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This study uses a comparative analysis of the Malayan Emergency,
the American experience in Vietnam, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM to
examine the role and effectiveness of artillery units in complex
counterinsurgency environments. Through this analysis, four factors
emerge which impact the employment of artillery units: the
counterinsurgency effort's requirement for indirect fires;
constraints and limitations on indirect fires; the
counterinsurgency effort's force organization; and the conversion
cost of nonstandard roles for artillery units. In conclusion, the
study offers five broadly descriptive fundamentals for employing
artillery units in a counterinsurgency environment: invest in
tactical leadership, exploit lessons learned, support the
operational approach and strategic framework, maintain pragmatic
fire support capability, and minimize collateral damage. Finally,
the study examines the role of education for leaders in a
counterinsurgency, and its influence on these imperative
fundamentals.
Updated and revised from the popular 2011 edition, with full-colour
maps and new images throughout, this is a concise study of the
American Revolutionary War. The American Revolution, or the
American War of Independence, has been characterized politically as
a united political uprising of the American colonies and militarily
as a guerrilla campaign of colonists against the inflexible British
military establishment. In this book, Daniel Marston argues that
this belief, though widespread, is a misconception. He contends
that the American Revolution, in reality, created deep political
divisions in the population of the Thirteen Colonies, while
militarily pitting veterans of the Seven Years' War against one
another, in a conflict that combined guerrilla tactics and classic
18th-century campaign techniques on both sides. The peace treaty of
1783 that brought an end to the war marked the formal beginning of
the United States of America as an independent political entity.
With revisions from the author and 50 new images, this illustrated
overview of the American Revolution provides an important reference
resource for the academic or student reader as well as those with a
general interest in the period.
The Partition of British India in 1947 resulted in the
establishment of the independent states of India and Pakistan and
the end of the British Raj. The decision to divide British India
along religious lines led to widespread upheaval and communal
violence in the period leading up to and following the official day
of independence, 15 August 1947. In this book, Daniel Marston
provides a unique examination of the role of the Indian army in
post-World War II India. He draws upon extensive research into
primary source documents and interviews with veterans of the events
of 1947 to provide fresh insight into the vital part that the
Indian Army played in preserving law and order in the region. This
rigorous book fills a significant gap in the historiography of the
British in India and will be invaluable to those studying the
British Empire and South Asia more generally.
This book traces the background and course of the French-Indian War, fought out in the forests, plains and forts of the North American Frontier. Despite early French success against a British Army unskilled in woodland fighting, the British learned quickly from their Native American allies and emerged victorious at Louisbourg and Quebec.
Series Information: Essential Histories
The closest thing to total war before World War I, the Seven Year's
War was fought in North America, Europe, the Caribbean and India,
with major consequences for all parties involved. This text reviews
the grand strategies of the combatants and examines the differing
styles of warfare used in the many campaigns. These ranged from the
large-scale battles and sieges of the European front to the ambush
and skirmish tactics used in the forests of North America. Daniel
Marston's narrative is supported by personal diaries and memoirs,
and official reports.
The Partition of British India in 1947 resulted in the
establishment of the independent states of India and Pakistan and
the end of the British Raj. The decision to divide British India
along religious lines led to widespread upheaval and communal
violence in the period leading up to and following the official day
of independence, 15 August 1947. In this book, Daniel Marston
provides a unique examination of the role of the Indian army in
post-World War II India. He draws upon extensive research into
primary source documents and interviews with veterans of the events
of 1947 to provide fresh insight into the vital part that the
Indian Army played in preserving law and order in the region. This
rigorous book fills a significant gap in the historiography of the
British in India and will be invaluable to those studying the
British Empire and South Asia more generally.
The closest thing to total war before World War One, the Seven
Years' War was fought in North America, Europe, the Caribbean and
India with major consequences for all parties involved. This
fascinating book is the first to truly review the grand strategies
of the combatants and examine the differing styles of warfare used
in the many campaigns. These ranged from the large-scale battles
and sieges of the European front to the ambush and skirmish tactics
used in the forests of North America. Daniel Marston's engaging
narrative is supported by official war papers, personal diaries and
memoirs, and official reports.
The British and US experience with the use of local, irregular
security forces suggest their importance in assisting the host
nation government and counterinsurgent forces. Their successful
establishment, training, and employment demonstrate the importance
of several prerequisites including partnership with an advisory
force, consent of the host nation's government to exist, and that
the security force is accountable to the local civil authority.
Without these prerequisites, the local, irregular security force
could risk illegitimacy in the eyes of the populace, the host
nation government, and the counterinsurgent. However, partnership
does not guarantee a local irregular force's success. The host
nation's involvement in the decision to build irregular forces is
important from the beginning of the campaign. Through the
examination of archival research and primary source interviews
associated with the British experience in North-West Frontier and
the Dhofar region of Oman, one can start to understand the
prerequisites needed to create a successful mentorship force. The
paper examines the method of partnership, selection and traits of
the advisors, and the host nation government's role in building the
Punjab Irregular Forces and Frontier Corps in North-West Frontier
in India, the firqat in Dhofar, and the Sons of Iraq. Illustrated.
This thesis contends the debate on whether to embrace a population
centric or enemy-centric counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan
detracts focus from building a balanced approach, customized for
the human and political landscape in each area of operation (AO).
The debate should be finally resolved since each strategic axis
represents a crucial portion of the ideal hybrid approach, which
necessarily looks different from one AO to the next. Each extreme,
whether focusing all effort on killing and capturing the enemy
(enemy-centric) or partnering with and protecting the population
from the enemy (population-centric) is unique to local conditions
on the ground. "Centric" means to focus efforts only in one
direction or the other. The "centric" banners must be dropped and
the US should maintain a balanced approach, integrating both
strategies and freeing commanders to use every available resource
across the lines of effort in the concentrations he deems
appropriate and conducive to his specific AO. The US is fighting a
counterinsuregency that necessitates both the destruction of the
enemy and the nurturing of the population. Counterinsurgency, as
another form of warfare, must utilize all elements of national
power to achieve the desired outcome. The consensus from a
comprehensive study of multiple counterinsurgency models indicates
that utilizing all available resources to achieve a balanced
approach and providing the autonomy our commanders require to
achieve success in their AOs is the most effective way to deal with
counterinsurgencies now and in the future.
The classical counterinsurgency theorists emphasize that it is
necessary for the government to gain and maintain control of the
population in order to defeat the insurgency. They describe
population and resource control measures as a means of doing so.
However, some contemporary writers have questioned the legitimacy
of such tactics and doubt that they can be employed effectively in
modern campaigns. Four case studies from three different campaigns:
the Philippines, Vietnam, and Iraq, examine how population and
resource control measures can be employed effectively and
legitimately by the counterinsurgent force. The case studies reveal
that protecting and isolating the population is the most critical
component of any such measures, without this condition the measures
will not achieve their desired effect. The case studies also reveal
that once the protection and isolation are in place, the government
can focus on controlling the behavior of the population. That is,
it can prevent behavior that supports the insurgency while enabling
behavior that supports the government or is neutral. This denies
the insurgency its means of support and facilitates the destruction
of its armed and subversive elements by the counterinsurgent
forces.
The Rhodesian African Rifles overcame profoundly divisive racist
and tribal differences among its members because a transcendent
"regimental culture" superseded the disparate cultures of its
individual soldiers and officers. The RAR's culture grew around the
traditions of the British regimental system, after which the RAR
was patterned. The soldiers of the RAR, regardless of racial or
tribal background, identified themselves first as soldiers and
members of the regiment, before their individual race and tribe.
Regimental history and traditions, as well as shared hardships on
deployments and training were mechanisms that forced officers and
soldiers to see past differences. The RAR is remarkable because
these bonds stayed true through to the end of the war, through
incredible pressure on black Rhodesians to succumb to the black
nationalist groups and cast off a government that was portrayed to
them as oppressive, racist and hateful. Through the end of the Bush
War, 1965-1980, RAR soldiers remained loyal and steadfast to their
regiment, and that must be their legacy. In the end, the values of
the government were irrelevant. It was the regiment that drew these
men in, and their loyalty was more to their comrades and their
heritage than to any particular government or cause.
This study analyzes the Chinese Red Army from 1927 to 1936 to
determine how the Red Army survived attacks from external military
forces and also successfully overcame the threats to its existence
posed by changing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policies. During
this period, the CCP attempted to develop, expand, and
professionalize the Chinese Red Army as a way to defend Communist
base areas from a series of Kuomingtang (KMT) Extermination
Campaigns. Also during these years, changes in the CCP leadership
often placed the Red Army in dangerous situations by
underestimating the KMT military threat and overestimating Red Army
capabilities. This re-examination of the origin and development of
the Chinese People's Liberation Army looks at the Chinese Red
Army's strategy, tactics, organization, and training and identifies
four themes that helped it adapt and survive: a pragmatic strategy
focused on long-term success; creating local populace support
through adaptation; strong soldier recruiting, training, and
retention; and a comprehensive officer development system.
Counterinsurgents have raised and employed irregular security
forces in many campaigns over the last century. Irregular security
forces are indigenous forces, not part of the regular police or
military organizations of the host nation, that are recruited
locally to provide a basic level of security in a given area.
Irregular security forces, when used in conjunction with all other
available capabilities, contribute to, but do not in and of
themselves, ensure success. While irregular security forces can be
effective in conducting local security, intelligence gathering,
surveillance and other tasks in their home areas, tasks that may
prove more difficult for regular security forces, irregular forces
are no silver bullet to achieving success. Counterinsurgency is a
struggle for the support of the population against an active and
thinking enemy and therefore, there are no hard and fast rules.
Several counterinsurgency scholars and theorists do, however, agree
on several key principles that can aid counterinsurgents in
prosecuting their campaigns successfully. This paper seeks to add
to the body of knowledge by examining the key aspects that
counterinsurgents should take into account when considering raising
an irregular security force.
Disrupting an insurgent's access to sanctuary and safe-haven is a
critical aspect of operational planning for counterinsurgent
forces. By denying an inurgent's access to safe havens early in the
conflict, the counterinsurgent will gain a marked advantage over
the initially weaker force. Only through a deep understanding of
how the insurgent is using international, tribal, or cultural
borders to evade the counterinsurgent force can the
counterinsurgent disrupt the insurgent operations. In order to
accomplish this, the counterinsurgent must understand the physical
terrain and cultural demographics, nest border operations into the
overarching strategy, and employ security forces to reinforce
success. Through the examination of the British experience in the
North-West Frontier, 1849-1947 and the counterinsurgent efforts in
the Sultanate of Oman's Dhofar Rebellion, 1962-1975, one can
develop techniques for applying border control operations to
disrupt insurgent safe-havens. Border control efforts are not the
decisive effort within a counterinsurgency, but they are critical
to defeating the insurgent's ability to maintain their ability to
conduct operations.
The classical counterinsurgency theorists emphasize that it is
necessary for the government to gain and maintain control of the
population in order to defeat the insurgency. They describe
population and resource control measures as a means of doing so.
However, some contemporary writers have questioned the legitimacy
of such tactics and doubt that they can be employed effectively in
modern campaigns. Four case studies from three different campaigns:
the Philippines, Vietnam, and Iraq, examine how population and
resource control measures can be employed effectively and
legitimately by the counterinsurgent force. The case studies reveal
that protecting and isolating the population is the most critical
component of any such measures, without this condition the measures
will not achieve their desired effect. The case studies also reveal
that once the protection and isolation are in place, the government
can focus on controlling the behavior of the population. That is,
it can prevent behavior that supports the insurgency while enabling
behavior that supports the government or is neutral. This denies
the insurgency its means of support and facilitates the destruction
of its armed and subversive elements by the counterinsurgent
forces.
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