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Roughly, instrumentalism is the view that science is primarily, and
should primarily be, an instrument for furthering our practical
ends. It has fallen out of favour because historically influential
variants of the view, such as logical positivism, suffered from
serious defects. In this book, however, Darrell P. Rowbottom
develops a new form of instrumentalism, which is more sophisticated
and resilient than its predecessors. This position-'cognitive
instrumentalism'-involves three core theses. First, science makes
theoretical progress primarily when it furnishes us with more
predictive power or understanding concerning observable things.
Second, scientific discourse concerning unobservable things should
only be taken literally in so far as it involves observable
properties or analogies with observable things. Third, scientific
claims about unobservable things are probably neither approximately
true nor liable to change in such a way as to increase in
truthlikeness. There are examples from science throughout the book,
and Rowbottom demonstrates at length how cognitive instrumentalism
fits with the development of late nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century chemistry and physics, and especially atomic
theory. Drawing upon this history, Rowbottom also argues that there
is a kind of understanding, empirical understanding, which we can
achieve without having true, or even approximately true,
representations of unobservable things. In closing the book, he
sets forth his view on how the distinction between the observable
and unobservable may be drawn, and compares cognitive
instrumentalism with key contemporary alternatives such as
structural realism, constructive empiricism, and semirealism.
Overall, this book offers a strong defence of instrumentalism that
will be of interest to scholars and students working on the debate
about realism in philosophy of science.
Roughly, instrumentalism is the view that science is primarily, and
should primarily be, an instrument for furthering our practical
ends. It has fallen out of favour because historically influential
variants of the view, such as logical positivism, suffered from
serious defects. In this book, however, Darrell P. Rowbottom
develops a new form of instrumentalism, which is more sophisticated
and resilient than its predecessors. This position-'cognitive
instrumentalism'-involves three core theses. First, science makes
theoretical progress primarily when it furnishes us with more
predictive power or understanding concerning observable things.
Second, scientific discourse concerning unobservable things should
only be taken literally in so far as it involves observable
properties or analogies with observable things. Third, scientific
claims about unobservable things are probably neither approximately
true nor liable to change in such a way as to increase in
truthlikeness. There are examples from science throughout the book,
and Rowbottom demonstrates at length how cognitive instrumentalism
fits with the development of late nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century chemistry and physics, and especially atomic
theory. Drawing upon this history, Rowbottom also argues that there
is a kind of understanding, empirical understanding, which we can
achieve without having true, or even approximately true,
representations of unobservable things. In closing the book, he
sets forth his view on how the distinction between the observable
and unobservable may be drawn, and compares cognitive
instrumentalism with key contemporary alternatives such as
structural realism, constructive empiricism, and semirealism.
Overall, this book offers a strong defence of instrumentalism that
will be of interest to scholars and students working on the debate
about realism in philosophy of science.
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Scientific Progress
Darrell P. Rowbottom
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R558
Discovery Miles 5 580
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Ships in 9 - 15 working days
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