression, standing to perception of
our own bodily state (or in some cases to touch) as visual
impressions stand to the sense of sight. He examines, and tries to
refute, all plausible alternative accounts of the nature of bodily
sensations. He prefaces his argument by an account of tactual and
bodily perception. Here he argues that, with the exception of heat
and cold, the qualities discerned by these senses are all reducible
to spatial and temporal properties of material objects. Combined
with his own conclusions on bodily sensations, this allows him to
draw up a short and exhaustive list of the so-called "secondary"
qualities of physical objects. This book will be of interest to
students of philosophy.
In this short text, a distinguished philosopher turns his attention
to one of the oldest and most fundamental philosophical problems of
all: How it is that we are able to sort and classify different
things as being of the same natural class? Professor Armstrong
carefully sets out six major theories?ancient, modern, and
contemporary?and assesses the
Breaking new ground in the debate about the relation of mind and
body, David Armstrong's classic text - first published in 1968 -
remains the most compelling and comprehensive statement of the view
that the mind is material or physical. In the preface to this new
edition, the author reflects on the book's impact and considers it
in the light of subsequent developments. He also provides a
bibliography of all the key writings to have appeared in the
materialist debate.
Dispositions are essential to our understanding of the world. Dispositions: A Debate is an extended dialogue between three distinguished philosophers - D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin and U.T. Place - on the many problems associated with dispositions, which reveals their own distinctive accounts of the nature of dispositions. These are then linked to other issues such as the nature of mind, matter, universals, existence, laws of nature and causation. eBook available with sample pages: 0203004876
Breaking new ground in the debate about the relation of mind and body, David Armstrong's classic text - first published in 1968 - remains the most compelling and comprehensive statement of the view that the mind is material or physical. In the preface to this new edition, the author reflects on the book's impact and considers it in the light of subsequent developments. He also provides a bibliography of all the key writings to have appeared in the materialist debate. eBook available with sample pages: 0203003233
Dispositions are essential to our understanding of the world.
Dispositions: A Debate is an extended dialogue between three
distinguished philosophers - D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin and U.T.
Place - on the many problems associated with dispositions, which
reveals their own distinctive accounts of the nature of
dispositions. These are then linked to other issues such as the
nature of mind, matter, universals, existence, laws of nature and
causation.
The relation of mind to body has been argued about by philosophers
for centuries. The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction
presents the problem as a debate between materialists about the
mind and their opponents. After examining the views of Descartes,
Hume and Thomas Huxley the debate is traced through the twentieth
century to the presen
The relation of mind to body has been argued about by philosophers
for centuries. "The Mind-Body Problem: An Opinionated Introduction"
presents the problem as a debate between materialists about the
mind and their opponents. After examining the views of Descartes,
Hume and Thomas Huxley the debate is traced through the twentieth
century to the present day. The emphasis is always on the arguments
used, and the way one position develops from another. By the end of
the book the reader is afforded both a grasp of the state of the
controversy, and how we got there.
In this short text, a distinguished philosopher turns his attention
to one of the oldest and most fundamental philosophical problems of
all: How it is that we are able to sort and classify different
things as being of the same natural class? Professor Armstrong
carefully sets out six major theories?ancient, modern, and
contemporary?and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of each.
Recognizing that there are no final victories or defeats in
metaphysics, Armstrong nonetheless defends a traditional account of
universals as the most satisfactory theory we have.This study is
written for advanced students, but as Armstrong goes considerably
beyond his earlier work on this topic, it will interest
professional scholars as well. Carefully plotted and clearly
written, Universals is both a paradigm of exposition and a case
study on the value of careful analysis of fundamental issues in
philosophy.
If asked what Humeanism could mean today, there is no other
philosopher to turn to whose work covers such a wide range of
topics from a unified Humean perspective as that of David Lewis.
The core of Lewis's many contributions to philosophy, including his
work in philosophical ontology, intensional logic and semantics,
probability and decision theory, topics within philosophy of
science as well as a distinguished philosophy of mind, can be
understood as the development of philosophical position that is
centered around his conception of Humean supervenience. If we
accept the thesis that it is physical science and not philosophical
reasoning that will eventually arrive at the basic constituents of
all matter pertaining to our world, then Humean supervenience is
the assumption that all truths about our world will supervene on
the class of physical truths in the following sense: There are no
truths in any compartment of our world that cannot be accounted for
in terms of differences and similarities among those properties and
external space-time relations that are fundamental to our world
according to physical science.
David Armstrong sets out his metaphysical system in a set of
concise and lively chapters each dealing with one aspect of the
world. He begins with the assumption that all that exists is the
physical world of space-time. On this foundation he constructs a
coherent metaphysical scheme that gives plausible answers to many
of the great problems of metaphysics. He gives accounts of
properties, relations, and particulars; laws of nature; modality;
abstract objects such as numbers; and time and mind.
Truths are determined not by what we believe, but by the way the
world is. Or so realists about truth believe. Philosophers call
such theories correspondence theories of truth. Truthmaking theory,
which now has many adherents among contemporary philosophers, is a
recent development of a realist theory of truth, and in this book,
first published in 2004, D. M. Armstrong offers the first
full-length study of this theory. He examines its applications to
different sorts of truth, including contingent truths, modal
truths, truths about the past and the future, and mathematical
truths. In a clear, even-handed and non-technical discussion he
makes a compelling case for truthmaking and its importance in
philosophy. His book marks a significant contribution to the debate
and will be of interest to a wide range of readers working in
analytical philosophy.
Truths are determined not by what we believe, but by the way the
world is. Or so realists about truth believe. Philosophers call
such theories correspondence theories of truth. Truthmaking theory,
which now has many adherents among contemporary philosophers, is a
recent development of a realist theory of truth, and in this book,
first published in 2004, D. M. Armstrong offers the first
full-length study of this theory. He examines its applications to
different sorts of truth, including contingent truths, modal
truths, truths about the past and the future, and mathematical
truths. In a clear, even-handed and non-technical discussion he
makes a compelling case for truthmaking and its importance in
philosophy. His book marks a significant contribution to the debate
and will be of interest to a wide range of readers working in
analytical philosophy.
In this important study David Armstrong offers a comprehensive
system of analytical metaphysics that synthesizes but also develops
his thinking over the last twenty years. Armstrong's analysis,
which acknowledges the 'logical atomism' of Russell and
Wittgenstein, makes facts (or states of affairs, as the author
calls them) the fundamental constituents of the world, examining
properties, relations, numbers, classes, possibility and necessity,
dispositions, causes and laws. All these, it is argued, find their
place and can be understood inside a scheme of states of affairs.
This is a comprehensive and rigorously this-worldly account of the
most general features of reality, argued from a distinctive
philosophical perspective, and it will appeal to a wide readership
in analytical philosophy.
In this important study D. M. Armstrong offers a comprehensive
system of analytical metaphysics that synthesises but also develops
his thinking over the last twenty years. Armstrong's analysis,
which acknowledges the 'logical atomism' of Russell and
Wittgenstein, makes facts (or states of affairs, as the author
calls them) the fundamental constituents of the world, examining
properties, relations, numbers, classes, possibility and necessity,
dispositions, causes and laws. All these, it is argued, find their
place and can be understood inside a scheme of states of affairs.
This is a comprehensive and rigorously this-worldly account of the
most general features of reality, argued from a distinctive
philosophical perspective, and it will appeal to a wide readership
in analytical philosophy.
David Armstrong’s new book is a contribution to recent philosophical discussion about possible worlds. Taking Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as his point of departure, Professor Armstrong argues that nonactual possibilities and possible worlds are recombinations of actually existing elements, and as such are useful fictions. There is an extended criticism of the alternative-possible-worlds approach championed by the American philosopher David Lewis. This major new work will be read with interest by a wide range of philosophers.
This is a study, in two volumes, of one of the longest-standing
philosophical problems: the problem of universals. In volume I
David Armstrong surveys and criticizes the main approaches and
solutions to the problems that have been canvassed, rejecting the
various forms of nominalism and 'Platonic' realism. In volume II he
develops an important theory of his own, an objective theory of
universals based not on linguistic conventions, but on the actual
and potential findings of natural science. He thus reconciles a
realism about qualities and relations with an empiricist
epistemology. The theory allows, too, for a convincing explanation
of natural laws as relations between these universals.
This is a study, in two volumes, of one of the longest-standing
philosophical problems: the problem of universals. In volume I
David Armstrong surveys and criticizes the main approaches and
solutions to the problems that have been canvassed, rejecting the
various forms of nominalism and 'Platonic' realism. In volume II he
develops an important theory of his own, an objective theory of
universals based not on linguistic conventions, but on the actual
and potential findings of natural science. He thus reconciles a
realism about qualities and relations with an empiricist
epistemology. The theory allows, too, for a convincing explanation
of natural laws as relations between these universals.
A wide-ranging study of the central concepts in epistemology -
belief, truth and knowledge. Professor Armstrong offers a
dispositional account of general beliefs and of knowledge of
general propositions. Belief about particular matters of fact are
described as structures in the mind of the believer which represent
or 'map' reality, while general beliefs are dispositions to extend
the 'map' or introduce casual relations between portions of the map
according to general rules. 'Knowledge' denotes the reliability of
such beliefs as representations of reality. Within this framework
Professor Armstrong offers a distinctive account of many of the
main questions in general epistemology - the relations between
beliefs and language, the notions of proposition, concept and idea,
the analysis of truth, the varieties of knowledge, and the way in
which beleifs and knowledge are supported by reasons. The book as a
whole if offered as a contribution to a naturalistic account of
man.
First published in 1985, D. M. Armstrong's original work on what
laws of nature are has continued to be influential in the areas of
metaphysics and philosophy of science. Presenting a definitive
attack on the sceptical Humean view, that laws are no more than a
regularity of coincidence between stances of properties, Armstrong
establishes his own theory and defends it concisely and
systematically against objections. Presented in a fresh
twenty-first-century series livery, and including a specially
commissioned preface written by Marc Lange, illuminating its
continuing importance and relevance to philosophical enquiry, this
influential work is available for a new generation of readers.
This is a study, in two volumes, of one of the longest-standing
philosophical problems: the problem of universals. In volume I
David Armstrong surveys and criticizes the main approaches and
solutions to the problems that have been canvassed, rejecting the
various forms of nominalism and 'Platonic' realism. In volume II he
develops an important theory of his own, an objective theory of
universals based not on linguistic conventions, but on the actual
and potential findings of natural science. He thus reconciles a
realism about qualities and relations with an empiricist
epistemology. The theory allows, too, for a convincing explanation
of natural laws as relations between these universals.
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