From the legendary whistle-blower who revealed the Pentagon Papers, the first insider exposé of the terrifying dangers of America's hidden, seventy-year-long nuclear policy.

At the same time former presidential advisor Daniel Ellsberg famously took the Pentagon Papers, he also took with him a cache of top-secret documents related to America's nuclear program in the 1960s. Here for the first time he reveals the contents of those now-declassified documents and makes clear their shocking relevance for today.

The Doomsday Machine is Ellsberg's account of the most dangerous arms build-up in the history of civilisation, whose legacy - and proposed renewal under the Trump administration - threatens the very survival of humanity.

Ellsberg elaborates on "Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms" and mounts a powerful challenge to the dominant theory of rational decision in this book.

Ellsberg's dissertation is a major landmark in the history of decision research. The issues that it raised and clarified have inspired scholars for decades, and will continue to do so - Daniel Kahneman, Princeton University

Daniel Ellsberg set the world of decision theorists on its ear when he introduced the distinction between risk and ambiguity in his article excerpted from his dissertation. The clear convincing example caused a fundamental shift in thinking and in many ways led to the subsequent studies of decision and judgment by cognitive psychologists which, in turn, are having an increasing influence in the analysis of economic phenomena. It is good to have the complete text available to us at last.- Emeritus Arrow, Stanford University

In his second public contribution to ending the American intervention in Vietnam, Daniel Ellsberg brings together and revises his papers that best explain US policy and strategies during the war. Drawing upon his virtually unique range of experience as a participant, field observer, analyst, and critic, Papers on the War shares a selection of Daniel Ellsberg's writings as he critiques the presence of US policies in Vietnam. With the major contribution of a greatly expanded and redefined version of his crucial study "The Quagmire Myth and the Stalemate Machine," Ellsberg reveals consistent patterns of decision-making with respect to Indo-china that ran from Truman's Administration into Nixon's. From the first participant permitted to make use of the entire study that led to the Pentagon Papers, this book shares analysis on the invasion of Laos, the internal policies of South Vietnam, the failure of rural pacification, the American way of war, and the renewed escalation in the spring of 1972.

Helps us to better understand the dangers of U.S. nuclear strategy, and reminds us that it is a strategy we can resist.

How and why was the course of America's relationship to Asia changed? What are the prospects for detente with the People's Republic of China? How might the new course affect America's economy and her relations with other nations, especially Japan and the USSR? These questions form the basis of a wide-ranging inquiry held recently at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington and recorded in Peace with China? Government officials candidly discuss emerging foreign policies. Former members of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations analyze the political and military realities as they saw them. Finally, critics of America's actions in Asia including spokemen for New Left and revisionist positions contribute their viewpoints and alternatives. The result is a unique scrutiny of the complex processes by which the White House, State Department, and Pentagon devise strategies, as well as a lively but scholarly debate on American options in Asia."