This book examines NATO's Balkan interventions over the entire decade starting with the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1992. Focusing on the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, it traces the record of early transatlantic failures and later successes as once bitterly divided allies were able, finally, to unite around some basic principles. By the time of the Kosovo intervention in spring 1999, the allies agreed on the necessity of taking sides and using military force in conflicts that were complicated, but far from morally opaque. The book concludes with some lessons around which the transatlantic allies might reasonably hope - despite other pressing concerns - to stay engaged and stay united.

The essays in this volume examine selected national, regional European, and international policies of Charles de Gaulle, giving consideration to their significance in his own time, and today. Not everything de Gaulle did withstands the test of time. Nor, obviously, was everything beyond criticism in his own time. Nonetheless, a main finding, in the words of one essayist, is that de Gaulle had an 'uncanny sense of where history was going' and the skill to position his country accordingly. De Gaulle also stands as a testament to the power of individuals in history, a somewhat unfashionable viewpoint in modern university curriculums. Today, when France's destiny appears increasingly to depend on structures and institutions beyond its national control, including a Europe weakened by the sovereign debt crisis, and a global economic system accountable to no one, it seems timely to reconsider the record of the twentieth century's greatest Frenchman, whose skill at dealing with the problems of his time can inspire today's generation of politicians and statesmen.

The essays in this volume examine selected national, regional European, and international policies of Charles de Gaulle, giving consideration to their significance in his own time, and today. Not everything de Gaulle did withstands the test of time. Nor, obviously, was everything beyond criticism in his own time. Nonetheless, a main finding, in the words of one essayist, is that de Gaulle had an 'uncanny sense of where history was going' and the skill to position his country accordingly. De Gaulle also stands as a testament to the power of individuals in history, a somewhat unfashionable viewpoint in modern university curriculums. Today, when France's destiny appears increasingly to depend on structures and institutions beyond its national control, including a Europe weakened by the sovereign debt crisis, and a global economic system accountable to no one, it seems timely to reconsider the record of the twentieth century's greatest Frenchman, whose skill at dealing with the problems of his time can inspire today's generation of politicians and statesmen.

Tracing the transformation of NATO in the aftermath of the Cold War, this volume assesses NATO's current accomplishments, continuing challenges and political pitfalls. International scholars and policy-makers explore three key themes influencing NATO's future: transatlantic relations, the debate over enlargement and the organization's new functions. Weighing the fate of an alliance poised for renewal or decline, the contributors offer analysis and discussion of an organization that has changed profoundly over the past five years and continues to evolve in the face of an uncertain global environment.

The damage that has been done to the transatlantic alliance will not be repaired through grand architectural redesigns or radical new agendas. Instead, the transatlantic partners need to restore their consensus and cooperation on key security challenges with a limited agenda that reflects the essential conservatism of the transatlantic partnership during the Cold War and the 1990s. There will inevitably be big challenges, such as the rise of China, where transatlantic disparities in strategic means and commitments preclude any common alliance undertaking. Yet such limits are nothing new. The absence of a common transatlantic commitment to counter-insurgency in Iraq may cause resentments, but so too did the lack of a common commitment to counter-insurgency in Vietnam.

This Adelphi Paper suggests ten propositions for future transatlantic consensus - that is to say, ten security challenges for which the allies should be able to agree on common strategies. These run the gamut froman effective strategy to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability to transatlantic leadership for international cooperation against global warming. If pursued with seriousness and a reasonable degree of transatlantic unity, these propositions could constitute the foundations of an effective partnership. They are, in the authors' view, the basis for a consensus on the most pressing security challenges of the twenty-first century.

The time is right for this kind of serious rededication to alliance purposes. There has already been some effort to repair the damage; moreover, new leaders are in place or coming to the countries that were major protagonists of the transatlantic crisis: Germany, France, Britain and, in 2009, the United States. It is possible that these four new leaders will be better able to put the disputes of the recent past behind them. This extended essay is a guide to the possibilities, and also the limits, of a new start.