Husserl's phenomenology has often been criticized for its Cartesian, fundamentalistic, idealistic and solipsistic nature. Today, this widespread interpretation must be regarded as being outdated, since it gives but a very partial and limited picture of Husserl's thinking. The continuing publication of Husserl's research manuscripts has disclosed analyses which have made it necessary to revise and modify a number of standard readings. This anthology documents the recent development in Husserl research. It contains contributions from a number of young phenomenologists, who have all defended their dissertation on Husserl in the nineties, and it presents a new type of interpretation which emphasizes the dimensions of facticity, passivity, alterity and ethics in Husserl's thinking.

The Phenomenological Mind, Third Edition introduces fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. One of the outstanding books in the field, now translated into eight languages, this highly regarded exploration of phenomenology from a topic-driven standpoint examines the following key questions and issues: what is phenomenology? phenomenology and the cognitive sciences consciousness and self-consciousness time and consciousness intentionality and perception the embodied mind action knowledge of other minds situated and extended minds phenomenology and personal identity. This third edition has been revised and updated throughout. The chapter on phenomenological methodologies has been significantly expanded to cover qualitative research, and there are new sections discussing important, recent research on topics such as critical phenomenology, imagination, social cognition, race and gender, collective intentionality, and selfhood. Also included are helpful features, such as chapter summaries, guides to further reading, and boxed explanations of specialized topics, making The Phenomenological Mind, Third Edition an ideal introduction to key concepts in phenomenology, cognitive science, and philosophy of mind.

The Phenomenological Mind, Third Edition introduces fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. One of the outstanding books in the field, now translated into eight languages, this highly regarded exploration of phenomenology from a topic-driven standpoint examines the following key questions and issues: what is phenomenology? phenomenology and the cognitive sciences consciousness and self-consciousness time and consciousness intentionality and perception the embodied mind action knowledge of other minds situated and extended minds phenomenology and personal identity. This third edition has been revised and updated throughout. The chapter on phenomenological methodologies has been significantly expanded to cover qualitative research, and there are new sections discussing important, recent research on topics such as critical phenomenology, imagination, social cognition, race and gender, collective intentionality, and selfhood. Also included are helpful features, such as chapter summaries, guides to further reading, and boxed explanations of specialized topics, making The Phenomenological Mind, Third Edition an ideal introduction to key concepts in phenomenology, cognitive science, and philosophy of mind.

The nature and reality of self is a subject of increasing prominence among Western philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists. It has also been central to Indian and Tibetan philosophical traditions for over two thousand years. It is time to bring the rich resources of these traditions into the contemporary debate about the nature of self. This volume is the first of its kind. Leading philosophical scholars of the Indian and Tibetan traditions join with leading Western philosophers of mind and phenomenologists to explore issues about consciousness and selfhood from these multiple perspectives. Self, No Self? is not a collection of historical or comparative essays. It takes problem-solving and conceptual and phenomenological analysis as central to philosophy. The essays mobilize the argumentative resources of diverse philosophical traditions to address issues about the self in the context of contemporary philosophy and cognitive science. Self, No Self? will be essential reading for philosophers and cognitive scientists interested in the nature of the self and consciousness, and will offer a valuable way into the subject for students.

This Oxford Handbook offers a broad critical survey of the development of phenomenology, one of the main streams of philosophy since the nineteenth century. It comprises thirty-seven specially written chapters by leading figures in the field, which highlight historical influences, connections and developments, and offer a better comprehension and assessment of the continuity as well as diversity of the phenomenological tradition. The handbook is divided into three distinct parts. The first part addresses the way phenomenology has been influenced by earlier periods or figures in the history of philosophy. The second part contains chapters targeting prominent phenomenologists: How was their work affected by earlier figures, how did their own views change over time, and what kind of influence did they exert on subsequent thinkers? The contributions in the third part trace various core topics such as subjectivity, intersubjectivity, embodiment, spatiality, imagination etc. in the work of different phenomenologists, in order to explore how the notions were transformed, enriched, and expanded up through the century. This volume will be a source of insight for philosophers, students of philosophy, and for people working in other disciplines of the humanities, social sciences, and sciences, who are interested in the phenomenological tradition. It is an authoritative guide to how phenomenology started, how it developed, and where it is heading.

This Oxford Handbook offers a broad critical survey of the development of phenomenology, one of the main streams of philosophy since the nineteenth century. It comprises thirty-seven specially written chapters by leading figures in the field, which highlight historical influences, connections and developments, and offer a better comprehension and assessment of the continuity as well as diversity of the phenomenological tradition. The handbook is divided into three distinct parts. The first part addresses the way phenomenology has been influenced by earlier periods or figures in the history of philosophy. The second part contains chapters targeting prominent phenomenologists: How was their work affected by earlier figures, how did their own views change over time, and what kind of influence did they exert on subsequent thinkers? The contributions in the third part trace various core topics such as subjectivity, intersubjectivity, embodiment, spatiality, imagination etc. in the work of different phenomenologists, in order to explore how the notions were transformed, enriched, and expanded up through the century. This volume will be a source of insight for philosophers, students of philosophy, and for people working in other disciplines of the humanities, social sciences, and sciences, who are interested in the phenomenological tradition. It is an authoritative guide to how phenomenology started, how it developed, and where it is heading.

"Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity "analyzes the transcendental relevance of intersubjectivity and argues that an intersubjective transformation of transcendental philosophy can already be found in phenomenology, especially in Husserl. Husserl eventually came to believe that an analysis of transcendental intersubjectivity was a "conditio sine qua non" for a phenomenological philosophy. Drawing on both published and unpublished manuscripts, Dan Zahavi examines Husserl's reasons for this conviction and delivers a detailed analysis of his radical and complex concept of intersubjectivity, showing that precisely his reflections on transcendental intersubjectivity are capable of clarifying the core-concepts of phenomenology, thus making possible a new understanding of Husserl's philosophy.
Against this background the book compares his view with the approaches to intersubjectivity found in Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, and it then attempts to establish to what extent the phenomenological approach can contribute to the current discussion of intersubjectivity. This is achieved through a systematic confrontation with the language-pragmatical positions of Apel and Habermas.

It is commonly believed that Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), well known as the founder of phenomenology and as the teacher of Heidegger, was unable to free himself from the framework of a classical metaphysics of subjectivity. Supposedly, he never abandoned the view that the world and the Other are constituted by a pure transcendental subject, and his thinking in consequence remains Cartesian, idealistic, and solipsistic.
The continuing publication of Husserl's manuscripts has made it necessary to revise such an interpretation. Drawing upon both Husserl's published works and posthumous material, "Husserl's Phenomenology" incorporates the results of the most recent Husserl research. It is divided into three parts, roughly following the chronological development of Husserl's thought, from his early analyses of logic and intentionality, through his mature transcendental-philosophical analyses of reduction and constitution, to his late analyses of intersubjectivity and lifeworld. It can consequently serve as a concise and updated introduction to his thinking.

Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivitat analyses the transcendental relevance of intersubjectivity, and argues that an intersubjective transformation of transcendental philosophy can already be found in phenomenology, especially in Husserl. Husserl eventually came to believe that an analysis of transcendental subjectivity was a conditio sine qua non for a phenomenological philosophy. Drawing on both published and unpublished manuscripts the book examines his reasons for this conviction and delivers a detailed analysis of his radical and complex concept of intersubjectivity, showing that precisely his reflections on transcendental intersubjectivity are capable of clarifying his phenomenological core-concepts, thus making possible a new understanding of his philosophy. Against this background the book then attempts to establish to what extent the phenomenological approach to intersubjectivity can contribute to the current discussions of intersubjectivity. This is achieved through a systematic confrontation with the language-pragmatical positions of Apel and Habermas. Die Abhandlung untersucht die transzendentale Relevanz der Intersubjektivitat und zeigt, dass eine intersubjektive Transformation der Transzendentalphilosophie schon innerhalb der Phanomenologie - besonders der Husserlschen - zu finden ist. Husserl gelangte zu der Auffassung, dass eine Analyse und Einbeziehung der transzendentalen Intersubjektivitat als conditio sine qua non fur eine phanomenologische Philosophie zu betrachten sei. Die Grunde, die Husserl zu dieser Uberzeugung fuhrten, werden herausgearbeitet. Dabei weist die Analyse des radikalen und komplexen Begriffs der Intersubjektivitat auf, dass erst seine Uberlegungen zur transzendentalen Intersubjektivitat viele phanomenologische Grundbegriffe ins rechte Licht stellen konnen und daruber hinaus ein neues Grundverstandnis seiner Phanomenologie ermoglichen. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird die Frage, inwieweit die Phanomenologie zur gegenwartigen Intersubjektivitatsdiskussion beitragen kann, durch eine systematische Auseinandersetzung mit der sprachpragmatischen Intersubjektivitatstheorie von Apel und Habermas beantwortet."

It is commonly believed that Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), well known as the founder of phenomenology and as the teacher of Heidegger, was unable to free himself from the framework of a classical metaphysics of subjectivity. Supposedly, he never abandoned the view that the world and the Other are constituted by a pure transcendental subject, and his thinking in consequence remains Cartesian, idealistic, and solipsistic.
The continuing publication of Husserl's manuscripts has made it necessary to revise such an interpretation. Drawing upon both Husserl's published works and posthumous material, "Husserl's Phenomenology" incorporates the results of the most recent Husserl research. It is divided into three parts, roughly following the chronological development of Husserl's thought, from his early analyses of logic and intentionality, through his mature transcendental-philosophical analyses of reduction and constitution, to his late analyses of intersubjectivity and lifeworld. It can consequently serve as a concise and updated introduction to his thinking.

Can you be a self on your own or only together with others? Is selfhood a built-in feature of experience or rather socially constructed? How do we at all come to understand others? Does empathy amount to and allow for a distinct experiential acquaintance with others, and if so, what does that tell us about the nature of selfhood and social cognition? Does a strong emphasis on the first-personal character of consciousness prohibit a satisfactory account of intersubjectivity or is the former rather a necessary requirement for the latter? Engaging with debates and findings in classical phenomenology, in philosophy of mind and in various empirical disciplines, Dan Zahavi's new book Self and Other offers answers to these questions. Discussing such diverse topics as self-consciousness, phenomenal externalism, mindless coping, mirror self-recognition, autism, theory of mind, embodied simulation, joint attention, shame, time-consciousness, embodiment, narrativity, self-disorders, expressivity and Buddhist no-self accounts, Zahavi argues that any theory of consciousness that wishes to take the subjective dimension of our experiential life serious must endorse a minimalist notion of self. At the same time, however, he also contends that an adequate account of the self has to recognize its multifaceted character, and that various complementary accounts must be integrated, if we are to do justice to its complexity. Thus, while arguing that the most fundamental level of selfhood is not socially constructed and not constitutively dependent upon others, Zahavi also acknowledges that there are dimensions of the self and types of self-experience that are other-mediated. The final part of the book exemplifies this claim through a close analysis of shame.

The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology presents twenty-eight essays by some of the leading figures in the field, and gives an authoritative overview of the type of work and range of topics found and discussed in contemporary phenomenology. The essays aim to articulate and develop original theoretical perspectives. Some of them are concerned with issues and questions typical and distinctive of phenomenological philosophy, while others address questions familiar to analytic philosophers, but do so with arguments and ideas taken from phenomenology. Some offer detailed analyses of concrete phenomena; others take a more comprehensive perspective and seek to outline and motivate the future direction of phenomenology.
This Handbook will be a rich source of insight and stimulation for philosophers, students of philosophy, and for people working in other disciplines of the humanities, social sciences, and sciences, who are interested in the state of phenomenology today. It is the definitive guide to what is currently going on in phenomenology. It includes discussions of such diverse topics as intentionality, embodiment, perception, naturalism, temporality, self-consciousness, language, knowledge, ethics, politics, art and religion, and will make it clear that phenomenology, far from being a tradition of the past, is alive and in a position to make valuable contributions to contemporary thought.

Dan Zahavi offers an in-depth and up-to-date analysis of central and contested aspects of the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology. What is ultimately at stake in Husserl's phenomenological analyses? Are they primarily to be understood as investigations of consciousness or are they equally about the world? What is distinctive about phenomenological transcendental philosophy, and what kind of metaphysical import, if any, might it have? Husserl's Legacy offers an interpretation of the more overarching aims and ambitions of Husserlian phenomenology and engages with some of the most contested and debated questions in phenomenology. Central to its interpretative efforts is the attempt to understand Husserl's transcendental idealism. Husserl's Legacy argues that Husserl was not an internalist, nor a quietist when it comes to metaphysical issues; that he assigned a fundamental importance to facticity and intersubjectivity; and that he was not opposed to all forms of naturalism.

Can you be a self on your own or only together with others? Is selfhood a built-in feature of experience or rather socially constructed? How do we at all come to understand others? Does empathy amount to and allow for a distinct experiential acquaintance with others, and if so, what does that tell us about the nature of selfhood and social cognition? Does a strong emphasis on the first-personal character of consciousness prohibit a satisfactory account of intersubjectivity or is the former rather a necessary requirement for the latter? Engaging with debates and findings in classical phenomenology, in philosophy of mind and in various empirical disciplines, Dan Zahavi's new book Self and Other offers answers to these questions. Discussing such diverse topics as self-consciousness, phenomenal externalism, mindless coping, mirror self-recognition, autism, theory of mind, embodied simulation, joint attention, shame, time-consciousness, embodiment, narrativity, self-disorders, expressivity and Buddhist no-self accounts, Zahavi argues that any theory of consciousness that wishes to take the subjective dimension of our experiential life serious must endorse a minimalist notion of self. At the same time, however, he also contends that an adequate account of the self has to recognize its multifaceted character, and that various complementary accounts must be integrated, if we are to do justice to its complexity. Thus, while arguing that the most fundamental level of selfhood is not socially constructed and not constitutively dependent upon others, Zahavi also acknowledges that there are dimensions of the self and types of self-experience that are other-mediated. The final part of the book exemplifies this claim through a close analysis of shame.

Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivitat analyses the transcendental relevance of intersubjectivity, and argues that an intersubjective transformation of transcendental philosophy can already be found in phenomenology, especially in Husserl. Husserl eventually came to believe that an analysis of transcendental subjectivity was a conditio sine qua non for a phenomenological philosophy. Drawing on both published and unpublished manuscripts the book examines his reasons for this conviction and delivers a detailed analysis of his radical and complex concept of intersubjectivity, showing that precisely his reflections on transcendental intersubjectivity are capable of clarifying his phenomenological core-concepts, thus making possible a new understanding of his philosophy. Against this background the book then attempts to establish to what extent the phenomenological approach to intersubjectivity can contribute to the current discussions of intersubjectivity. This is achieved through a systematic confrontation with the language-pragmatical positions of Apel and Habermas. Die Abhandlung untersucht die transzendentale Relevanz der Intersubjektivitat und zeigt, dass eine intersubjektive Transformation der Transzendentalphilosophie schon innerhalb der Phanomenologie - besonders der Husserlschen - zu finden ist. Husserl gelangte zu der Auffassung, dass eine Analyse und Einbeziehung der transzendentalen Intersubjektivitat als conditio sine qua non fur eine phanomenologische Philosophie zu betrachten sei. Die Grunde, die Husserl zu dieser Uberzeugung fuhrten, werden herausgearbeitet. Dabei weist die Analyse des radikalen und komplexen Begriffs der Intersubjektivitat auf, dass erst seine Uberlegungen zur transzendentalen Intersubjektivitat viele phanomenologische Grundbegriffe ins rechte Licht stellen konnen und daruber hinaus ein neues Grundverstandnis seiner Phanomenologie ermoglichen. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird die Frage, inwieweit die Phanomenologie zur gegenwartigen Intersubjektivitatsdiskussion beitragen kann, durch eine systematische Auseinandersetzung mit der sprachpragmatischen Intersubjektivitatstheorie von Apel und Habermas beantwortet.

The nature and reality of self is a subject of increasing prominence among Western philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists. It has also been central to Indian and Tibetan philosophical traditions for over two thousand years. It is time to bring the rich resources of these traditions into the contemporary debate about the nature of self. This volume is the first of its kind. Leading philosophical scholars of the Indian and Tibetan traditions join with leading Western philosophers of mind and phenomenologists to explore issues about consciousness and selfhood from these multiple perspectives. Self, No Self? is not a collection of historical or comparative essays. It takes problem-solving and conceptual and phenomenological analysis as central to philosophy. The essays mobilize the argumentative resources of diverse philosophical traditions to address issues about the self in the context of contemporary philosophy and cognitive science. Self, No Self? will be essential reading for philosophers and cognitive scientists interested in the nature of the self and consciousness, and will offer a valuable way into the subject for students.

The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology presents twenty-eight essays by some of the leading figures in the field, and gives an authoritative overview of the type of work and range of topics found and discussed in contemporary phenomenology. The essays aim to articulate and develop original theoretical perspectives. Some of them are concerned with issues and questions typical and distinctive of phenomenological philosophy, while others address questions familiar to analytic philosophers, but do so with arguments and ideas taken from phenomenology. Some offer detailed analyses of concrete phenomena; others take a more comprehensive perspective and seek to outline and motivate the future direction of phenomenology. The handbook will be a rich source of insight and stimulation for philosophers, students of philosophy, and for people working in other disciplines of the humanities, social sciences, and sciences, who are interested in the state of phenomenology today. It is the definitive guide to what is currently going on in phenomenology. It includes discussions of such diverse topics as intentionality, embodiment, perception, naturalism, temporality, self-consciousness, language, knowledge, ethics, politics, art and religion, and will make it clear that phenomenology, far from being a tradition of the past, is alive and in a position to make valuable contributions to contemporary thought.

The essays in this book seek to address the following issue: to what extent can the current discussion of consciousness in mainstream cognitive science and analytical philosophy of mind profit from insights drawn from the investigations of subjectivity found in the Kantian and post-Kantian tradition (Kant, Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard), as well as in the phenomenological and hermeneutical tradition. The contributions include some that are philosophical, while others relate to issues in empirical science, such as psychopathology, cognitive neuroscience, and developmental psychology. Contributors include Andrew Brook, John Drummond, Shaun Gallagher, Arne Groen, Josef Parnas, Peter Poellner, Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl, Louis Sass, Dieter Teichert, and the editor.

Phenomenology: The Basics is a concise and engaging introduction to one of the dominant philosophical movements of the 20th century. This lively and lucid book provides an introduction to the essential phenomenological concepts that are crucial for understanding great thinkers such as Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Written by a leading expert in the field, Dan Zahavi examines and explains key questions such as: What is a phenomenological analysis? What are the methodological foundations of phenomenology? What does phenomenology have to say about embodiment and intersubjectivity? How is phenomenology distinguished from, and related to, other fields in philosophy? How do ideas from classic phenomenology relate to ongoing debates in psychology and qualitative research? With a glossary of key terms and suggestions for further reading, the book considers key philosophical arguments around phenomenology, making this an ideal starting point for anyone seeking a concise and accessible introduction to the rich and complex study of phenomenology.

Phenomenology: The Basics is a concise and engaging introduction to one of the dominant philosophical movements of the 20th century. This lively and lucid book provides an introduction to the essential phenomenological concepts that are crucial for understanding great thinkers such as Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Written by a leading expert in the field, Dan Zahavi examines and explains key questions such as: What is a phenomenological analysis? What are the methodological foundations of phenomenology? What does phenomenology have to say about embodiment and intersubjectivity? How is phenomenology distinguished from, and related to, other fields in philosophy? How do ideas from classic phenomenology relate to ongoing debates in psychology and qualitative research? With a glossary of key terms and suggestions for further reading, the book considers key philosophical arguments around phenomenology, making this an ideal starting point for anyone seeking a concise and accessible introduction to the rich and complex study of phenomenology.

Dan Zahavi offers an in-depth and up-to-date analysis of central and contested aspects of the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology. What is ultimately at stake in Husserl's phenomenological analyses? Are they primarily to be understood as investigations of consciousness or are they equally about the world? What is distinctive about phenomenological transcendental philosophy, and what kind of metaphysical import, if any, might it have? Husserl's Legacy offers an interpretation of the more overarching aims and ambitions of Husserlian phenomenology and engages with some of the most contested and debated questions in phenomenology. Central to its interpretative efforts is the attempt to understand Husserl's transcendental idealism. Zahavi argues that Husserl was not a sophisticated introspectionist, not a phenomenalist, nor an internalist, not a quietist when it comes to metaphysical issues, and not opposed to all forms of naturalism. Husserl's Legacy argues that Husserl's phenomenology is as much about the world as it is about consciousness, and that a proper grasp of Husserl's transcendental idealism reveals the fundamental importance of facticity and intersubjectivity.

In the rigorous and highly original "Self-Awareness and Alterity, " Dan Zahavi provides a sustained argument that phenomenology, especially in its Husserlian version, can contribute something decisive to the analysis of self-awareness.
Taking on recent discussions within both analytical philosophy (Shoemaker, Castaneda, Nagel) and contemporary German philosophy (Henrich, Frank, Tugendhat), Zahavi argues that the phenomenological tradition has much more to offer when it comes to the problem of self-awareness than is normally assumed. As a contribution to the current philosophical debate concerning self-awareness, the book presents a comprehensive reconstruction of Husserl's theory of pre-reflective self-awareness, thereby criticizing a number of prevalent interpretations and a systematic discussion of a number of phenomenological insights related to this issue, including analyses of the temporal, intentional, reflexive, bodily, and social nature of the self.

Recent work on empathy theory, research, and applications, by scholars from disciplines ranging from neuroscience to psychoanalysis. There are many reasons for scholars to investigate empathy. Empathy plays a crucial role in human social interaction at all stages of life; it is thought to help motivate positive social behavior, inhibit aggression, and provide the affective and motivational bases for moral development; it is a necessary component of psychotherapy and patient-physician interactions. This volume covers a wide range of topics in empathy theory, research, and applications, helping to integrate perspectives as varied as anthropology and neuroscience. The contributors discuss the evolution of empathy within the mammalian brain and the development of empathy in infants and children; the relationships among empathy, social behavior, compassion, and altruism; the neural underpinnings of empathy; cognitive versus emotional empathy in clinical practice; and the cost of empathy. Taken together, the contributions significantly broaden the interdisciplinary scope of empathy studies, reporting on current knowledge of the evolutionary, social, developmental, cognitive, and neurobiological aspects of empathy and linking this capacity to human communication, including in clinical practice and medical education.

What is a self? Does it exist in reality or is it a mere social construct--or is it perhaps a neurologically induced illusion? The legitimacy of the concept of the self has been questioned by both neuroscientists and philosophers in recent years. Countering this, in Subjectivity and Selfhood, Dan Zahavi argues that the notion of self is crucial for a proper understanding of consciousness. He investigates the interrelationships of experience, self-awareness, and selfhood, proposing that none of these three notions can be understood in isolation. Any investigation of the self, Zahavi argues, must take the first-person perspective seriously and focus on the experiential givenness of the self. Subjectivity and Selfhood explores a number of phenomenological analyses pertaining to the nature of consciousness, self, and self-experience in light of contemporary discussions in consciousness research.Philosophical phenomenology--as developed by Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others--not only addresses crucial issues often absent from current debates over consciousness but also provides a conceptual framework for understanding subjectivity. Zahavi fills the need--given the recent upsurge in theoretical and empirical interest in subjectivity--for an account of the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness that is accessible to researchers and students from a variety of disciplines. His aim is to use phenomenological analyses to clarify issues of central importance to philosophy of mind, cognitive science, developmental psychology, and psychiatry. By engaging in a dialogue with other philosophical and empirical positions, says Zahavi, phenomenology can demonstrate its vitality and contemporary relevance.