Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis examines for the first time the role and performance of all three intelligence communities centrally involved in this seminal event: American, Soviet and Cuban. The ways in which organizational and personality variables affect the political exploitation of intelligence is assessed followed by an analysis of the psychology of intelligence assessment, showing how common cognitive and motivational pathologies can explain crucial errors of inference and attribution made by all three intelligence communities. In closing, the lessons of the volume as a whole are reflected upon for the theory and practice of intelligence assessment, and for our understanding of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Intelligence played a crucial part in the genesis, management and resolution of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the world's closest brush with nuclear war. This study examines the role and performance of all three intelligence communities centrally involved in this event: American, Soviet and Cuban.

How do we know when we are investing wisely in security? Answering this question requires investigating what things are worth securing (and why); what threatens them; how best to protect them; and how to think about it. Is it possible to protect them? How best go about protecting them? What trade-offs are involved in allocating resources to security problems? This book responds to these questions by stripping down our preconceptions and rebuilding an understanding of security from the ground up on the basis of a common-sense ontology and an explicit theory of value. It argues for a clear distinction between objective and subjective security threats, a non-anthropocentric understanding of security, and a particular hierarchy of security referents, looking closely at four in particular-the ecosphere, the state, culture, and individual human beings. The analysis will be of interest not only to students and scholars of International Relations, but also to practitioners.

"This ambitious and clear-headed book advances the cause of eclectic theorizing. A compelling theory of foreign policy change is supported by highly readable plausibility probes. David Welch's impeccable scholarship has succeeded where most of ours has failed us--joining analytical parsimony with policy relevance."--Peter J. Katzenstein, Walter S. Carpenter, Jr. Professor of International Studies, Cornell University

"David Welch has written an outstanding account of foreign policy change. His main claim is that leaders will change foreign policy most when they perceive existing policy as likely to lead to painful losses; they are not motivated to change policy simply because they might be able to make minor gains. He develops three main hypotheses to operationalise this claim, and 'test drives' these against a set of structured, focused case studies. He finds that his theory is substantially confirmed by the case studies, and he sees this as vindication of general theory. This is a fascinating book, with an excellent integration between theory and practice; it will become required reading for anyone interested in explaining foreign policy change or in international theory. Illuminating and theoretically convincing, this is that rare thing-a theoretically sophisticated book that says something new, and does so by the use of detailed case studies."--Steve Smith, Vice-Chancellor and Professor of International Relations, University of Exeter

"In the tradition of Hans Morgenthau, David Welch has produced a highly original theory that will also do yeoman's work as an introductory text in foreign policy courses. His book is psychologically informed, eminently plausible, appropriatelyhedged, probed fairly in interesting cases, and extremely well written. Painful Choices is delightful reading."--Richard Ned Lebow, James O. Freedman Presidential Professor of Government, Dartmouth College

"Exceptionally well written, and mercifully free of jargon, this book is a major contribution to the field. By placing policy change at the core of the theory of foreign policy he seeks to develop, Welch deviates sharply from recent scholarship--and this is precisely the strength of his book. Not only will political scientists welcome the book but so too will historians, both because of the excellent case studies and because Welch is adept at using historical materials without distorting them to 'prove' some abstract theory."--Ole R. Holsti, George V. Allen Professor of Political Science, Duke University

"This very well written book addresses an area of international relations and foreign policy research that has received little attention in the field. The scholarship, both in the theoretical and empirical sections, is excellent; the research behind its case studies is first rate. Welch's writing is lively, and he effectively articulates complex ideas in easily digestible ways. No other work brings together institutional, psychological, and loss/gains-frame analysis like this book."--Scott Silverstone, Associate Professor of Political Science, United States Military Academy, West Point

The Virtual JFK DVD is now available For more information on the film companion to the book, visit http: //www.virtualjfk.com/ It Matters Who Is President Then and Now At the heart of this provocative book lies the fundamental question: Does it matter who is president on issues of war and peace? The Vietnam War was one of the most catastrophic and bloody in living memory, and its lessons take on resonance in light of America's current devastating involvement in Iraq. Tackling head-on the most controversial and debated "what if" in U.S. foreign policy, this unique work explores what President John F. Kennedy would have done in Vietnam if he had not been assassinated in 1963. Drawing on a wealth of recently declassified documents, frank oral testimony of White House officials from both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and the analysis of top historians, this book presents compelling evidence that JFK was ready to end U.S. involvement well before the conflict escalated. With vivid immediacy, readers will feel they are in the president's war room as the debates raged that forever changed the course of American history and continue to affect us profoundly today as the shadows of Vietnam stretch into Iraq."

Under what conditions should we expect states to do things radically differently all of a sudden? In this book, David Welch seeks to answer this question, constructing a theory of foreign policy change inspired by organization theory, cognitive and motivational psychology, and prospect theory. He then "test drives" the theory in a series of comparative case studies in the security and trade domains: Argentina's decision to go to war over the Falklands/Malvinas vs. Japan's endless patience with diplomacy in its conflict with Russia over the Northern Territories; America's decision to commit large-scale military force to Vietnam vs. its ultimate decision to withdraw; and Canada's two abortive flirtations with free trade with the United States in 1911 and 1948 vs. its embrace of free trade in the late 1980s. Painful Choices has three main objectives: to determine whether the general theory project in the field of international relations can be redeemed, given disappointment with previous attempts; to reflect on what this reveals about the possibilities and limits of general theory; and to inform policy. Welch argues that earlier efforts at general theory erred by aiming to explain state behavior, which is an intractable problem. Instead, since inertia is the default expectation in international politics, all we need do is to explain changes in behavior. Painful Choices shows that this is a tractable problem with clear implications for intelligence analysts and negotiators.

For decades, Japan's foreign policy has been seen by both internal and external observers as abnormal in relation to its size and level of sophistication. Japan as a 'Normal Country'? is a thematic and geographically comparative discussion of the unique limitations of Japanese foreign and defence policy. The contributors reappraise the definition of normality and ask whether Japan is indeed abnormal, what it would mean to become normal, and whether the country can--or should--become so.Identifying constraints such as an inflexible constitution, inherent antimilitarism, and its position as a U.S. security client, Japan as a 'Normal Country'? goes on to analyse factors that could make Japan a more effective regional and global player. These essays ultimately consider how Japan could leverage its considerable human, cultural, technological, and financial capital to benefit both its citizens and the world.

In The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History, Second Edition, Don Munton and David A. Welch distill the best current scholarship on the Cuban missile crisis into a brief and accessible narrative history. The authors draw on newly available documents to provide a comprehensive treatment of its causes, events, consequences, and significance. Stressing the importance of context in relation to the genesis, conduct, and resolution of the crisis, Munton and Welch examine events from the U.S., Soviet, and Cuban angles, revealing the vital role that differences in national perspectives played at every stage. While the book provides a concise, up-to-date look at this pivotal event, it also notes gaps and mysteries in the historical record and highlights important persistent interpretive disputes. The authors provide a detailed guide to relevant literature and film for those who wish to explore further. Commemorating the 50th anniversary of the crisis, this revised and updated edition of The Cuban Missile Crisis is ideal for undergraduate courses on the 1960s, U.S. foreign policy, the Cold War, twentieth-century world history, and comparative foreign policy. New to this Edition * Thoroughly revised to incorporate the latest scholarship * Expanded coverage of the Cuban dimension of the crisis * New Conclusion offers perspective on the significance of the crisis on its 50th anniversary

How do we know when we are investing wisely in security? Answering this question requires investigating what things are worth securing (and why); what threatens them; how best to protect them; and how to think about it. Is it possible to protect them? How best go about protecting them? What trade-offs are involved in allocating resources to security problems? This book responds to these questions by stripping down our preconceptions and rebuilding an understanding of security from the ground up on the basis of a common-sense ontology and an explicit theory of value. It argues for a clear distinction between objective and subjective security threats, a non-anthropocentric understanding of security, and a particular hierarchy of security referents, looking closely at four in particular-the ecosphere, the state, culture, and individual human beings. The analysis will be of interest not only to students and scholars of International Relations, but also to practitioners.

The Virtual JFK DVD is now available For more information on the film companion to the book, visit http: //www.virtualjfk.com/ It Matters Who Is President Then and Now At the heart of this provocative book lies the fundamental question: Does it matter who is president on issues of war and peace? The Vietnam War was one of the most catastrophic and bloody in living memory, and its lessons take on resonance in light of America's current devastating involvement in Iraq. Tackling head-on the most controversial and debated "what if" in U.S. foreign policy, this unique work explores what President John F. Kennedy would have done in Vietnam if he had not been assassinated in 1963. Drawing on a wealth of recently declassified documents, frank oral testimony of White House officials from both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and the analysis of top historians, this book presents compelling evidence that JFK was ready to end U.S. involvement well before the conflict escalated. With vivid immediacy, readers will feel they are in the president's war room as the debates raged that forever changed the course of American history and continue to affect us profoundly today as the shadows of Vietnam stretch into Iraq."

In this major study of the causes of war, David Welch argues that, contrary to the received wisdom in academic and policy circles, states are often motivated by sincere concern for the perceived demands of justice, not merely by self interest. By examining the outbreak of five Great Power wars (the Crimean War, the Franco-Prussian War, World War I, World War II, and the Falklands War), Welch demonstrates the importance of the justice motive in state behavior, using both historical and philosophical analysis to shed new light on an old problem.

Studies of the causes of wars generally presuppose a 'realist' account of motivation: when statesmen choose to wage war, they do so for purposes of self-preservation or self-aggrandizement. In this book, however, David Welch argues that humans are motivated by normative concerns, the pursuit of which may result in behaviour inconsistent with self-interest. He examines the effect of one particular type of normative motivation - the justice motive - in the outbreak of five Great Power wars: the Crimean war, the Franco-Prussian war, World War I, World War II, and the Falklands war. Realist theory would suggest that these wars would be among the least likely to be influenced by considerations other than power and interest, but the author demonstrates that the justice motive played an important role in the genesis of war, and that its neglect by theorists of international politics is a major oversight.