Originally published in 1984, this book tells the story of sixteen of Australia’s most eminent military men, as they performed under the stress of strategy-making and in the heat of battle. In scrutinising critical periods in the careers of such men as Brudenell White, Chauvel, Monash, Gordon Bennett, Blamey and Scherger, it addresses a number of fascinating questions: Is there an Australian style of command? How well have Australian officers been prepared for high command? How have Australian commanders handled the problems of coalition way or co-operation with allies? How have political direction, organisational structures and entrenched defence policy affected the performance of commanders in the field? Each re-evaluation compares performance with reputation. Some of the figures examined are familiar (What was the real basis of Monash’s reputation as a commander? Was Blamey worthy of the field-marshal’s baton?); some are given an appraisal long denied them. This roll-call of some of Australia’s greatest warriors presents a fascinating picture of the realities of war at the top. Each of the sixteen lives examined presents a revealing account of the conditions under which crucial military decisions are made and carried out – on the battlefield, at headquarters, in victory and defeat. The Commanders will appeal not only to students of military affairs but to everyone interested in Australian history and biography.

This book, first published in 1981, examines the broader aspects of international strategic relations, and analyses Cold War developments within particular nations, fields of warfare and areas of political-military interaction. The role of force in international society changed as the nuclear deadlock between the superpowers continued, with military forces being deployed for political purposes in situations only just short of war. The balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces also changed as American technology increased and short-range nuclear missiles were deployed in Europe. This book also examines the development of strategic thinking in China, Japan and India, as well as insurgency in the Third World, so often the site for proxy superpower conflict.

This book, first published in 1981, examines the broader aspects of international strategic relations, and analyses Cold War developments within particular nations, fields of warfare and areas of political-military interaction. The role of force in international society changed as the nuclear deadlock between the superpowers continued, with military forces being deployed for political purposes in situations only just short of war. The balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces also changed as American technology increased and short-range nuclear missiles were deployed in Europe. This book also examines the development of strategic thinking in China, Japan and India, as well as insurgency in the Third World, so often the site for proxy superpower conflict.

Originally published in 1984, this book tells the story of sixteen of Australia's most eminent military men, as they performed under the stress of strategy-making and in the heat of battle. In scrutinising critical periods in the careers of such men as Brudenell White, Chauvel, Monash, Gordon Bennett, Blamey and Scherger, it addresses a number of fascinating questions: Is there an Australian style of command? How well have Australian officers been prepared for high command? How have Australian commanders handled the problems of coalition way or co-operation with allies? How have political direction, organisational structures and entrenched defence policy affected the performance of commanders in the field? Each re-evaluation compares performance with reputation. Some of the figures examined are familiar (What was the real basis of Monash's reputation as a commander? Was Blamey worthy of the field-marshal's baton?); some are given an appraisal long denied them. This roll-call of some of Australia's greatest warriors presents a fascinating picture of the realities of war at the top. Each of the sixteen lives examined presents a revealing account of the conditions under which crucial military decisions are made and carried out - on the battlefield, at headquarters, in victory and defeat. The Commanders will appeal not only to students of military affairs but to everyone interested in Australian history and biography.

They were the forgotten commanders of World War II. While the names of Bradley and Patton became household words for Americans, few could identify Krueger or Eichelberger. They served under General Douglas MacArthur, a military genius with an enormous ego who dominated publicity from the Southwest Pacific during the American advance from Australia, through New Guinea, to the Philippines. While people at home read about the great victories that were won by "MacArthur's navy" and "MacArthur's air force," his subordinates labored in obscurity, fearful lest attention from the press lead to their replacement.

Historians too have paid little attention to the men who fought so well in the far reaches of the Pacific, and not a single biography has appeared in the decades since V-J Day. Yet General Blamey played a key role in the early battles of New Guinea. Generals Krueger and Eichelberger led American armies to major victories over the Japanese. General Kenney was one of the foremost air strategists of the war, while few airmen could match General Whitehead's tactical brilliance. Admiral Kinkaid took a crucial part in one of the greatest naval engagements in history. Admiral Barbey was an acknowledged master of amphibious warfare.

We Shall Return addresses a serious shortcoming in the literature of World War II. Revealed for the first time is the full extent of the contributions made by MacArthur's commanders to the defeat of the Japanese. As the authors of these essays so ably demonstrate, many of MacArthur's bold decisions and innovative tactics were urged upon him by his subordinates. Clearly, these men deserve more credit for his successes than they have received.