In Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War, accomplished foreign relations historian David F. Shmitz provides students of US history and the Vietnam era with an up-to-date analysis of Nixon's Vietnam policy in a brief and accessible book that addresses the main controversies of the Nixon years. President Richard Nixon's first presidential term oversaw the definitive crucible of the Vietnam War. Nixon came into office seeking the kind of decisive victory that had eluded President Johnson, and went about expanding the war, overtly and covertly, in order to uphold a policy of "containment," protect America's credibility, and defy the left's antiwar movement at home. Tactically, politically, Nixon's moves made sense. However, by 1971 the president was forced to significantly de-escalate the American presence and seek a negotiated end to the war, which is now accepted as an American defeat, and a resounding failure of American foreign relations. Schmitz addresses the main controversies of Nixon's Vietnam strategy, and in so doing manages to trace back the ways in which this most calculating and perceptive politician wound up resigning from office a fraud and failure. Finally, the book seeks to place the impact of Nixon's policies and decisions in the larger context of post-World War II American society, and analyzes the full costs of the Vietnam War that the nation feels to this day.

In Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War, accomplished foreign relations historian David F. Shmitz provides students of US history and the Vietnam era with an up-to-date analysis of Nixon's Vietnam policy in a brief and accessible book that addresses the main controversies of the Nixon years. President Richard Nixon's first presidential term oversaw the definitive crucible of the Vietnam War. Nixon came into office seeking the kind of decisive victory that had eluded President Johnson, and went about expanding the war, overtly and covertly, in order to uphold a policy of "containment," protect America's credibility, and defy the left's antiwar movement at home. Tactically, politically, Nixon's moves made sense. However, by 1971 the president was forced to significantly de-escalate the American presence and seek a negotiated end to the war, which is now accepted as an American defeat, and a resounding failure of American foreign relations. Schmitz addresses the main controversies of Nixon's Vietnam strategy, and in so doing manages to trace back the ways in which this most calculating and perceptive politician wound up resigning from office a fraud and failure. Finally, the book seeks to place the impact of Nixon's policies and decisions in the larger context of post-World War II American society, and analyzes the full costs of the Vietnam War that the nation feels to this day.

The twentieth century witnessed the rise of the United States as the preeminent player on the world stage. While many individuals were responsible for the American ascension, few have left a larger legacy in the arena of foreign policy than Henry L. Stimson. Serving nearly every American president from Theodore Roosevelt to Harry S. Truman, Stimson shaped America's worldview and influenced America's foreign affairs decisions for over 40 years. A Republican, Stimson served as Secretary of War under William H. Taft (1911-13), Secretary of State under Herbert Hoover (1929-33), and Secretary of War for Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman (1940-45); in addition, he fought in World War I, initiated the Good Neighbor Policy in Central America, and served as Governor General of the Philippines (1927-29). In this new book, David Schmitz reveals how the life of Stimson provides a unique framework for analyzing America's foreign policy development from the imperialism of the 1890s to the origins of the Cold War and the emergence of the United States as the world's leading power after World War II. The author also explains the continuities in foreign policy over this period and the emergence of the internationalist perspective over isolation-ism, showing how Stimson was able to pass along his perspec-tives to the next generation of American policymakers who after World War II established the internationalist mindset of the Cold War years. Stimson's crucial role in the development and use of the atomic bomb is also examined. Henry L. Stimson: The First Wise Man is useful for courses in United States foreign policy, World War II, American history from 1900-1945, and survey courses in U.S. history.

On January 30, 1968 approximately 84,000 North Vietnamese Army and National Liberation Front forces launched nearly simultaneous attacks against over 100 cities and military installations in South Vietnam. The well-coordinated urban attacks came during the most sacred of Vietnamese holidays and caught American commanders by surprise. The results of the Tet Offensive were monumental, tens of thousands were killed and many more wounded. But its importance goes far beyond its military outcome to the powerful political, psychological, and economic impact in the United States. In this new work, historian David F. Schmitz analyzes what is arguably the most important event in the history of the Vietnam conflict. Schmitz situates the Tet Offensive in the context of American foreign policy and the state of the war up to 1968 while carefully considering the impact of the media on American public opinion. Through his up-to-date analysis of recently available sources, Schmitz works to dispel myths and clarify the central debates surrounding this pivotal event that brought an end to American escalation of the war and led to LBJ's decision to withdraw from the presidential race.

When Franklin D. Roosevelt became president in March 1933, he initially devoted most of his attention to finding a solution to the Great Depression. But the pull of war and the results of FDR's foreign policy ultimately had a deeper and more transformative impact on U.S. history. "The Triumph of Internationalism" offers a fresh, concise analysis and narrative of FDR's foreign policy from 1933 to America's entry into World War II in 1941. David Schmitz covers the attempts to solve the international economic crisis of the Great Depression, the Good Neighbor Policy in Latin America, the U.S. response to war in Europe and the Pacific, and other topics of this turbulent era. Schmitz describes Roosevelt as an internationalist who set out to promote U.S. interests abroad short of direct intervention. He tried to make amends for past transgressions with the nation's southern neighbors, eventually attempted to open and promote international trade to foster economic growth, and pursued containment policies intended to halt both the Japanese threat in the Pacific through deterrence and German aggression in Europe through economic appeasement. When his policies regarding the Axis powers failed, he began educating the American public about the dangers of Axis hegemony and rearming the nation for war. This effort required a profound shift in the American mind-set, given the prevailing isolationism, the disillusionment with America's involvement in World War I, and the preoccupation with domestic problems. A less powerful president would likely have failed, or perhaps not even attempted, to alter the prevailing public opinion. FDR revived American internationalism and reshaped the public'sunderstanding of the national interest and defense. Roosevelt's policies and the outcome of World War II made the United States a superpower without equal.

A comprehensive analysis of American foreign policy and Mussolini's Italy. Schmitz argues that the U.S. desire for order, interest in Open Door trade, and concern about left-wing revolution led American policymakers to welcome Mussolini's coming to power and to support fascism in Italy for most of the interwar period.
Originally published in 1988.
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Despite its avowed commitment to liberalism and democracy internationally, the United States has frequently chosen to back repressive or authoritarian regimes in parts of the world. In this comprehensive examination of American support of right-wing dictatorships. David Schmitz challenges the contention that the democratic impulse has consistently motivated U.S. foreign policy. Compelled by a persistent concern for order and influenced by a paternalistic racism that characterized non-Western peoples as vulnerable to radical ideas, U.S. policymakers viewed authoritarian regimes as the only vehicles for maintaining political stability and encouraging economic growth in nations such as Nicaragua and Iran, Schmitz argues. Expediency overcame ideology, he says, and the United States gained useful - albeit brutal and corrupt - allies who supported American policies and provided a favorable atmosphere for U.S. trade. But such policy was not without its critics and did not remain static, Schmitz notes. Instead, its influence waxed and waned over the course of five decades, until the U.S. interventions in Vietnam marked its culmination.

Building on Schmitz's earlier work, Thank God They're On Our Side, this is an examination of American policy toward right-wing dictatorships from the 1960s to the end of the Cold War. During the 1920s American leaders developed a policy of supporting authoritarian regimes because they were seen as stable, anti-communist, and capitalist. After 1965, however, American support for these regimes became a contested issue. The Vietnam War served to undercut the logic and rationale of supporting right-wing dictators. By systematically examining U.S. support for right-wing dictatorships in Africa, Latin America, Europe, and Asia, and bringing together these disparate episodes, this book examines the persistence of older attitudes, the new debates brought about by the Vietnam War, and the efforts to bring about changes and an end to automatic U.S. support for authoritarian regimes.

Building on Schmitz's earlier work, Thank God They're On Our Side, this is an examination of American policy toward right-wing dictatorships from the 1960s to the end of the Cold War. During the 1920s American leaders developed a policy of supporting authoritarian regimes because they were seen as stable, anti-communist, and capitalist. After 1965, however, American support for these regimes became a contested issue. The Vietnam War served to undercut the logic and rationale of supporting right-wing dictators. By systematically examining U.S. support for right-wing dictatorships in Africa, Latin America, Europe, and Asia, and bringing together these disparate episodes, this book examines the persistence of older attitudes, the new debates brought about by the Vietnam War, and the efforts to bring about changes and an end to automatic U.S. support for authoritarian regimes.

This collection of essays representing new thought on U.S. appeasement policy in 1930's Europe enlarges the traditional focus of research beyond United States-German relations by investigating American appeasement policy toward different nations. Zeroing in on the ideology of policymakers and the influences of various groups on the development of appeasement policy during the Roosevelt administration, the essays pose new questions about the role of antibolshevism, examine appeasement as one part of the quest for stability and peace in Europe, and provide different and illuminating insights not only on appeasement but also on the nature of U.S. foreign policy prior to World War II. The new scholarship presented here contributes to a more complete understanding of how the United States responded to the challenge of fascism in Europe during the 1930s. Schmitz's introduction defines appeasement and discusses why and how the policy was formulated and in what respects it differed from the policy of Great Britain. The book outlines European political conditions of the period and how U.S. appeasement policy sought to prevent German and Italian aggression by either applying economic pressure or offering incentives for cooperation with Western democracies. In the first chapter by Wayne S. Cole, the three distinct schools of historical interpretation that have emerged to explain U.S. appeasement policy are reviewed and assessed. Where as the ideological dimensions of appeasement have been long overlooked by historians, Douglas Little's chapter on the British and American responses to the Spanish Civil War addresses the problem of how to contain the right without aiding Soviet foreign policy. Chapter three, by Jane Karoline Vieth, reexamines the crucial events leading up to the Munich agreement and its aftermath through a study of the thoughts and actions of Neville Chamberlain, Roosevelt, and Joseph P. Kennedy, and their critics. In chapter four, Schmitz investigates how prior American experience with Fascist Italy influenced U.S. policy toward Nazi Germany and motivated attempts to use Mussolini as a moderating force on Hitler. Chapter four also deals with material that is crucial for understanding American policy: the question of Roosevelt's response to British appeasement. The concluding essay by Richard A. Harrison examines possible U.S. and British alternatives to Chamberlain's appeasement policies that could have been employed. Appeasement in Europe will aid historians, students, and informed general readers in attaining a more complete understanding of American appeasement policy within the broader context of U.S. diplomacy during the 1930s.