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Michael Wallerstein was a leader in developing a rigorous
comparative political economy approach to understanding substantive
issues of inequality, redistribution, and wage-determination. His
early death from cancer left both a hole in the profession and a
legacy that will surely provide the foundation for research on
these topics. This volume collects his most important and
influential contributions, organized by topic, with each topic
preceded by an editorial introduction that provides overview and
context.
Social choices, about expenditures on government programs, or about
public policy more broadly, or indeed from any conceivable set of
alternatives, are determined by politics. This book is a collection
of essays that tie together the fields spanned by Jeffrey S. Banks'
research on this subject. It examines the strategic aspects of
political decision-making, including the choices of voters in
committees, the positioning of candidates in electoral campaigns,
and the behavior of parties in legislatures. The chapters of this
book contribute to the theory of voting with incomplete
information, to the literature on Downsian and probabilistic voting
models of elections, to the theory of social choice in distributive
environments, and to the theory of optimal dynamic decision-making.
The essays employ a spectrum of research methods, from
game-theoretic analysis, to empirical investigation, to
experimental testing.
Michael Wallerstein was a leader in developing a rigorous
comparative political economy approach to understanding substantive
issues of inequality, redistribution, and wage-determination. His
early death from cancer left both a hole in the profession and a
legacy that will surely provide the foundation for research on
these topics. This volume collects his most important and
influential contributions, organized by topic, with each topic
preceded by an editorial introduction that provides overview and
context.
Social choices, about expenditures on government programs, or about
public policy more broadly, or indeed from any conceivable set of
alternatives, are determined by politics. This book is a collection
of essays that tie together the fields spanned by Jeffrey S. Banks'
research on this subject. It examines the strategic aspects of
political decision-making, including the choices of voters in
committees, the positioning of candidates in electoral campaigns,
and the behavior of parties in legislatures. The chapters of this
book contribute to the theory of voting with incomplete
information, to the literature on Downsian and probabilistic voting
models of elections, to the theory of social choice in distributive
environments, and to the theory of optimal dynamic decision-making.
The essays employ a spectrum of research methods, from
game-theoretic analysis, to empirical investigation, to
experimental testing.
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