Arabs and Israelis have battled one another in political and military arenas, seemingly continuously, for some fifty years. The 1991 Madrid Peace Conference sought to change this pattern, launching bilateral and multilateral tracks in the Arab-Israeli peace process. As a result, a broad group of Arab states sat down with Israel and began to cooperate on a wide range of regional issues in what became known as the Middle East multilaterals. Yet why did enemies reluctant even to recognize one another choose to cooperate on regional problems? And once this process began, what drove the parties to continue such cooperation or, in some cases, halt their cooperative efforts? "Beyond the Handshake" addresses these fundamental questions, exploring the origins of the multilaterals and the development of multilateral cooperation in the areas of arms control and regional security, economic development, water management, and the environment. Dalia Dassa Kaye, challenging conventional concepts of cooperation, argues that multilateral cooperation in the Middle East must be appreciated as a process of interaction rather than solely as a set of outcomes. Presenting theoretical insights of value to students of regional and international relations, "Beyond the Handshake" provides a unique look at the evolving nature of Arab-Israeli relations and exposes the foundation the multilateral peace process laid for future regional cooperation in the Middle East.

It is not inevitable that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons or even that it will gain the capacity to quickly produce them. U.S. and even Israeli analysts continually push their estimates for such an event further into the future. Nevertheless, absent a change in Iranian policy, it is reasonable to assume that, some time in the coming decade, Iran will acquire such a capability. Most recent scholarly studies have also focused on how to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Other, less voluminous writing looks at what to do after Iran becomes a nuclear power. What has so far been lacking is a policy framework for dealing with Iran before, after, and, indeed, during its crossing of the nuclear threshold. This monograph attempts to fill that gap by providing a midterm strategy for dealing with Iran that neither begins nor ends at the point at which Tehran acquires a nuclear weapon capability. It proposes an approach that neither acquiesces to a nuclear-armed Iran nor refuses to admit the possibility - indeed, the likelihood - of this occurring.

The authors describe possible regional security structures and bilateral U.S. relationships with Iraq and Afghanistan. They recommend that the United States offer a wide range of security cooperation activities to compatible future governments in Kabul and Baghdad and should also plan to hedge against less-favorable contingencies. They emphasize that the U.S. Air Force should expect to remain heavily tasked for the foreseeable future.This book frames potential long-term U.S. security relationships with Iraq and Afghanistan in a regional context and posits roles of U.S. forces, especially the Air Force, in supporting these relationships under a variety of contingencies.

This monograph examines security-related track two diplomacy efforts in the Middle East and South Asia, including how such efforts have socialized participants into thinking about security in more cooperative terms, and whether the ideas generated in track two forums have been acknowledged at the societal level or influenced official policy. Kaye concludes with suggestions on how to improve future track two efforts.