In the wake of the worst U.S. financial crisis since the Great Depression, Congress passed and the President signed into law sweeping reforms of the financial services regulatory system through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), P.L. 111-203. Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act is entitled the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 (CFP Act). The CFP Act establishes the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB or Bureau) within the Federal Reserve System (FRS) with rulemaking, enforcement, and supervisory powers over many consumer financial products and services, as well as the entities that sell them. The CFP Act significantly enhances federal consumer protection regulatory authority over nondepository financial institutions, potentially subjecting them to analogous supervisory, examination, and enforcement standards that have been applicable to depository institutions in the past. The act also transfers to the Bureau much of the consumer compliance authority over larger depositories that previously had been held by banking regulators. Additionally, the Bureau acquired the authority to write rules to implement most federal consumer financial protection laws that previously was held by a number of other federal agencies. Although the powers that the CFPB has at its disposal are largely the same or analogous to those that other federal regulators have held for decades, there is a great deal of uncertainty in how the new agency will exercise these broad and flexible authorities, especially in light of its almost exclusive focus on consumer protection. As a result, the CFP Act has proven to be one of the more controversial portions of the financial reform legislation. The 112th Congress is actively involved in conducting oversight of the implementation of the CFP Act. Additionally, the 112th Congress has considered a number of bills that would significantly alter the structure of the Bureau. For example, H.R. 2434, the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2012, would make the CFPB's primary funding subject to the traditional appropriations process, and H.R. 1315, the Consumer Financial Protection Safety and Soundness Improvement Act, would convert the CFPB's leadership structure from a sole directorship to a commission and would allow the newly established Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to overturn CFPB-issued regulations with a simple majority vote, as opposed to the current super majority requirement. H.R. 2434 was reported favorably out of the House Committee on Appropriations, and H.R. 1315 was referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs after passing the full House by a vote of 241 to 173. Additionally, 44 Senators signed a letter to the President expressing support for the Bureau-related objectives of H.R. 2434 and H.R. 1315. This report provides an overview of the regulatory structure of consumer finance under existing federal law before the Dodd-Frank Act went into effect and examines arguments for modifying the regime in order to more effectively regulate consumer financial markets. It then analyzes how the CFP Act changes that legal structure, with a focus on the Bureau's organization; the entities and activities that fall (and do not fall) under the Bureau's supervisory, enforcement, and rulemaking authorities; the Bureau's general and specific rulemaking powers and procedures; and the Bureau's funding.

Throughout the history of social assistance programs, administrators have attempted to limit access only to those families considered "worthy" of assistance. Policies about worthiness have included both judgments about need-generally tied to income, demographic characteristics, or family circumstances-and judgments about moral character, often as evidenced by behavior. Past policies evaluating moral character based on family structure have been replaced by today's policies, which focus on criminal activity, particularly drug-related criminal activity. The existing crime and drug-related restrictions were established in the late 1980s through the mid-1990s, when crime rates, especially drug-related violent crime rates, were at peak levels. While crime rates have since declined, interest in expanding these policies has continued. The three programs examined in this report-the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly Food Stamps), and federal housing assistance programs (public housing and Section 8 tenant and project-based assistance)-are similar, in that they are administered at the state or local level. They are different in the forms of assistance they provide. TANF provides cash assistance and other supports to low-income parents and their children, with a specific focus on promoting work. SNAP provides food assistance to a broader set of poor households including families with children, elderly households, and persons with disabilities. The housing assistance programs offer subsidized rental housing to all types of poor families, like SNAP. All three programs feature some form of drug- and other crime-related restrictions and all three leave discretion in applying those restrictions to state and local administrators. Both TANF and SNAP are subject to the statutory "drug felon ban," which bars states from providing assistance to persons convicted of a drug-related felony, but also gives states the ability to opt-out of or modify the ban, which most states have done. Housing assistance programs are not subject to the drug felon ban, but they are subject to a set of policies that allow local program administrators to deny or terminate assistance to persons involved in drug-related or other criminal activity. Housing law also includes mandatory restrictions related to specific crimes, including sex offenses and methamphetamine production. All three programs also have specific restrictions related to fugitive felons. Recently, the issue of drug testing in federal assistance programs has risen in prominence. In the case of TANF, states are permitted to drug-test recipients; however, state policies involving suspicionless drug testing of TANF applicants and recipients are currently being challenged in courts. SNAP law does not explicitly address drug testing, but given the way that SNAP and TANF law interact, state TANF drug testing policies may affect SNAP participants. The laws governing housing assistance programs are silent on the topic of drug testing. The current set of crime- and drug-related restrictions in federal assistance programs are not consistent across programs, meaning that similarly situated persons may have different experiences based on where they live and what assistance they are seeking. This variation may be considered important, in that it reflects a stated policy goal of local discretion. However, the variation may also be considered problematic if it leads to confusion among eligible recipients as to what assistance they are eligible for or if the variation is seen as inequitable. Proposals to modify these policies also highlight a tension that exists between the desire to use these policies as a deterrent or punishment and the desire to support the neediest families, including those that have ex-offenders in the household.