Based on a four year research project investigating voting behavior, "Topics In Social Choice" begins with the well-known premise that different voting procedures may lead to different outcomes. The author then fills a void in present literature by comparing voting procedures in terms of four issues: sophisticated versus sincere voting; sophisticated voters and simultaneous versus sequential voting; voter efficacy in plurality and approval voting; and the use of normative standards to compare outcomes. He proposes both a new model of sophisticated voting and normative standards for proportional representation procedures. This study addresses both the general reader interested in voting issues and the serious student of voting schemes, voting behavior, and social choice theory.

"Topics In Social Choice" is divided into three parts representing its three themes. It addresses theoretical and experimental aspects of sophisticated voting; the problem of efficacy and correct decision; and it concludes with an investigation of fair proportional representation. The volume represents the first attempt to address sophisticated and yet simultaneous voting. It is also the first to subject various voting models to competitive testing and provide a set of normative criteria for systems evaluation.

Both theoretical and empirical aspects of single- and multi-winner voting procedures are presented in this collection of papers. Starting from a discussion of the underlying principles of democratic representation, the volume includes a description of a great variety of voting procedures. It lists and illustrates their susceptibility to the main voting paradoxes, assesses (under various models of voters' preferences) the probability of paradoxical outcomes, and discusses the relevance of the theoretical results to the choice of voting system.

This book is the first of its kind: a monograph devoted to a systematic critical examination and exposition of the theory of a priori voting power. This important branch of social-choice theory overlaps with game theory and is concerned with the ability of members in bodies that make yes or no decisions by vote to affect the outcome. The book includes, among other topics, a reasoned distinction between two fundamental types of voting power, the authors' discoveries on the paradoxes of voting power, and a novel analysis of decision rules that admit abstention. Formal mathematical statements are accompanied by reader-friendly informal explanations. The theory is applied and illustrated in extensive case studies. A series of US court cases concerning the application of the principle of 'one person, one vote' are critically examined in the light of the theory. The history of 'qualified majority voting' in the European Community's Council of Ministers is outlined and the distribution of voting power under this rule is analysed for each period of the community's growth. The measurement of voting power where abstention is a distinct option is illustrated with the examples of the US Congress and the UN Security Council. This important book breaks new ground and will be of interest to students and researchers in social choice, game theory, and in related disciplines such as political economy, business administration and constitutional law.

This book provides an evaluation of 18 voting procedures in terms of the most important monotonicity-related criteria in fixed and variable electorates. All voting procedures studied aim at electing one out of several candidates given the voters' preferences over the candidates. In addition to (strict) monotonicity failures, the vulnerability of the procedures to variation of the no-show paradoxes is discussed. All vulnerabilities are exemplified and explained. The occurrence of the no-show paradoxes is related to the presence or absence of a Condorcet winner. The primary readership of this book are scholars and students in the area of social choice.

This book deals with 18 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid paradoxical outcomes. Together with a companion volume by the same authors, Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, published by Springer in 2017, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes.

This book deals with 20 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid five important paradoxes in a restricted domain, viz., when a Condorcet winner exists and is elected in the initial profile. Together with the two companion volumes by the same authors, published by Springer in 2017 and 2018, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of voting procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes.