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In Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War, accomplished foreign
relations historian David F. Shmitz provides students of US history
and the Vietnam era with an up-to-date analysis of Nixon's Vietnam
policy in a brief and accessible book that addresses the main
controversies of the Nixon years. President Richard Nixon's first
presidential term oversaw the definitive crucible of the Vietnam
War. Nixon came into office seeking the kind of decisive victory
that had eluded President Johnson, and went about expanding the
war, overtly and covertly, in order to uphold a policy of
"containment," protect America's credibility, and defy the left's
antiwar movement at home. Tactically, politically, Nixon's moves
made sense. However, by 1971 the president was forced to
significantly de-escalate the American presence and seek a
negotiated end to the war, which is now accepted as an American
defeat, and a resounding failure of American foreign relations.
Schmitz addresses the main controversies of Nixon's Vietnam
strategy, and in so doing manages to trace back the ways in which
this most calculating and perceptive politician wound up resigning
from office a fraud and failure. Finally, the book seeks to place
the impact of Nixon's policies and decisions in the larger context
of post-World War II American society, and analyzes the full costs
of the Vietnam War that the nation feels to this day.
In Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War, accomplished foreign
relations historian David F. Shmitz provides students of US history
and the Vietnam era with an up-to-date analysis of Nixon's Vietnam
policy in a brief and accessible book that addresses the main
controversies of the Nixon years. President Richard Nixon's first
presidential term oversaw the definitive crucible of the Vietnam
War. Nixon came into office seeking the kind of decisive victory
that had eluded President Johnson, and went about expanding the
war, overtly and covertly, in order to uphold a policy of
"containment," protect America's credibility, and defy the left's
antiwar movement at home. Tactically, politically, Nixon's moves
made sense. However, by 1971 the president was forced to
significantly de-escalate the American presence and seek a
negotiated end to the war, which is now accepted as an American
defeat, and a resounding failure of American foreign relations.
Schmitz addresses the main controversies of Nixon's Vietnam
strategy, and in so doing manages to trace back the ways in which
this most calculating and perceptive politician wound up resigning
from office a fraud and failure. Finally, the book seeks to place
the impact of Nixon's policies and decisions in the larger context
of post-World War II American society, and analyzes the full costs
of the Vietnam War that the nation feels to this day.
The twentieth century witnessed the rise of the United States as
the preeminent player on the world stage. While many individuals
were responsible for the American ascension, few have left a larger
legacy in the arena of foreign policy than Henry L. Stimson.
Serving nearly every American president from Theodore Roosevelt to
Harry S. Truman, Stimson shaped America's worldview and influenced
America's foreign affairs decisions for over 40 years. A
Republican, Stimson served as Secretary of War under William H.
Taft (1911-13), Secretary of State under Herbert Hoover (1929-33),
and Secretary of War for Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman
(1940-45); in addition, he fought in World War I, initiated the
Good Neighbor Policy in Central America, and served as Governor
General of the Philippines (1927-29). In this new book, David
Schmitz reveals how the life of Stimson provides a unique framework
for analyzing America's foreign policy development from the
imperialism of the 1890s to the origins of the Cold War and the
emergence of the United States as the world's leading power after
World War II. The author also explains the continuities in foreign
policy over this period and the emergence of the internationalist
perspective over isolation-ism, showing how Stimson was able to
pass along his perspec-tives to the next generation of American
policymakers who after World War II established the
internationalist mindset of the Cold War years. Stimson's crucial
role in the development and use of the atomic bomb is also
examined. Henry L. Stimson: The First Wise Man is useful for
courses in United States foreign policy, World War II, American
history from 1900-1945, and survey courses in U.S. history.
On January 30, 1968 approximately 84,000 North Vietnamese Army and
National Liberation Front forces launched nearly simultaneous
attacks against over 100 cities and military installations in South
Vietnam. The well-coordinated urban attacks came during the most
sacred of Vietnamese holidays and caught American commanders by
surprise. The results of the Tet Offensive were monumental, tens of
thousands were killed and many more wounded. But its importance
goes far beyond its military outcome to the powerful political,
psychological, and economic impact in the United States. In this
new work, historian David F. Schmitz analyzes what is arguably the
most important event in the history of the Vietnam conflict.
Schmitz situates the Tet Offensive in the context of American
foreign policy and the state of the war up to 1968 while carefully
considering the impact of the media on American public opinion.
Through his up-to-date analysis of recently available sources,
Schmitz works to dispel myths and clarify the central debates
surrounding this pivotal event that brought an end to American
escalation of the war and led to LBJ's decision to withdraw from
the presidential race.
When Franklin D. Roosevelt became president in March 1933, he
initially devoted most of his attention to finding a solution to
the Great Depression. But the pull of war and the results of FDR's
foreign policy ultimately had a deeper and more transformative
impact on U.S. history. "The Triumph of Internationalism" offers a
fresh, concise analysis and narrative of FDR's foreign policy from
1933 to America's entry into World War II in 1941. David Schmitz
covers the attempts to solve the international economic crisis of
the Great Depression, the Good Neighbor Policy in Latin America,
the U.S. response to war in Europe and the Pacific, and other
topics of this turbulent era. Schmitz describes Roosevelt as an
internationalist who set out to promote U.S. interests abroad short
of direct intervention. He tried to make amends for past
transgressions with the nation's southern neighbors, eventually
attempted to open and promote international trade to foster
economic growth, and pursued containment policies intended to halt
both the Japanese threat in the Pacific through deterrence and
German aggression in Europe through economic appeasement. When his
policies regarding the Axis powers failed, he began educating the
American public about the dangers of Axis hegemony and rearming the
nation for war. This effort required a profound shift in the
American mind-set, given the prevailing isolationism, the
disillusionment with America's involvement in World War I, and the
preoccupation with domestic problems. A less powerful president
would likely have failed, or perhaps not even attempted, to alter
the prevailing public opinion. FDR revived American
internationalism and reshaped the public'sunderstanding of the
national interest and defense. Roosevelt's policies and the outcome
of World War II made the United States a superpower without equal.
A comprehensive analysis of American foreign policy and Mussolini's
Italy. Schmitz argues that the U.S. desire for order, interest in
Open Door trade, and concern about left-wing revolution led
American policymakers to welcome Mussolini's coming to power and to
support fascism in Italy for most of the interwar period.
Originally published in 1988.
A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the
latest in digital technology to make available again books from our
distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These
editions are published unaltered from the original, and are
presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both
historical and cultural value.
Despite its avowed commitment to liberalism and democracy
internationally, the United States has frequently chosen to back
repressive or authoritarian regimes in parts of the world. In this
comprehensive examination of American support of right-wing
dictatorships. David Schmitz challenges the contention that the
democratic impulse has consistently motivated U.S. foreign policy.
Compelled by a persistent concern for order and influenced by a
paternalistic racism that characterized non-Western peoples as
vulnerable to radical ideas, U.S. policymakers viewed authoritarian
regimes as the only vehicles for maintaining political stability
and encouraging economic growth in nations such as Nicaragua and
Iran, Schmitz argues. Expediency overcame ideology, he says, and
the United States gained useful - albeit brutal and corrupt -
allies who supported American policies and provided a favorable
atmosphere for U.S. trade. But such policy was not without its
critics and did not remain static, Schmitz notes. Instead, its
influence waxed and waned over the course of five decades, until
the U.S. interventions in Vietnam marked its culmination.
Building on Schmitz's earlier work, Thank God They're On Our Side,
this is an examination of American policy toward right-wing
dictatorships from the 1960s to the end of the Cold War. During the
1920s American leaders developed a policy of supporting
authoritarian regimes because they were seen as stable,
anti-communist, and capitalist. After 1965, however, American
support for these regimes became a contested issue. The Vietnam War
served to undercut the logic and rationale of supporting right-wing
dictators. By systematically examining U.S. support for right-wing
dictatorships in Africa, Latin America, Europe, and Asia, and
bringing together these disparate episodes, this book examines the
persistence of older attitudes, the new debates brought about by
the Vietnam War, and the efforts to bring about changes and an end
to automatic U.S. support for authoritarian regimes.
Building on Schmitz's earlier work, Thank God They're On Our Side,
this is an examination of American policy toward right-wing
dictatorships from the 1960s to the end of the Cold War. During the
1920s American leaders developed a policy of supporting
authoritarian regimes because they were seen as stable,
anti-communist, and capitalist. After 1965, however, American
support for these regimes became a contested issue. The Vietnam War
served to undercut the logic and rationale of supporting right-wing
dictators. By systematically examining U.S. support for right-wing
dictatorships in Africa, Latin America, Europe, and Asia, and
bringing together these disparate episodes, this book examines the
persistence of older attitudes, the new debates brought about by
the Vietnam War, and the efforts to bring about changes and an end
to automatic U.S. support for authoritarian regimes.
This collection of essays representing new thought on U.S.
appeasement policy in 1930's Europe enlarges the traditional focus
of research beyond United States-German relations by investigating
American appeasement policy toward different nations. Zeroing in on
the ideology of policymakers and the influences of various groups
on the development of appeasement policy during the Roosevelt
administration, the essays pose new questions about the role of
antibolshevism, examine appeasement as one part of the quest for
stability and peace in Europe, and provide different and
illuminating insights not only on appeasement but also on the
nature of U.S. foreign policy prior to World War II. The new
scholarship presented here contributes to a more complete
understanding of how the United States responded to the challenge
of fascism in Europe during the 1930s. Schmitz's introduction
defines appeasement and discusses why and how the policy was
formulated and in what respects it differed from the policy of
Great Britain. The book outlines European political conditions of
the period and how U.S. appeasement policy sought to prevent German
and Italian aggression by either applying economic pressure or
offering incentives for cooperation with Western democracies. In
the first chapter by Wayne S. Cole, the three distinct schools of
historical interpretation that have emerged to explain U.S.
appeasement policy are reviewed and assessed. Where as the
ideological dimensions of appeasement have been long overlooked by
historians, Douglas Little's chapter on the British and American
responses to the Spanish Civil War addresses the problem of how to
contain the right without aiding Soviet foreign policy. Chapter
three, by Jane Karoline Vieth, reexamines the crucial events
leading up to the Munich agreement and its aftermath through a
study of the thoughts and actions of Neville Chamberlain,
Roosevelt, and Joseph P. Kennedy, and their critics. In chapter
four, Schmitz investigates how prior American experience with
Fascist Italy influenced U.S. policy toward Nazi Germany and
motivated attempts to use Mussolini as a moderating force on
Hitler. Chapter four also deals with material that is crucial for
understanding American policy: the question of Roosevelt's response
to British appeasement. The concluding essay by Richard A. Harrison
examines possible U.S. and British alternatives to Chamberlain's
appeasement policies that could have been employed. Appeasement in
Europe will aid historians, students, and informed general readers
in attaining a more complete understanding of American appeasement
policy within the broader context of U.S. diplomacy during the
1930s.
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