|
Showing 1 - 4 of
4 matches in All Departments
Public pensions in the United States face an impending funding
crisis in the wake of the financial crisis and the COVID-19
recession. Many cities and states will struggle to meet these
growing obligations without major cuts in government services,
reneging on pension promises, or raising taxes. This Element
examines the development of the pension crisis through the lens of
political economy. We analyze the knowledge and incentive problems
inherent in the institutional structure, governance, and accounting
of public pensions. We conclude by offering several institutional,
governance, and reporting reforms to address the pension funding
crisis.
Contemporary monetary institutions are flawed at a foundational
level. The reigning paradigm in monetary policy holds up
constrained discretion as the preferred operating framework for
central banks. But no matter how smart or well-intentioned are
central bankers, discretionary policy contains information and
incentive problems that make macroeconomic stability systematically
unlikely. Furthermore, central bank discretion implicitly violates
the basic jurisprudential norms of liberal democracy. Drawing on a
wide body of scholarship, this volume presents a novel argument in
favor of embedding monetary institutions into a rule of law
framework. The authors argue for general, predictable rules to
provide a sturdier foundation for economic growth and prosperity. A
rule of law approach to monetary policy would remedy the flaws that
resulted in misguided monetary responses to the 2007-8 financial
crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. Understanding the case for true
monetary rules is the first step toward creating more stable
monetary institutions.
Contemporary monetary institutions are flawed at a foundational
level. The reigning paradigm in monetary policy holds up
constrained discretion as the preferred operating framework for
central banks. But no matter how smart or well-intentioned are
central bankers, discretionary policy contains information and
incentive problems that make macroeconomic stability systematically
unlikely. Furthermore, central bank discretion implicitly violates
the basic jurisprudential norms of liberal democracy. Drawing on a
wide body of scholarship, this volume presents a novel argument in
favor of embedding monetary institutions into a rule of law
framework. The authors argue for general, predictable rules to
provide a sturdier foundation for economic growth and prosperity. A
rule of law approach to monetary policy would remedy the flaws that
resulted in misguided monetary responses to the 2007-8 financial
crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. Understanding the case for true
monetary rules is the first step toward creating more stable
monetary institutions.
|
|